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F r o m  a  H u m a n  R i g h t  t o  D e m o c r a c y  t o  a  H u m a n  R i g h t  t o  
V o i c e   
Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende kumulative Dissertation befasst sich mit der Frage, ob die Forderung nach ei-
nem Menschenrecht auf Demokratie normativ gerechtfertigt werden kann. In der in der Form 
eines wissenschaftlichen Artikels publizierten Vorstudie „Moral and political conceptions of 
human rights: rethinking the distinction“, werden zunächst zwei prominente Weisen der nor-
mativen Rechtfertigung von Menschenrechtsforderungen verglichen: moralphilosophische und 
politikphilosophische. (Teil 1) Anhand der Auseinandersetzung mit dieser etablierten Unter-
scheidung wird für den Sinn der Aufrechterhaltung einer humanistischen Menschenrechtsauf-
fassung als Grundlage für sowohl moral- wie für politikphilosophische Menschenrechtstheorien 
argumentiert. Dies geschieht mit Bezug auf ein anerkennungstheoretisches Menschenbild, das 
die soziale, intersubjektive Grundbedingung der menschlichen Existenz als zentralen normati-
ven Referenzpunkt des politischen Denkens hervorhebt. Auf der Grundlage dieser Vorstudie 
leistet der monographische Hauptteil der Dissertation unter dem Titel „The Human Right to 
Democracy. A Critical Evaluation“ eine exegetisch-kritische Aufarbeitung des aktuellen For-
schungsstandes in der philosophischen Debatte um ein Menschenrecht auf Demokratie. (Teil 2) 
Das Buch endet mit dem originären Vorschlag, die Forderung nach einem Menschenrecht auf 
demokratische Regierung durch ein Menschenrecht auf Stimme („human right to voice“) zu er-
setzen. Den Schluss der Dissertation bildet eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem gegenwärtigen 
Stand der Anerkennungstheorie von Axel Honneth. (Teil 3) Der Artikel „Anerkennung und 
Freiheit: Subjekttheoretische Grundlagen einer Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit“ erlaubt ei-
ne subjekttheoretische Vertiefung und Begründung der Forderung nach einem Recht auf 
Stimme, wie es im zweiten Teil der Dissertation eingeführt wurde. 
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SYNOPSE  
T E I L  1  :  A R T I K E L  «  M O R A L  A N D   P O L I T I C A L  CONC E P T I -
O N S  O F  H U M A N  R I G H T S .  R E T H I N K I N G  T H E  D I S T I NC -
T I O N  »  
 
Der im Februar 2016 publizierte wissenschaftliche Artikel „Moral and politi-
cal conceptions of human rights: rethinking the distinction.“ (in: The International 
Journal of Human Rights, Februar 2016) eröffnet die Diskussion um ein Menschen-
recht auf Demokratie anhand einer grundsätzlichen Auseinandersetzung mit 
dem gegenwärtigen Verständnis des Begriffs der Menschenrechte in der Politi-
schen Philosophie. Diese Vorstudie vertieft den Einblick in die philosophischen 
Begründungslogiken der zeitgenössischen Menschenrechtsdebatte. Ausgegan-
gen wird von der Kritik des Moralphilosophen James Griffin. Der Begriff der 
Menschenrechte, einst als unumstössliches Symbol zum Schutz der intrinsi-
schen Menschenwürde verstanden, wird gegenwärtig je nach Verwendungszu-
sammenhang in der Ethik, dem Bereich des Internationalen Rechts oder in der 
Sphäre des politischen Lebens anders gedeutet. Wenn Griffin moniert, dass es 
für jeden Bereich einen separaten theoretischen Ansatz brauchen würde, ver-
weist er damit auf eine grundsätzliche Unterbestimmung des moralischen, sub-
stantiellen Gehalts der Menschenrechte. Diese moralphilosophische Unterbe-
stimmtheit erschwert die Interpretation der Menschenrechte in der Praxis, bei-
spielsweise bei der Anwendung des Internationalen Rechts. Die Menschenrech-
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te können nicht mehr selbstverständlich in der naturrechtlichen Tradition als 
Rechte, die dem Menschen aufgrund seines Menschseins zukommen, definiert 
werden. Je nach kulturellem oder religiösem Hintergrund, moralischem oder 
anthropologischem Fokus werden unterschiedlich Rechte als substantielle Men-
schenrechte betrachtet. Ausgehend von dieser Schwierigkeit, sich auf eine ein-
heitliche Begründung von Menschenrechten zu einigen, haben sich seit dem 
Zweiten Weltkrieg zwei Denktraditionen manifestiert, die sich als moralische 
und politische Konzeptionen bezeichnen lassen. Während die moralischen 
Konzeptionen an einer moralisch intrinsischen oder anthropologischen Be-
stimmung des Menschenrechtsbegriffs festhalten, definieren politische Konzep-
tionen Menschenrechte als konventionell bestimmte Normen, die primär eine 
instrumentelle Rolle bei der Regulierung Internationaler Beziehungen spielen. 
Im Artikel werden zunächst die historischen Entwicklungen aufgezeigt, die 
zur Verstärkung der politischen Tradition geführt haben. Die Analyse der phi-
losophischen Argumentationsweise zeigt, dass die politischen Konzeptionen 
grundsätzliche Schwierigkeiten haben, Menschenrechte ohne substantielle An-
leihen bei den moralischen Konzeptionen überzeugend zu definieren. Umge-
kehrt wirken moralische Konzeptionen nur dann glaubwürdig, wenn sie die 
praktischen Einwände der politischen Konzeptionen adressieren. U.a. aufgrund 
dieser Einsichten wird deshalb geschlussfolgert, dass die Unterscheidung zwi-
schen moralischen und politischen Konzeptionen grundsätzlich in Frage zu stel-
len ist. Es wird in Anlehnung an den Vorschlag des Philosophen Paolo Gilabert 
eine Unterscheidung von abstrakten und spezifischen Menschenrechten einge-
führt, die darauf verweist, dass sowohl die moralphilosophischen wie die politi-
schen Überlegungen in eine glaubwürdige Menschenrechtstheorie integriert 
werden müssen. Gilabert’s Grundidee ist, dass moralische und politische Kon-
zeptionen im Tandem funktionieren sollten. In der Weiterentwicklung dieser 
Idee argumentiere ich dafür, dass ein gemeinsamer moralischer Standpunkt, 
der in einer institutionalisierten Form am internationalen runden Tisch immer 
wieder von neuem evaluiert und diskutiert wird, unverzichtbar ist, sofern die 
Menschenrechte ihren Stellenwert als universelle moralische Referenzgrösse  
(re-)etablieren wollen. Um einen geteilten moralischen Standpunkt zu finden, 
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wird von einem Menschenbild ausgegangen, das neben der Erörterung von all-
gemein menschlichen Interessen und Bedürfnissen insbesondere die soziale Na-
tur des Menschen ins Zentrum stellt. Die Grenzen des menschlichen wechselsei-
tigen Verstehens und die globalen Unterschiede im kulturellen, religiösen Seins- 
und Wertverständnis müssen als soziale und psychologische Voraussetzungen in 
den normativen Menschenrechtsdiskurs integriert werden. Im Anschluss an die 
anerkennungstheoretischen Beiträge von Axel Honneth und an die humanisti-
sche, individualrechtliche Begründungsweise der Menschenrechte im Sinne von 
Gilabert mache ich den erweiterten Vorschlag, neben der individualrechtlich 
begründeten Ebene der Menschenrechte den Begriff der Kosmopolitischen 
Rechte einzuführen. Der Begriff der Kosmopolitischen Rechte würde diejeni-
gen Rechtsforderungen umfassen, die nicht aus der unmittelbaren Bedürfnisla-
ge des betroffenen Subjekts erhoben werden können, jedoch aufgrund der glo-
balen Interdependenz von übergenerationellen und langfristigen Effekten im 
gegenwärtigen historischen Kontext von einem moralphilosophischen Stand-
punkt aus als menschenrechtlich relevant identifiziert werden können.  
Ziel des ersten Teils der Dissertation war es aufzuzeigen, dass der allgemeine 
Menschenrechtsdiskurs gegenwärtig von einer Spaltung zwischen einem ur-
sprünglich naturrechtlichen und einem politischen Verständnis der Menschen-
rechte geprägt ist. Hinter den unterschiedlichen Lesarten verbergen sich unter-
schiedliche Menschenbilder und unterschiedliche Zweckbestimmungen der 
Menschenrechte. Bei genauer Betrachtung zeigen sich jedoch nicht nur Unter-
schiede, sondern grundsätzliche Gemeinsamkeiten der Argumentation. Solange 
diese nicht transparent gemacht werden, ist der Dialog zwischen den verschie-
denen Ansätzen erschwert. Die vorgeschlagene Versöhnung zwischen morali-
schen und politischen Konzeptionen im ersten Teil der Dissertation ist für die 
in Teil 2 folgende Auseinandersetzung mit der spezifischen Frage nach dem 
Menschenrecht auf Demokratie relevant. Um die einzelnen Positionen in der 
Debatte um ein Menschenrecht auf Demokratie konstruktiv zu vergleichen, 
müssen die Beiträge zunächst entsprechend ihrer Grundorientierung geordnet 
und ausgelegt werden. 
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T E I L  2  :  MONOGRA PH I E  «  T H E  H U M A N  R I G H T  T O  D E -
M O C R A C Y .  A  C R I T I C A L  E V A L U A T I O N »  
 
Der zweite und umfassendste Teil der Dissertation besteht aus einem Buch-
manuskript unter dem Titel „The Human Right to Democracy. A Critical Eva-
luation“. Diese Studie beschreibt zunächst die Entstehung der philosophischen 
Debatte um ein Menschenrecht auf Demokratie (MRD). Die wichtigsten Bei-
träge zur MRD-Debatte, die 2004 durch einen Artikel des Rawls Schülers Jos-
hua Cohen lanciert wurde, werden diskutiert. Nach diesem Debattenüberblick 
werden die Positionen bezüglich von Vereinbarkeiten und Divergenzen der Ar-
gumentation verglichen. Der Schlussteil des Buches befasst sich mit der Forde-
rung nach einem Recht auf Stimme („human right to voice“), das alternativ zu 
einem Menschenrecht auf Demokratie vorgeschlagen wird. Dieses Recht auf 
Stimme wird als normativer Kern des Rechts auf Demokratie identifiziert und 
aus einer anerkennungstheoretischen Perspektive philosophisch begründet. 
Nachdem im ersten Teil der Dissertation verschiedene Auffassungen des 
Menschenrechtsbegriffs im Zentrum standen, geht es im zweiten Teil um die 
Erörterung der Frage, ob das Recht auf „Demokratie“ zum Menschenrecht er-
hoben werden soll. Hierbei ist zunächst erneut eine begriffsanalytische Bestim-
mung notwendig, um zu definieren, was unter „Demokratie“ im Sinne einer 
Menschenrechtsforderung verstanden werden kann. Ein Blick in die Debatte 
um die Frage nach einem Menschenrecht auf Demokratie zeigt, dass die Forde-
rung nach Demokratie nicht einheitlich definiert ist. Bei einigen Autoren wird 
das Menschenrecht auf Demokratie als minimale Forderung auf politische Par-
tizipation des Einzelnen verstanden, bei anderen beinhaltet es den umfassenden 
Anspruch einer jeden politischen Gemeinschaft auf demokratische Regierung, 
einschliesslich egalitär-demokratischer Institutionen, Prozeduren und Rechte. 
Neben den menschenrechtlichen Theorien unterscheiden sich entsprechend 
auch die Argumente, mit denen für oder gegen ein Menschenrecht auf Demo-
kratie eingestanden wird. Um die verschiedenen Ansätze zu systematisieren, 
habe ich eine vierfache kategoriale Unterscheidung eingeführt. Gemäss dieser 
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vierfachen Einteilung („the fourfold map“) lassen sich die Positionen der Debat-
te zum einen nach den moralischen und politischen Schwerpunkten der Be-
gründung einordnen, zum anderen gemäss der entweder intrinsischen oder in-
strumentellen Auffassungen des menschenrechtlichen Werts von „Demokratie“. 
Konkret wird zwischen den Kategorien a) normativ politische Konzeptionen, b) 
instrumentelle politische Konzeptionen, c) moralisch intrinsische Konzeptionen 
und d) moralisch instrumentelle Konzeptionen, unterschieden. Vor dem Hin-
tergrund dieses Analyserasters, das einen systematischen Vergleich und Über-
blick der Positionen erlaubt, werden 19 bedeutende Debattenbeiträge unter an-
derem von Joshua Cohen, Charles Beitz, Seyla Benhabib, Carol Gould und 
Thomas Christiano diskutiert.  
Die Diskussionsergebnisse zeigen, dass trotz des fehlenden Konsenses dar-
über, ob und zu welchem Umfang „Demokratie“ als Menschenrecht legitim 
eingefordert werden kann, der Dissens insbesondere auf praktischen Implemen-
tationsfragen beruht, nicht aber auf grundsätzlich moralisch oder ethisch diver-
gierenden Wertvorstellungen der Autoren. Als problematisch angesehen wird 
also primär die politische, rechtliche Forderung nach weltweit eingeführten de-
mokratischen Institutionen, nicht aber die moralische Begründbarkeit eines (je-
dem Einzelnen zukommenden) Menschenrechts auf demokratische Partizipati-
on. Als kleinster gemeinsamen Nenner lässt sich bei allen Autoren ein morali-
sches Recht auf Partizipation identifizieren, das es dem Einzelnen im Falle der 
Widerfahrnis von Ungerechtigkeiten erlauben muss, gegen diese Unrechtser-
fahrung in der eigenen politischen oder sozialen Mitgliedergemeinschaft Ein-
spruch zu erheben. Dieser herausgeschälte Kerngehalt eines demokratischen 
Selbstverständnisses, der die Selbstverfügbarkeit des Einzelnen im Kollektiv be-
hauptet und zugleich dadurch, dass er in die Forderung nach einem Recht auf 
politische Partizipation im Kollektiv mündet, die soziale, intersubjektive Struk-
tur der demokratischen Position des Einzelnen hervorhebt, wird zum Grund-
baustein dessen, was ich als „Menschenrecht auf Stimme“ („human right to 
voice“) bezeichne. Unter dem Menschenrecht auf Stimme wird also ein Recht 
verstanden, welches den Einzelnen dazu berechtigt, sich gegen Ungerechtig-
keitserfahrungen innerhalb der eigenen Gemeinschaft demokratisch zur Wehr 
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zu setzen, sich zu beschweren oder Proteste zu organisieren („The human right 
to voice can be defined as a right that secures the individual political right to 
complain, or organize to complain or to protest if, for example, the individual 
becomes endangered or harmed within the society it is living in.“). Die Definiti-
on des Menschenrechts auf Stimme beinhaltet das Recht auf effektive Anhö-
rung der Stellungnahme. Zum Konzept des Menschenrechts auf Stimme gehört 
in Anlehnung an Albert O. Hirschmans auch seine enge Anbindung an ein 
Recht auf Emigration („right to exit“), das bei unzumutbaren Verletzungen des 
Rechts auf Stimme in Kraft trifft.  
Das Recht auf Stimme lässt sich unter Rückgriff auf die untersuchten Beiträ-
ge der Autoren sowohl intrinsisch wie instrumentell rechtfertigen. Aus der mo-
ralischen Perspektive eines Fähigkeiten-Ansatzes („capability approach“) lässt 
sich das Recht auf Stimme beispielsweise begründen, weil es die Ausübung der 
Sprache und der praktischen Denkfähigkeit schützt, die etwa von Martha Nuss-
baum als notwendig erachtet werden, um ein menschenwürdiges Leben zu füh-
ren. Zudem verkörpert es den menschlichen Anspruch einer minimalen politi-
schen Kontrolle über das eigene Umfeld. Aus der Perspektive einer diskurstheo-
retischen Menschenrechtsbegründung verkörpert es den Anspruch nach indivi-
dueller Selbstbestimmung, der jeder normativen Bestimmung kollektiver 
Selbstbestimmung zugrunde liegt. Der sozial demokratische Ansatz von Carol 
Gould lässt eine Rechtfertigung des Rechts auf Stimme insofern ableiten, als 
gemäss dieser Auffassung die Ausbildung von „human agency“ per se darauf 
basiert, soziale, relationale Partizipation unter Gebrauch der eigenen Stimme 
und Stellungnahme im Kollektiv eingeübt zu haben. Aus einer moralisch in-
strumentellen Perspektive wie derjenigen von Beitz lässt sich argumentieren, 
dass ein Recht auf Stimme unabhängig von weitreichenderen Forderungen 
nach demokratischen Institutionen zum Ausgangspunkt jeglicher Beurteilung 
von Menschenrechtsforderungen erhoben wird. Hierbei liegt bei Beitz insofern 
ein paradoxer Zusammenhang vor, als das Recht auf Stimme zugleich einer 
minimalen Forderung nach einem Menschenrecht auf Demokratie gleichzu-
kommen scheint, wie es auch den eigentlichen Einwand darstellt, um beispiels-
weise eine paternalistisch eingeführte Menschenrechtsreform, die z.B. umfas-
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sende demokratische Institutionen einführen soll ohne von einer betroffenen 
Bevölkerungsmehrheit unterstützt zu werden, abzulehnen. Mit Robert Dahl 
lässt sich das Recht auf Stimme, wie ich es als Kern des demokratischen Selbst-
verständnisses identifiziert habe, als Schutzrecht persönlicher Autonomie be-
trachten. Unter dem bedürfnisorientierten Menschenrechtsansatz von David 
Miller ist das Menschenrecht auf Stimme insofern legitim, als es dazu dient, die 
Basisbedürfnisse („basic needs“), die durch den Menschenrechtskatalog ge-
schützt werden, aktiv einzufordern. Aus dem Blickwinkel politischer Konzepti-
onen lässt sich dieser summarische Ausschnitt von moralischen Begründungs-
weisen ergänzen, indem aufgezeigt wird, dass selbst vor dem Hintergrund der 
politischen Auffassung von Menschenrechten das Recht auf Stimme über 
Rawls’ Forderung einer Konsultationshierarchie („consultation hierarchy“) uni-
versell einforderbar bleibt, weil es die Forderung nach einer minimalen Interes-
sensvertretung des Einzelnen innerhalb jeder wohlgeordneten sozialen und poli-
tischen Gemeinschaft vertritt.  
Die eigentliche normative Begründung des Rechts auf Stimme, die ich in 
meiner eigenen Schlussfolgerung hervorhebe, betont neben dem Einschluss der 
genannten Begründungsfaktoren, die sich durch die vergleichende Debatten-
analyse aufzeigen lassen, die sozialphilosophische Dimension des Menschen-
rechts auf Stimme. Dadurch, dass die gewählte Definition des Rechts auf Stim-
me auch das Recht auf effektive Anhörung miteinschliesst, wird dieses Recht 
zum Symbol der Reziprozität, der unhintergehbaren intersubjektiven Voraus-
setzung des menschlichen Selbstverständnisses und der individuellen Lebensge-
staltung. Über den Gebrauch der Sprache, aber auch über die Beziehungsge-
staltung zum Anderen und zur eigenen Mitgliedergemeinschaft werden Un-
rechtserfahrungen identifiziert, Selbstverhältnisse und Konzeptionen des je ei-
genen guten Lebens entwickelt. Mit der Versagung des Rechts auf Stimme und 
effektive Anhörung geht eine Beschneidung der existentiellen menschlichen 
Ausdrucksweisen einher, die für die Durchsetzung von Individualinteressen 
notwendig ist. Es entsteht eine Kommunikationszensur, welche nicht nur das 
Selbstverhältnis, sondern das freie diskursive Zusammenleben beeinträchtigt. 
Beschnitten wird diejenige Qualität des Menschseins, die Axel Honneth mit 
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dem Begriff der sozialen Freiheit als Form des „Bei-sich-selbst-Sein im Ande-
ren“ bezeichnet. Das Recht auf Stimme und effektive Anhörung verstärkt also 
nicht nur den individualrechtlichen Anspruch des Einzelnen, aktiven Einfluss 
auf seine Betroffenheit in der eigenen sozialen und politischen Umwelt zu neh-
men, sondern es verweist auch auf eine grundsätzliche psychologische und ef-
fektive Angewiesenheit des Einzelnen auf die Gemeinschaft, die nur durch den 
aufrechterhaltenen Meinungsaustausch und die wechselseitige Bezogenheit zwi-
schen den Akteuren zur Grundlage demokratischer Sittlichkeit und Solidarität 
werden kann.  
 
T E I L  3  :  A R T I K E L  «  A N E R K E N N U N G  U N D  F R E I H E I T :  
S U B J E K T T H E O R E T I S C H E  G R U N D L A G E N  E I N E R  T H EO -
R I E  D E M O K R A T I S C H E R  S I T T L I C H K E I T  B E I  A X E L  
HONNETH »  
Der dritte Teil der Dissertation ist ein wissenschaftlicher Artikel mit dem Ti-
tel „Anerkennung und Freiheit: Subjekttheoretische Grundlagen einer Theorie 
demokratischer Sittlichkeit“. Der Artikel befasst sich zunächst mit der Frage der 
Vereinbarkeit der theoretischen Annahmen von Honneths Werken Kampf um 
Anerkennung (KuA, 1994) und Das Recht der Freiheit (RdF, 2011). Der Zusammen-
hang zu den vorhergehenden Teilen der Dissertation scheint hier zunächst er-
läuterungsbedürftig. Der Fokus liegt im dritten Teil nicht mehr spezifisch auf 
dem Menschenrechtsbegriff. Vielmehr geht es nun darum, die subjekttheoreti-
schen Grundlagen demokratischer Sittlichkeit unter dem anerkennungstheoreti-
schen Fokus genauer zu betrachten. Diese Studie trägt jedoch zumindest impli-
zit beträchtlich dazu bei, den Wert des Rechts auf Stimme als Bedingung der 
Selbstverwirklichung des einzelnen Menschen zu beleuchten. Dies geschieht je-
doch aus einer bereits Demokratie-immanenten Perspektive. Das anerken-
nungstheoretische  Modell und die Politische Theorie demokratischer Sittlich-
keit von Axel Honneth setzen Rechtstaatlichkeit und einen demokratischen Ge-
sellschaftskontext mehrheitlich voraus.  
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Der Vergleich der theoretischen Grundannahmen aus KuA und RdF drängt 
sich auf, weil eine deutliche Verschiebung vom Kernbegriff der Anerkennung 
zum Begriff der Freiheit stattgefunden hat. Während in der Anerkennungstheo-
rie die intersubjektive Anerkennung als Kernbegriff der subjekttheoretischen 
Sozialphilosophie fungiert, tritt der Begriff der Anerkennung im neueren Werk 
zugunsten des Freiheitsbegriffs deutlich in den Hintergrund. Die Frage der Ver-
einbarkeit der anerkennungstheoretischen Subjekttheorie mit der Politischen 
Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit ist zunächst für eine exegetische, werkkriti-
sche Standortbestimmung interessant. Der Nachvollzug dieser Veränderung ist 
jedoch insbesondere auch für meine Dissertation relevant, weil diese sich stark 
auf das ursprüngliche, dreistufige Modell der Anerkennung bezieht. Dieses 
scheint durch den neuen Schwerpunkt und Honneths explizite Revision des 
Anerkennungsmodells gerade in Frage gestellt zu werden. Es stellt sich also die 
Frage, inwiefern die intersubjektive Anerkennungstheorie, die zur Begründung 
des Primats einer humanitären Lesart von Menschenrechten im ersten Teil und 
zur Begründung des Rechts auf Stimme im zweiten Teil der Dissertation her-
beigezogen wurde, durch die jüngst von Honneth vorgenommene Revision des 
Anerkennungsmodells an Erklärungskraft verliert. 
Die Erörterung und Kritik der Revision des ursprünglichen Anerkennungs-
modells versucht aufzuzeigen, dass die Aufrechterhaltung des ursprünglichen 
Anerkennungsmodells für die Konsistenz von Honneths Gesamttheorie bedeut-
sam ist. Die fruchtbaren Erweiterungen des Modells, insbesondere die vertiefte 
Auseinandersetzung mit der individuellen und moralischen Freiheit, werden 
nicht in Frage gestellt. Gefragt wird jedoch, ob nicht die starke Betonung der in-
stitutionellen Anerkennungsvoraussetzungen demokratischer Sittlichkeit im 
RdF Gefahr läuft, den ursprünglichen normativen Gehalt der anthropologi-
schen anerkennungsbezogenen Subjekttheorie auszuschwemmen. Vor dem 
Hintergrund dieser Interpretation argumentiere ich für die Beibehaltung des ur-
sprünglichen anerkennungstheoretischen Modells. 
Die charakteristische Stärke von Honneths intersubjektiver Anerkennungs-
theorie liegt gerade darin, dass sie sich nicht davor scheut, die anthropologi-
schen, sozialen und psychologischen Voraussetzungen menschlicher Ko-
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Existenz als Referenzpunkte des politisch-normativen Denkens zu behaupten. 
Im Artikel wird dargelegt, dass ein vergleichender Blick in die beiden Theorien 
zeigen kann, dass in beiden Werken die wechselseitige Bedingtheit von Aner-
kennung und Freiheit – sowohl auf der intersubjektiven, privaten, wie auf der 
politisch-öffentlichen, institutionellen Ebene – als Grundthese grundsätzlich 
aufrechterhalten wird. Unter der subjekttheoretischen Annahme, dass intersub-
jektive Anerkennung und Freiheit, als sich wechselseitig bedingende Grundvo-
raussetzungen eines guten Lebens, die Prozesse in den sozialen, politischen und 
wirtschaftlichen Sphären der Gemeinschaft bestimmen, analysiert Honneth die 
Herausforderungen und Chancen der modernen westlich liberal-
demokratischen Gesellschaft im RdF anhand der Methode der normativen Re-
konstruktion. Im KuA identifiziert Honneth beispielsweise den Zweck der An-
erkennung in der Autonomie menschlicher Lebenspraxis. Im RdF wird die 
primär institutionell-kontextualisierte soziale Freiheit subjekttheoretisch ver-
gleichbar mit der ersten Anerkennungsform aus dem ursprünglichen Modell, 
der Liebe, als „Bei-sich-selbst-Sein im Anderen“ definiert. Es wird entsprechend 
die These vertreten, dass die starke wechselseitige Bedingtheit von intersubjekti-
ver Anerkennung und Freiheit nach einer sozialphilosophischen Theorie ver-
langen, welche das explizit subjekttheoretische Modell nicht aufgibt, sondern es 
als Voraussetzung des politischen Denkens konstruktiv abgrenzt – und es 
dadurch zugleich explizit integrierbar macht. Als Argument für diese These 
dient auch die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Begriff und der Funktion sozialer 
Wertschätzung in beiden Werken.  
Soziale Wertschätzung entspricht im ursprünglichen Anerkennungsmodell 
der anspruchsvollsten Stufe der Anerkennung mit Blick auf die Entwicklungs-
leistung des Subjekts. Im RdF spielt sie ebenfalls eine wichtige Rolle, da sie als 
Bedingung sozialer Freiheit in der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit die Überbrü-
ckung zwischen der Subjektebene und der Ebene der politischen Institutionen 
leistet. Dieser Zusammenhang ist für die Dissertation deshalb wichtig, weil das 
Recht auf Stimme einer wesentlichen Institutionalisierung sozialer Wertschät-
zung entspricht. Sofern soziale Wertschätzung als Voraussetzung dafür gesehen 
wird, dass ein Bürger sich im politischen, rechtlichen Gesellschaftskontext mo-
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ralisch frei und reflektiert einbringen kann, ist ein intersubjektiver Prozess der 
Persönlichkeitsentwicklung vorausgesetzt, der die Internalisierung intersubjekti-
ver Anerkennungsfähigkeit miteinschliesst. Diese Internalisierung der Anerken-
nungsfähigkeit basiert auf a) den intersubjektiven, privaten Beziehungserfah-
rungen (Familie, Freundschaft), b) auf der Ebene der Rechtsperson und c) auf 
der Ebene des sozialen, verantwortlichen und idealerweise solidaritätsfähigen 
Gesellschaftsmitglieds. Für die anerkennungstheoretische Rechtfertigung des 
Rechts auf Stimme sind insbesondere die Ebenen b) und c) relevant, da das 
Recht auf Stimme als Realisierungsbedingung beider Anerkennungsformen gel-
tend gemacht werden kann: 
Ad b) Die Anerkennung als Rechtsperson eröffnet durch die Zuschreibung 
moralischer Zurechnungsfähigkeit den Raum für reflexive Freiheit. Innerhalb 
des gesellschaftlich geltenden Normengefüges hat der Einzelne das Recht zur 
moralischen Autonomie und Selbstgesetzgebung, zur Beeinflussung der öffentli-
chen Auslegung moralischer Normen. Moralisch-reflexive Freiheit kann aber 
nur durch die Teilnahme an einer Rechtfertigungspraxis realisiert werden kann. 
Für die Teilnahme an dieser Rechtfertigungspraxis ist das Recht auf Stimme 
und effektives Gehör, nach funktionierender wechselseitiger Kommunikation 
vorausgesetzt.  
Ad c) Die soziale Wertschätzung, die als Anerkennungsform u.a. auf der so-
zialen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Ebene des gesellschaftlichen Zusam-
menlebens fungiert, geht auf der Ebene des einzelnen Subjekts mit dem Be-
wusstsein für den kollektiven Wert seiner individuellen guten und wertvollen 
Fähigkeiten einher. Wenn die einzelne Person mit ihren je eigenen Fähigkeiten 
und Bedürfnissen wertgeschätzt wird, eröffnet sich aus dieser intersubjektiv er-
langten Selbstachtung die Erfahrung sozialer Freiheit. Wie Honneth schreibt, 
ist jede Form von Freiheit „Produkt einer sozialen Kommunikation, die die be-
sondere Gestalt wechselseitiger Anerkennung besitzt“1. Das Recht auf Stimme 
und effektives Gehör erhält also als „Kommunikationsrecht“ auf der Ebene der 
 
1 Axel Honneth, “Réponse (De la reconnaissance à la liberté),” in Axel Honneth. De la recon-
naissance à la liberté, ed. Mark Hunyadi, La Pensée élargie (Le Bord de l’eau: Lormont, 2014), 
125–126. 
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sozialen Wertschätzung seine anerkennungstheoretische Rechtfertigung 
dadurch, dass es eine Grundbedingung von Freiheitserfahrungen repräsentiert.  
Die Untersuchung des Zusammenhangs zwischen intersubjektiven Anerken-
nungs- und politischen Freiheitsverhältnissen in der Sphäre der demokratischen 
Öffentlichkeit bildet den Schlussteil des Artikels. Zu den sechs Bedingungen 
demokratischer Öffentlichkeit, die Honneth nennt, gehört unter anderem die 
Forderung nach einem schichtübergreifenden, allgemeinen Kommunikations-
raum, der es den verschiedenen von den politischen Entscheidungen betroffe-
nen Gruppen und Klassen ermöglicht, überhaupt in einen Meinungsaustausch 
zu treten. Wenn Honneth darlegt, dass zur historischen Entwicklung demokra-
tischer Öffentlichkeit die Etablierung kommunikativer Bedingungen gehört, un-
ter denen sich die Bürgerinnen und Bürger in freiwilligen Assoziationen diskur-
siv ihre Meinung über praktisch-politische Grundsätze der repräsentativen 
Körperschaften und das gesellschaftliche Selbstverständnis bilden2, kann das 
Recht auf Stimme, wie es im Rahmen der Dissertation als Kern der Forderung 
nach einem Menschenrecht auf Demokratie identifiziert wurde, neben der sub-
jekttheoretischen Rechtfertigung auch als politisches Recht gerechtfertigt wer-
den, das unter Umständen eine demokratische Gesellschaftsentwicklung einlei-
ten kann. Während der Artikel also einerseits eine an sich geschlossene Ausei-
nandersetzung mit den begrifflichen Verschiebungen im Werk von Honneth 
darstellt, steckt darin andererseits zugleich die Möglichkeit, die in Teil 2 ausge-
arbeitete Begründung des Menschenrechts auf Stimme zusätzlich anzureichern.  
 
F A Z I T  
Die Hauptergebnisse der Dissertation lassen sich mit Bezug auf die Frage, 
die das SNF-Projekt ursprünglich übertitelt: „Should There Be a Human Right 
to Democracy?“ in drei Thesen zusammenfassen. Erstens ist eine Versöhnung 
zwischen moralischen und politischen Menschenrechtsansätzen angezeigt. Eine 
 
2 Axel Honneth, Das Recht Der Freiheit - Grundriss einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit (Suhr-
kamp, 2011), 483. 
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umfassende Menschenrechtstheorie differenziert zwischen moralischen, politi-
schen und rechtlichen Dimensionen von Menschenrechten ohne den morali-
schen Ansprüchen aufgrund von politischen Umsetzungsschwierigkeiten ihren 
Referenzwert abzusprechen. Es braucht trotz der Abwendung von der natur-
rechtlichen Tradition eine humanistische Tradition von Menschenrechten, die 
ein Orientierungsideal dafür imaginiert, was wir als Menschen für ein lebens-
wertes und würdiges Leben brauchen, was wir einander als Menschen mora-
lisch schulden und was wir innerhalb unserer sozialen und politischen Gesell-
schaften einfordern sollen. Zweitens wird das Recht auf demokratische Institu-
tionen nicht als Menschenrecht eingefordert, jedoch stattdessen das demokrati-
sche Recht auf Stimme und effektive Anhörung. Das Recht auf Stimme lässt 
sich drittens mit Blick auf die Beiträge der Autoren der Debatte sowie aus aner-
kennungstheoretischer Perspektive als Institution sozialer Wertschätzung intrin-
sisch und instrumentell rechtfertigen.  
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Moral and political conceptions of human rights: rethinking the
distinction
Anita Sophia Horn*
Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
In one important strand of the philosophical debate, human rights are seen as a practical
benchmark to evaluate and orient matters of national politics, international relations and
global governance. The article investigates the possible beneﬁts and problems of this
approach. Problematising the well-established distinction between moral and political
human rights in philosophical human rights debate, the author follows Paolo
Gilabert’s attempt to alternatively discuss human rights under the perspective of
rights having both an abstract and a speciﬁc dimension. Discussing the (self-)
understanding of the contemporary human being as representing the subject of human
rights, Axel Honneth’s recognition theory is applied to concretise Gilabert’s humanist
claim to do justice to the ‘essentially social’ nature of the human being. While
holding on to the traditional idea that human rights are in ﬁrst instance to be
understood as individual rights human beings have in virtue of being human, the
important international political function of human rights is accounted for by
introducing the term cosmopolitan rights.
Keywords: human rights; political and moral conceptions; recognition theory; Paolo
Gilabert; Axel Honneth
Introduction
One of the key questions in current philosophical human rights debates concerns the com-
patibility of moral and political rationales as a basis for a consistent justiﬁcation of human
rights. Effectively, the development of human rights since the end of World War II has
created a ‘universally accepted value system’.1 The claim that human rights have
become ‘the dominant doctrine for evaluating the moral status of the contemporary geo-pol-
itical order’2 is deemed to be a safe belief. Yet, despite the human rights boom in practice,
scholarship on human rights is drifting apart to the extent that the label ‘human rights’
appears to be the only common denominator. James Grifﬁn states in his article ‘Human
Rights: Questions of Aim an Approach’:
What are we philosophers, political theorists, and jurisprudents trying to do? One might think
that the answer is obvious: we are trying to understand better what human rights are. But the
answer is most unclear. ‘Human rights’ as used in ethics? Or in law? Or in political life? [… ]
All of these different aims require different approaches. [… ]3
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A brief look at the relevant literature in philosophy shows a remarkable heterogeneity of
rationales and normative, empirical and political arguments for deﬁning, justifying and
applying the concept of human rights. Human rights are, of course, a topic in political
science, law and philosophy, but particularly in view of the latter there is a divide
between moral and political philosophy. Grifﬁn insists that the lack of a common
concept of human rights leads both to differences regarding the nature of the problem
and to its solution.4 Tellingly, lists of human rights provided by philosophical scholars
diverge signiﬁcantly depending on whether they take human capabilities, needs, interests,
(collective) self-determination or political feasibility as theoretical anchors for their
accounts. Like many other scholars trying to order the conceptions, Fabienne Peter suggests
that human rights should be categorised according to the Rawlsian distinction between ‘tra-
ditional’ and ‘political’ conceptions:
According to the traditional conception, human rights are moral rights that people have qua
salient features of their humanity. These features may relate to fundamental needs or
interests (e.g., Miller 2012) or basic aspects of human agency (e.g., Grifﬁn 2008). According
to the political conception, by contrast, human rights are a set of special rights that have their
origins in salient features of contemporary human rights practice (e.g., Rawls 1999; Beitz
2009).5
According to this line of reasoning, political conceptions of human rights typically grasp
them as a given practice of public reasoning in a form of bottom-up approach.6 Represen-
tatively, Charles Beitz states that human rights are a public enterprise, and that ‘those who
would interpret its principles must hold themselves accountable to its public aims and char-
acter’.7 Human rights name ‘not so much an abstract normative idea as an emergent politi-
cal practice’.8 The emphasis of the human rights concept’s paramount practical function is
understood to account for doctrinal and political complications shaping the actual debate.
The functional role of human rights in international discourse and practice is taken as the
basic constraint of political conceptions of human rights:
A practical conception takes the doctrine and practice of human rights as we ﬁnd them in
international political life as the source materials for constructing a conception of human
rights. [… ] There is no assumption of a prior or independent layer of fundamental rights
whose nature and content can be discovered independently of a consideration of the place of
human rights in the international realm and its normative discourse and then used to interpret
and criticize international doctrine.9
Deﬁning human rights as a mere ‘set of special rights’ originating from practice, does
not mean that these rights must lack moral content. However, the focus of justiﬁcation and
orientation clearly shifts away from genuine moral theoretical and anthropological reﬂec-
tions to deliberations about actual political and juridical practices and practicalities. By con-
trast, moral conceptions (i.e. ‘traditional’ conceptions in Peter’s vocabulary) interpret
human rights primarily as expressions of a moral idea.10 In this latter view, human rights
are understood as individual, extra-positive, moral rights that aim at protecting negative lib-
erties and at guaranteeing positive liberties. They serve as an ideal benchmark to determine
legal rights and political standards in a sort of top-down approach.
This article is structured in three parts. In Part I, I sketch two historical interpretations,
which have led to the contemporary primacy of the political conception of human rights. I
then challenge the very distinction between moral and political conceptions by showing that
the latter fail to be independent of substantive moral assumptions. Political conceptions are,
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at least partly, moral conceptions, too. In Part II, I refocus the debate by elaborating a moral
conception that takes central (political) criticisms into account. The proposed moral con-
ception focuses on the intersubjective, social dimension of human rights. I ﬁrst elaborate
Paolo Gilabert’s claim of an explicit conceptual distinction between abstract (moral)
human rights and speciﬁc (practical) human rights. His conception of the humanist self-
understanding that has to ground human rights reasoning is extended by Axel Honneth’s
recognition theory. Finally, in Part III, the demand for political feasibility of human
rights in the global political context leads to the distinction between (abstract and speciﬁc)
human rights and (abstract and speciﬁc) cosmopolitan rights. The intersection – it shall be
argued – of the local, individual and intersubjective dimension of human rights with their
global political dimension should take centre stage within the debate.
I. From moral to political conceptions: two historical tracks leading towards a
practical interpretation of human rights
The history of human rights is marked by two distinct historical interpretations, each doc-
umenting the relative rise of political conceptions to the disadvantage of moral conceptions
of human rights.11 A ﬁrst trajectory emanates from human rights as historically linked to
Enlightenment philosophers (e.g. Locke and Rousseau) under the label ‘natural rights’.12
Understanding human rights as natural rights implies ‘that moral agents have these rights
because of their very nature as humans (or moral agents)’.13 This idea of human rights
drove the English, American and French revolutions in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies; the revolutions ‘were proclaimed and conducted in its name, as was the struggle
against slavery’.14 The human was understood as a rational being, capable of self-develop-
ment and the ongoing realisation of a better, progressive society.
In the course of secularisation, however, the idea of natural rights rooted in Christianity
and the absoluteness of the values system became questioned. Whereas the general idea of
universal human rights is unquestioned in academic discourse, the criticism against particu-
lar facets of universalism is widespread under the headings of ‘cultural-relativism’ on the
one hand, and ‘formal properties’ such as fundamentality, subjectivism, generality,
egality, absoluteness and indivisibility on the other hand. The cultural-relativist objections
can be summarised under the headings ‘decontextualism’, ‘euro-centrism’, ‘anti-pluralism’,
‘individualism’ and ‘imperialism’.15 The objections of decontextualism and euro-centrism
are both directed to the fact that self-understanding, customs and correlating rights-systems
diverge according to different cultures. The objection of decontextualism argues that equal-
ity and justice need to be interpreted respectively to the concrete life-conditions of individ-
uals and communities. The euro-centrism objection claims that the historical genesis of
human rights is closely intertwined with the Western thought tradition. The one-to-one
adaption to non-Western cultures is put into question. Derived from these reservations,
the anti-pluralism objection warns from an authoritative dominance of the continental con-
ception of the good life that displaces intercultural variety. The prominent scepticism
against paternalistic decision-making in human rights regimes is at least partly based in
these kinds of objections. The value of personal autonomy, a designed paramount basic
value of human life in the Western context that frames the moral philosophical thinking
about human rights, is less crucial according to other cultural self-understandings. The cri-
ticism against paternalism also applies at the international level, for instance when Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDH)-backed humanitarian interventions are deemed
paternalistic because they constrain the liberty of the affected people in their very attempt to
extend it.16
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Contrary to the anti-pluralism objection, the individualism objection claims that human
rights have to be understood as individual rights. Such individual rights are rights that every
person has against any cultural community. Finally, the objection of imperialism is directed
against the Great Powers’ prerogative of interpretation. If human rights politics is used as a
camouﬂage to enforce capitalist globalisation, it becomes an unreliable normative stand-
point.17 Such doubts about the universal validity of human rights destabilise the normative
force and moral persuasiveness. Therefore, the legitimacy of human rights that are con-
structed under a condition of imagined political consent rather then derived from a particu-
lar moral self-understanding seems easier to stand by in political philosophical
argumentation.
A second trajectory leading to the contemporary credibility loss of substantial moral
conceptions of human rights turns on a speciﬁc kind of anthropology that incorporates a
primacy of reason and was undermined by the traumatic experiences of World War II.
These experiences belied the idealistic idea of a dialectical development of reason-driven
mankind; as Isaiah Berlin encapsulates, ‘reason is the thinnest of walls against the raging
seas of violent emotion: on so insecure a basis no permanent structure can ever be
erected’.18 According to Jack Donnelly, it was only after World War II that human rights
became a true subject of international relations as an institutionalised part of international
politics.19 This is also the view of Christoph Menke and Arnd Pollmann who hold that the
‘veraciously imperative’ political meaning of the idea of human rights arose from the
experience of the political and moral catastrophe of totalitarianism.20 They see the inter-
national human rights regimes established by the UDHR of 1948 and its contractual,
liberal-democratic transformation in international law, as a direct reaction to prevent
similar humanitarian disasters in the future.21 The human rights doctrine is seen as the
result of an ongoing normative discourse of global political life.22 Understanding the devel-
opment and practice of such practical human rights is seen as a central task helping to opti-
mise human rights as tools that ‘provide reasons for the world community or its agents to act
in ways aimed at reducing infringements or contributing to the satisfaction of the rights in
societies where they are insecure’.23 According to Beitz, a human rights doctrine should be
constructed ‘so that appeals to human rights, under conditions that will need to be speciﬁed,
can provide reasons for the world community or its agents to act in ways aimed at reducing
infringements or contributing to the satisfaction of the rights in societies where they are
insecure’.24 Given this international political focus, the narrative of human rights as pre-
institutional claims ‘that individuals have against all other individuals in virtue of interests
characteristic of their common humanity’25 takes a backseat. However, it is exactly this
humanist perspective that grounds the moral philosophical and anthropological attempts
to justify human rights.
The vague boundaries of political conceptions of human rights
As Beitz states, ‘because a practical conception prescinds from taking any philosophical
view about the nature or basis of human rights, it can distinguish between the problem
of conceptualizing human rights and that of understanding their authority’.26 Political con-
ceptions indeed carry the advantage of theoretical parsimony, enabling practitioners to
focus on mechanisms of implementation and the establishment of human rights ‘authority’.
One can reasonably argue that victims of torture pleading for justice do not attach much
importance to theoretical background dispute. They want to know which rights are
suable, to whichever international actors they can trust and whether these actors have the
power of sanctions to guarantee protection and shelter. The UDHR and supplementary
4 A.S. Horn
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conventions serve as widely recognised manubrium to impose human rights standards upon
sovereign states. They set standards and aspirations for domestic politics, international pol-
itical debate, and for international treaties and global organisations.27
Why should we then blur these evident practical, legitimising features by ﬁnger point-
ing to the obscurity of the moral justiﬁcation and conceptualisation of human rights? A
closer look at politics makes clear that Beitz’s claim of a successful distinction between
the problem of ‘conceptualizing human rights’ and the problem of ‘understanding their
authority’ based on separating political from moral philosophical views must be challenged.
It is remarkable that many authors who advocate political conceptions borrow heavily from
moral philosophical reasoning. Joshua Cohen for example, while working towards a politi-
cal conception of human rights, introduces a minimal substantive content whose primary
function is to clarify and guarantee just principles of membership in a political community.
He thus evinces that political conceptions are not free from substantive moral claims. Such
claims loom large in political conceptions even if they are often directed to the macro-pol-
itical rather than to the individual level, e.g. by advocating principles of collective self-
determination or of national sovereignty. Joseph Raz unites the forces of moral and political
reasoning while arguing that human rights can be understood as ‘synchronically univer-
sal’,28 that is as rights that all contemporary living humans have.
The more plausible claim is that human rights are synchronically universal, meaning that all
people alive today have them. Something like that seems to be assumed in contemporary
human rights practice. This is of crucial importance, as it expresses the view that human life
is valuable unconditionally, a view we tend – I hope – to take for granted, but which is not
always observed in practice. So one crucial contribution of individual rights to the emerging
world order is in underpinning its commitment to the value of human life.29
The reference to the ‘commitment to the value of human life’ showcases how moral
claims are used to conceptualise and justify political human rights conceptions. At the
same time, Raz inserts a disclaimer when pointing out that this view, namely that
‘human life is valuable unconditionally’, is only hoped for but not yet established to be
correct. At any rate, the moral claim of universal validity of human rights and the emphasis
on conventional, discursive political agreements generate a tension which cannot be cir-
cumvented by simply ignoring it. The legitimising uses of the vocabulary of ultimate
values like dignity, equality, freedom, autonomy or liberty are widespread in practical dis-
course.30 Were these values to express simply the result of a global political discourse (and
not also amount to substantive moral normative claims), one might wonder whether they
would not be perceived as empty word shells at the service of yet another purpose, most
relevantly, the (increasing) politicisation of human rights practice in light of power relations
and strategic interests. Especially worthy of attention is the presumption of (successful)
public reasoning as a way of integrating moral reasoning into political conceptions (by
Beitz,31 Rawls32). Can the presumption of public reason be justiﬁed without reverting to
anthropological foundations of reason or to guiding moral principles? Even though the bor-
rowings of political conceptions from moral reasoning are not always made transparent,
these borrowings seem to have an indispensable legitimising impact. Lately even Beitz
re-evaluates the idea of ‘human dignity’ as an element in the justiﬁcation of human
rights, motivated by insight into ‘the inescapability of reference to the idea in human
rights’ and ‘a more general interest in the political theory of the subject’.33 Therefore,
despite the contemporary pragmatic advantages of political conceptions, the crucial ques-
tion remains whether this factual normative force of human rights can be justiﬁed by
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conventional, discursive political agreements that have been worked out during the last
decades. Referring to experiences of striking injustice as a motivation of international
human rights commitments leads back to the questions: what kinds of harm and deﬁciency
of humans must induce aid commitments? Which criteria demarcate rights to be human
rights? Only based on the dispute about the content of human rights can the characteristic
of human rights as ‘salient features of contemporary human rights practice’34 then become
determined. On the one hand, the unavoidability of reference to the normative content of
human rights shows that the shift to political conceptions has surmounted the theoretical
difﬁculties at ﬁrst appearance only. On the other hand, this interweaving claims for recon-
ciliation of moral and political conceptions. The problem is not that political conceptions
have their implicit moral assumptions but that they underestimate their deploying power.
The importance of a moral philosophical grounding of human rights
Despite the mainstream in political theory inclining towards political conceptions to justify
human rights, supplemented with minimal borrowings from moral theory, there are several
reasons to keep moral theory justiﬁcations prominently in the running (and therefore not
underdetermined). Concerning the justiﬁcation of human rights, the abandonment of a
genuine moral philosophical theory in favour of a justiﬁcation that originates from practice
and the idea of a reasonable public consent is controversial in at least two regards. The ﬁrst
concerns the assumption that the values on which the declaration stands are self-evidently
given. The second concerns the corrective, referential and symbolic function that a moral
philosophical rationale can provide in practical reasoning about political and legal
human rights implementation.
First, along with the reinforced emphasis of legitimising political, juridical aspects of
human rights, a de-emphasis on the theoretical justiﬁcation of human rights promotes the
widespread talk of ‘self-evidence’ of human rights in practice. The normative core
values incorporated in the declaration, such as human dignity, freedom, equality and
democracy,35 seem self-evident in the ﬁrst moment, but their meaning and extent are con-
troversial – if they are not just used as rhetorical place holders. Mark Mazower, for instance,
writes that contemporary political theorists have made sure that these values and ideas ‘are
disembodied and plucked from historical context’.36 His diagnosis refers to the displace-
ment of extra-positive entities like ‘God’ or ‘nature’ and how these formerly legitimised
the international law system and its universal validity claims. The lack of concern for
and discussion of metaphysical foundations risks losing sight of the justiﬁcation that motiv-
ated the introduction of human rights. Whereas it seems impossible to return to metaphys-
ical foundations, it is necessary to insist on awareness and transparency of the particular
moral self-understanding guiding the conceptualisation and interpretation of values and
ideals of the declaration in the contemporary context. Such a normative groundwork
must of course not be a dogmatic moral theory but a reliable starting point for ongoing
reﬂection and widespread individual and collective identiﬁcation.
Second, the shift from moral to political justiﬁcations of human rights can be seen as
problematic with regard to the enforcement of human rights. Complications arise partly
due to the well-established twofold understanding of human rights as moral claims and
as legal rights:
Human rights are best thought of, therefore, as being both moral and legal rights. The legiti-
macy claims of human rights are tied to their status as moral rights. The practical efﬁcacy of
human rights is, however, largely dependent upon their developing into legal rights.37
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The transmission from the moral to the legal rights sphere is complicated by the limits of
political reality. It is only reasonable to formulate a legal right if its enforcement can be
guaranteed. Whereas moral rights develop fundamental ideal conditions of a good
human life, the legal form of human rights is meant to represent claims that are effectively
made in contemporary political reality. Therefore, if the set of moral human rights is
required to be convergent with the set of practical, legal human rights, it stays underdeter-
mined and limited to the political conditions of the here and now. One practical problem
caused by an underdetermined moral status of human rights is an increasing pressure on
lawyers and experts in international law to offer exegesis of human rights. They are fac-
tually obliged to cover not only the legal expertise, but also to justify their instructions
and principles from more general theoretical standpoints. Since universal human rights
became a ﬁrm component of international law in the mid-twentieth century, the inter-
national jurisdiction of international law necessarily contains a supranational responsibility
and accountability.38 Supranational guarantees incurred by the international community
require strong elements of universality and non-negotiability of human rights doctrine.
Yet, any non-negotiable doctrine contradicts the claim for bottom-up legitimation by
national democracies. On the one hand, human rights lawyers and experts in international
law have to insist on strong arguments of universality to uphold common human rights stan-
dards for all countries. On the other hand, they are, within the European Union, confronted
with appeals to bargain about exceptions and adoptions for singular member countries.
Emphasising the importance of the human rights system to deal with economic and political
trials of strength, Mads Andenas39 names Greece’s deﬁance of the most basic human rights
in dealing with refugees during the Eurozone crisis since late 2009 as an alerting example to
insist that scholars have to strengthen elements of universality and non-negotiability of the
human rights doctrine. If human rights are mainly conceptualised and justiﬁed as ‘emerging
from the political practice’, they are likely to become relativised by power political
decisions. The reference to an independent normative basis that is legitimised through its
humanistic moral arguments is therefore of practical and symbolic value. The human
rights doctrine can only maintain its status as a universally accepted value system if it
draws its legitimation from the moral, humanist obligation towards the human being.
However, this position arguing for a strong normative universalism leads also to funda-
mental concerns. Responding to Andenas, for example, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen points
out his concern of a ‘rising human rights nationalism’ as it becomes expressed for example
in the report of a British think tank.40 According to Gammeltoft-Hansen, the therein-uttered
concern is a reaction to institutional overtaking of the human rights interpretation in the
form of international ‘top down law’. Instead of re-strengthening a natural law-like
bulwark of universal values, he recommends exploring the understanding of natural
differences.
The previous discussion shows that both moral and political conceptions of human
rights seem incomplete. Authors advocating moral conceptions regret the renunciation of
distinct substantive moral values that would allow operating from a constant rational stand-
point and that would help avoiding relativism by providing globally reliable judgements.
Authors advocating political conceptions like to keep the distinctive values of human
rights preferably open to meet the criticisms of paternalism and relativism, to maintain a
wider radius of operation in international politics. While moral conceptions have to
reject the accusation of undue bias in their normative assumptions, political conceptions
run the risk of ending up as a pawn in the hands of the powerful. Is there a practicable
third way that would avoid the biased universalism of moral conceptions and balance the
danger of political conceptions falling into the hands of expert technocrats and the
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powerful? Is it possible to discover a basic value concept that can serve as a structuring,
motivational point of orientation?
Deﬁnitively, any sensible middle course has to face and incorporate the tension between
the moral and the political function of human rights.41 My proposal is that moral and pol-
itical conceptions of human rights should not be pitted against one another; the question is
not whether a moral core of human rights conceptions is needed but how thick and substan-
tive it must be, if the conception (a) seeks to be convincing from a moral philosophical
standpoint, and (b) feasible and practical from a juridical and political standpoint. The
inevitable tension between theoretical claims and political realisation that has to be
balanced in human rights debates is directly faced, but without pretending mutual exclusion
of the rationales.
II. Refocusing the debate: the need of a shared moral standpoint to determine
human rights
Taking Gammeltoft-Hansen’s above-mentioned appeal against diversity reduction through
absolutist natural rights reasoning seriously, I will yet argue for the revaluation of a sphere
of moral philosophical thinking about human rights, maintaining its corrective function in
practice due to its original conceptual independence from considerations about international
politics. In a similar vein, the article ‘Humanist and Political Perspectives on Human
Rights’ (2011) by Pablo Gilabert suggests that the political and the moral considerations
should work in tandem. I will take his account as a starting point for my own deliberations.
To be clear, the natural rights idea is not incorporated as a metaphysically grounded one but
rather as a conceptual framework in the way John Tasioulas phrases it:
Considered as moral standards, my claim is that human rights are best understood as continu-
ous with what were once known as ‘natural rights.’ This continuity is not merely historical, but
conceptual: it is not simply that the tradition of natural rights thought is part of the historical
lead-up to contemporary human rights discourse, but that the ethical idea at the core of the
latter is essentially that of a natural right.42
The talk about natural rights only represents the particular human (individual) rights
understanding that sees their normative justiﬁcation as dependent from intrinsic human
needs, interests, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and so on. The ‘ethical idea at the core’ main-
tains that human rights are rights any human being has in virtue of being human. Now, how
can a human standpoint of ethically determining human rights be imagined? In Gilabert’s
words, ‘a more plausible, charitable construal of humanism’43 is necessary. In the next
section, I introduce his account as a valuable starting point for my own proposal and
critique.
Finding a moral standpoint to derive abstract and speciﬁc human rights
In a nutshell, Gilabert justiﬁes his own attempt to reconcile humanist with political human
rights understandings by pointing out, ﬁrst, that the former already represent a substantial
part of the declaration’s wording. The Preamble and also the ﬁrst Articles repeatedly refer to
human inherent dignity, a shared self-understanding of humans as free, equal in dignity and
rights. Human beings are understood as agents with reason and conscience, having the duty
to act in a spirit of brotherhood. Second, he argues that global public reasoning regarding
the meaning, content and justiﬁcation of human rights can proﬁt from humanist
8 A.S. Horn
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
An
ita
 H
orn
] a
t 2
2:1
3 2
2 F
eb
rua
ry 
20
16
 
considerations.44 Stemming from the fact that human rights can be formulated at ‘different
levels of abstraction’, Gilabert provides a particular distinction between a set of speciﬁc
rights and a set of abstract rights45:
We can, on the one hand, formulate a set of speciﬁc rights identifying claims that people in the
contemporary world have against their own government and fellow citizens and against inter-
national organizations, foreign governments and foreign citizens. The rights of the Declaration
largely operate at this level. We can, on the other hand, formulate a set of abstract rights con-
cerned with extremely important interests shared by all (or most) human beings, whose protec-
tion involves responsibilities for anyone who can affect their satisfaction.46
According to Gilabert, speciﬁc rights ‘correlate’ with the given options within the con-
temporary international institutional framework and therefore account for political reality-
based human rights implementation. This dimension therefore meets the legitimacy con-
ditions claimed by political human rights conceptions. The set of abstract human rights
‘that are held by everyone against everyone else in virtue of their common humanity, not
their membership in any speciﬁc institutional structure’ 47 are based on a humanist self-
understanding. Whereas they cannot be implemented as legal rights, they function as nor-
mative guidelines in selecting speciﬁc human rights.48 Instead of sticking to the distinction
between moral and political rationales, I adopt Gilabert’s speciﬁcation in borrowing the dis-
tinction between abstract and speciﬁc human rights to emphasise the complementarity of
both rationales.
Demarcating his argumentation from a classical natural rights position and its atomistic
understanding of the individual and its rights, Gilabert emphasises the understanding of
human beings as ‘essentially social’ beings.49 The derivation of abstract rights thus requires
a comprehensive social understanding of the human being. The emphasis on aspects of
social life is chosen to draw a ‘more plausible, charitable construal of humanism’, including
the capacity to reason prudentially and morally about what is good and right, about morality
and physical and psychological vulnerability, the use of language and the relative capacity
to modify the environment through intentional action. Further anthropological assumptions
on which the derivation of abstract rights is based include the assumptions that ‘humans
face relative material scarcity, display tendencies to social conﬂict of interest and occasion-
ally aggressive and non-cooperative dispositions, as well as benign tendencies to
cooperation, respect, concern, and sympathy’.50 With regard to the human rights justiﬁca-
tion, Gilabert advocates a deliberative reﬂective equilibrium approach in which humanist
(moral) considerations ‘provide a substantive layer of reasoning cementing our ability to
both defend and criticize aspects of current human rights practice’.51 The tandem con-
ception allows bridging the sphere of moral ideas about intrinsic human interests, needs
and capabilities with one of instrumental, political reasoning. Favouring the idea of
global public reasoning, he sees the global public debate about the shared humanist
grounds for assessing domestic and international institutional structures as crucial to preser-
ving human rights as signiﬁcant normative guidelines.
III. Two extensions: recognition as guideline and cosmopolitan rights as a new
category
Following Gilabert’s direction of thought in general, my proposal differs from his position
mainly in two ways. First, I extend and concretise Gilabert’s social understanding of human
beings by using the recognition theoretical rights understanding of Axel Honneth. Second, I
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introduce the distinction between human rights and cosmopolitan rights to account for the
important political international function of human rights that cannot be fully accounted for
if deﬁning them as individual rights in the ﬁrst instance.
Approaching the human subject of human rights in a recognition theoretical
perspective
To begin by elaborating the ﬁrst extension, I identify with Gilbert’s commitment to a more
complex understanding of the human being as the subject of human rights that is not
restricted to rational capacities and material needs but puts an additional strong focus on
social and psychological vulnerabilities and needs. Based on Honneth’s recognition
theory,52 I defend a more concrete claim than Gilabert saying that the ascription of
(human) rights can be crucial for the maintenance of individual self-esteem, especially if
an individual suffers under repression from his or her own membership community. For
example, focussing on those human beings that are especially in need of human rights guar-
antees such as poor families, migrants or disabled persons should not be equal to confront-
ing their (costly) needs and claims but to the question of how their potential as social human
rights agents can be activated and appreciated. The recent dominance of the political human
rights understanding leads to a change in perspective particularly towards those human
beings that are dependent on support, as they are not primarily approached and empathised
with as beings with potential and dignity but as variables in a bigger political equation. In
my understanding of Gilabert’s intention to revalue humanist foundations in human rights
theory, such a focus contributes to strengthening the international political value of the
declaration. The theory of recognition can serve as an appropriate model to re-focus on
human rights in a humanist, normative agency-centred way that accounts for the social,
intersubjective relevance of human rights (as an idea and as a practice). As such, they
can be a fundamental component of contemporary self-understanding, and serve as a nor-
mative guideline for the singular actors to identify with. A human rights idea that is grasp-
able and self-esteem stabilising for anyone symbolises the ascription of dignity and moral
responsibility both as a member of local, national communities and of the global society.53
Only with such a substantial and agent-centred (therefore de-politicised or pre-political)
commitment, can a human rights theory be used as a legitimate normative guideline at
the international political level.
What should a revised human rights conception account for to allow a worldwide
bottom-up shared identiﬁcation? It somehow has to account for the limits of human under-
standing, as Grifﬁn stated. From a standpoint of recognition theory, the idea of basic
material and physical needs must be extended by the emphasis on basic social needs that
need to be fulﬁlled for a healthy psyche and the individual’s individuation. Let me therefore
take a brief excursion to the relevant concepts from recognition theory.
Distinguishing between three levels of recognition shaping human life and socialisation
(love, rights, solidarity54), Honneth not only includes different levels of analysis of social
relations but also provides a useful portfolio to think about a contemporary self-understand-
ing of the social human being. The ﬁrst mode of recognition is internalised through the
emotional support a child gets in its early relationships with caregivers. Receiving basic
support and love in the, by nature asymmetrical, relationship with its caregivers, the
child experiences the fulﬁlment of its needs, acceptance despite a dependent state, and fun-
damental support in affect regulation. This (ideal) basis in primary relationships helps to
develop a practical relation-to-self that is stabilised through basic self-conﬁdence. The cor-
relating forms of disrespect are abuse and rape, where physical integrity is the threatened
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component of personality. The second mode of recognition is experienced through the re-
enactment and understanding of cognitive respect as it is experienced in legal relations. Out
of the cognitive understanding of the mutual relatedness and equality in legal relations, the
personality experiences the ascription of moral responsibility and learns to de-formalise and
generalise relationships to the Other. In the ideal process, the individual develops self-
respect as the practical relation-to-the-self. Correlating forms of disrespect are identiﬁed
as the denial of rights and exclusion. These forms of disrespect threaten the social integrity
of the personality. The third mode of recognition is experienced through social esteem in a
community where the subject develops and becomes recognised for his traits and abilities.
In the ideal developmental process, the individual internalises the deep understanding of
solidarity as a form of recognition that uniﬁes the community. Also, on this ground, the per-
sonality starts to differentiate, individualise and equalise in an ongoing personal individua-
tion. The practical relation-to-self is developed as self-esteem. The correlating forms of
disrespect are denigration and insult, threatening honour and dignity.55
All the levels of recognition are relevant for a comprehensive understanding of human
rights, but it is speciﬁcally the second level of recognition, the juridical recognition, which
is relevant for the human rights discourse. However, as the basis of social esteem and soli-
darity, it is closely interwoven with the third level. The guarantee of individual rights
through a legitimate (national) authority but also via the practice of mutual ascription
and respect of rights within the community one is living in provides the secure basis and
internal psychic understanding allowing a human being to rely on and trust in social
relationships, to collaborate and to ﬁnd solidarity with others even if they are not able to
provide any compensation for received support. The rights endowment of an individual
within a community gives the subject the feeling of dignity and inclusion. This experience
of recognition corresponds with a modus of practical self-relationship: The individual can
be sure of the social value of his identity and is afﬁrmed in his self-esteem. Even if ‘rights’
represent only a partial and general basis for the individual development of self-esteem, rec-
ognition as a legal person transports the basic understanding of oneself and the other as a
carrier of legitimate individual entitlements.
At the individual level, the experience of being recognized as a legal person by the members of
one’s community ensures that one can develop a positive attitude towards oneself. For in rea-
lizing that they are obliged to respect one’s rights, they ascribe to one the quality of morally
responsible agency. However, because one necessarily shares the capacities thus entailed
with all of one’s fellow citizens, one cannot yet, as a legal person, relate positively to those
of one’s characteristics that precisely distinguish one from one’s partners in interaction. For
that, a form of mutual recognition is needed in which each individual is afﬁrmed not only as
a member of his or her community but just as much as a biographically individuated subject.56
According to the interlaced logic of recognition, the ascription of rights and the practice
of social esteem are necessary for the development of internalised solidarity but also crucial
for the individual’s psychological individuation. If the moral human right reasoning
becomes adjusted to questions of recognition, the genuine bridge between the private
(social, relational aspects), the political (rights, communal commitment) and the inter-
national sphere (solidarity for strangers) that human rights should cover becomes more
explicit and conscious again.
Besides this short overview of how a humanist, social understanding of the human
rights agent in Gilabert’s sense could be considered, my account differs from Gilabert’s
also by putting more weight on anthropological thoughts but less emphasis on the belief
in global public consent. I suggest that revealing and strengthening the unifying potential
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of a humanist human rights idea requires raised awareness for its ideal theoretical value.
The positive imagination of a better life for every human being transported through the
human rights idea and realised through a shared understanding of the project has a sym-
bolic, and therefore a normative, motivational function. Introduced in a comprehensive
way, the shared narrative allows a rational, intellectual, but also an affective identiﬁcation
and commitment of individuals worldwide. Following Gilabert’s distinction between
abstract and speciﬁc human rights and using it as a substitution for the conceptual distinc-
tion between moral and political human rights, I emphasise the potential of abstract rights
with regard to individual identiﬁcation and their motivation to actively advocate the human
rights idea. Abstract human rights can provide a vivid ideal imagination of a better life for
anyone. To concentrate on how such a contemporary human self-understanding could be
elaborated, I argue more explicitly in favour of an independent, accessible moral human
standpoint serving as a point of reference for any philosophical human rights derivations
as well as for political implementations. I would like to point out the necessity of an insti-
tutionalised philosophical human rights roundtable that hosts and contains the diversity of
philosophical human rights conceptions. The function of such an institution would be to
provide a substantial, transparent value discussion in periodic meetings. Such an institution,
maybe as a part of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), could provide
explicit discussion about our contingent self-understanding as human beings as grounds
for further reﬂections about human rights practicalities. Such a philosophical ‘think tank’
reasoning would involve both an intrinsic moral ground and practical-oriented political
dimension. The idea would be that an ongoing and targeted discussion about the social
and political self-understanding and moral attitude would determine what is intrinsically
valuable and legitimate. This keeps the level of normative awareness high and the reﬂection
process in operation. This reﬂection-zone can work as a normative corrective, as a ﬁeld in
which the justiﬁcation of abstract human rights and cosmopolitan rights can be approached
on neutral ground, ﬁrst of all free from power-political preliminaries. It is not the point of
this article to elaborate the idea of such a roundtable in further detail, but it is one that
deserves further attention. Whereas the realisation of global public consent seems very
ambitious and hard to pin down, a concentrated diversity-hosting human rights roundtable
seems to have better chances to ﬁnd common understandings and goals. The periodic
meeting could assure a constant self-obligation to revise and reﬂect about the current stan-
dards. The non-dogmatic but institutionalised, central and transparent circle could serve as a
point of orientation in demanding normative justiﬁcation for international action if executed
in the name of human rights.
Human rights and cosmopolitan rights: from individual, social through to global level
The second extension in comparison to Gilabert is my argument that an individual rights
understanding, as outlined, needs to be completed by a global, international dimension
of human rights. As I will argue in the following section, the mere understanding of
human rights as individual rights cannot fully account for all those (human well-being
related) issues caused by international political interdependences that have been related
to the concept of human rights in the contemporary global context. Whereas human
rights provide grounds for immediate and needs-related claims against one’s own social
community or national government, cosmopolitan rights represent those interests that
arise from a global comparative view against the background of a highly politically and
economically interdependent world. They allow acknowledging political interests and
needs of individuals and groups that are, for example, clearly disadvantaged through
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either power-political or economic global interdependences. Whereas the term human
rights refers to the shared membership in humankind, the term cosmopolitan rights refers
to the shared membership in the international or transnational political and economic com-
munity. I therefore suggest introducing an additional distinction between human rights and
cosmopolitan rights, both having an abstract and a speciﬁc dimension.
This article has argued so far that any human rights conception must be explicitly pre-
mised on a minimal moral, substantive core of human rights. Human rights as moral claims
have to be determined with respect to the intrinsic value of social human beings. The trans-
mission from abstract (moral) to speciﬁc (legal, practical) human rights has to be discussed
with respect to practicalities. Turning to the political function of human rights it is now time
to address the question of how such a ‘social’ moral conception of human rights could serve
as a point of orientation to include the global political dimension of human rights. The dis-
tinction between intrinsic and instrumental must therefore be calibrated in reference not
only to the two poles of ‘abstract moral values’ and ‘speciﬁc practicalities’, but it also
has to accommodate the inter-state and global political dimension. To demarcate an individ-
ual and intersubjective human rights dimension from a global, political one, it is proposed to
distinguish between (a) abstract human rights and speciﬁc human rights, and (b) abstract
cosmopolitan rights and speciﬁc cosmopolitan rights. ‘Human rights’ are distinctly deﬁned
as rights of ‘the human being’; moral and political ‘cosmopolitan rights’ are established as
speciﬁed human rights guiding a content-related kind of human governance and responsive
to a changed geopolitical world order.
The core dimension of moral or abstract human rights remains at the individual level. At
the individual level, abstract (moral) human rights are distinguished from speciﬁc (practi-
cal) human rights. At the inter-state and global political levels abstract (moral) cosmopo-
litan rights are distinguished from speciﬁc (practical) cosmopolitan rights. The
transmission of abstract human rights to speciﬁc human rights as well as the determination
from abstract and speciﬁc cosmopolitan rights takes place under the normative ‘magnifying
glass’ of the moral human standpoint at the outlined philosophical roundtable. Evaluating
international politics then means orienting global aims, standards and actions against the
question of human well-being and future cross-generational implications. Principles of
state sovereignty, collective self-determination and social justice would be considered as
inherently bound to a moral conception of human rights so that they could legitimately
assume a public and standard-setting role in international politics. The social dimension
of human rights has to be valued also at the cosmopolitan dimension. For this purpose,
the respective scope of human rights and of cosmopolitan rights has to be distinguished.
First, deﬁning ‘speciﬁc human rights’ as tied to ‘abstract human rights’ means adjusting
them to the individual, intersubjective local dimension that affects life conditions before
linking further claims to the cosmopolitan aims of international, global politics. The inter-
subjective, social dimension of human rights is necessarily interwoven with the local pol-
itical dimension, since political participation, welfare, goods and services, tax liability, etc.,
are still predominantly managed at national level. Taking the social affectedness and recog-
nition processes as crucial for the moral conception of human rights and its subjective re-
enactment, derived practical human rights should incorporate claims towards the other,
within a social or cultural community, and towards their own government. National govern-
ments are the dedicated ﬁrst instance to guarantee human rights within state territory. Con-
ﬁning the formal ‘territory’ of human rights to the realm of national politics is then
artiﬁcially but reasonably upheld to distinguish human rights from ‘cosmopolitan rights’,
as rights that can be claimed at the responsible, international level.
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Second, whereas cosmopolitan rights incorporate the normative core of human rights, in
their practical form they also allow a further speciﬁcation that adjustably corresponds with
the de facto changed world order, shaped by various economic, political and cultural inter-
dependences, a gradual degradation of states and states-systems against the background of
the increasing importance of global governance. As ‘world-political’ human rights, cosmo-
politan rights would have to be speciﬁed and extended in terms of membership in a cosmo-
politan political community. Contrary to human rights that help to claim rights towards the
other within a local community or (more traditionally) against and from one’s own national
government, cosmopolitan rights have to account for those cases when national human
rights protection fails, but also for cases that require global governance solutions because
they transcend mere national interests (climate change, genetic engineering, humanitarian
interventions, etc.). Whereas cosmopolitan rights share the same normative core with
human rights, they have an extended scope covering transnational and global issues.
Following the assumption of a ‘law of proximity’, the conduct of both individuals and
governments is foremost framed by envisaged spatial, temporal, social or modal conse-
quences in one’s own near environment and concerning one’s own affectedness.57
Increased distances that possibly diminish personal solidarity of course complicate the
implementation of cosmopolitan rights. This factor is highlighted exemplarily when
humanitarian interventions are blocked by national parliamentary decisions, for instance,
for fear of losing too many lives of soldiers and too many resources – which might be com-
prehensible from a personal perspective but is out of proportion if one considers the harm
done to the affected people. Distinguishing between human rights and cosmopolitan rights
allows analysing and responding to such divergences by using a more speciﬁed
terminology.
Further research might investigate the proposed fourfold distinction between human
rights. Research questions would have to be speciﬁed with regard to the following particular
ﬁelds: abstract human rights, speciﬁc human rights, abstract cosmopolitan rights and
speciﬁc cosmopolitan rights. For instance, questions about human self-understanding, exis-
tential and social needs, capabilities, and human values are associated with the ‘abstract
human rights ﬁeld’. Based on such a ‘moral human standpoint’, it is asked how these chal-
lenges could theoretically be met within societies and by governmental institutions. The
‘speciﬁc human rights ﬁeld’ is hosting questions such as ‘How can theoretical assumptions
become applied and implemented in the context of the given? What institutions and legal
rights can optimally provide for the implementation of moral human rights in the “real
world”?’ The reasoning within the ‘abstract cosmopolitan rights ﬁeld’ is concerned with
the question of how human rights have to be extended or adapted in relation to structuring
concepts of cosmopolitanism, (global) governance, (social) justice, division of responsibil-
ities between states and transnational institutions, etc. Thus, cosmopolitan rights as rights
concerned with moral claims might for example (compared to abstract human rights) not
focus on immediate levels of suffering of particular human beings (like actual incidents
of torture) but instead articulate claims from the perspective of collective or cross-
generational danger that need to be mitigated by long-term transnational solutions (for
example, globally guaranteed prevention measures against natural or climate change disas-
ters). The coherence between abstract cosmopolitan rights and abstract human rights has to
be carefully examined. Questions about the implementation of abstract cosmopolitan rights
would be hosted within the ‘speciﬁc cosmopolitan rights ﬁeld’ discussion, which would
again discuss the question of optimal realisation within a given social and geopolitical
context.
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Towards a humane governance
A current approach in political theory that resonates with the outlined human rights under-
standing is spelt out in Richard Falk’s ‘On Humane Governance’.58 Criticising the geopo-
litical strategies of globalisation as directed by ‘wealth and power’ as ‘the norms of value’,
Falk designs a normative geopolitical account that bases its legitimation on the recognition
of ‘sane and intelligent persons’.59 According to Falk, to direct the structures and practices
of governance methodically into humane directions in order to diminish the gap between it
and geopolitical and economic processes, democratic means are required. What could well
be called a cosmopolitan citizen standpoint must therefore encompass more than norma-
tively neutral criteria like the geopolitical functionality of coordinating mechanisms and
economic efﬁciency at regional and global levels. This kind of (moral) ‘personalisation
of geopolitics’ is understood as the claim to include the kind of personal evaluation that
is generally expected from ‘sane and intelligent’ individuals. The idea is simply to base
inter-state and global decisions systematically on the normative benchmark of human
needs and values. Individuals represent the smallest entities within the global political
space and should therefore, according to Falk, be awarded with a larger inﬂuence.
Most conceptions of geogovernance are limited to coordinating mechanisms at regional and
global levels. This view of humane governance is one that links the global and regional to
the national and personal. The aggregation of the various sites of governance from the local
and personal to the global and bureaucratic cumulatively constitute humane governance.
The inclusion of the personal within the scope of humane governance is an acknowledgement
of, for example, feminist claims that the home and family are units of social control that model
behavioural roles in public space. The work of women has been habitually neglected by locat-
ing its domain within the sphere of ‘the personal’, which is excluded from assessments of
governance.60
For sure, linking ‘the global and regional to the national and personal’ requires having a
distinct pool of concepts and values ascribed to the human being in question. For this
purpose, the outlined conception of human rights, understanding human rights as a
concept that is deﬁned with respect to the personal, intersubjective dimension, may
provide a fertile ground. Such a concept of human rights would get its political meaning
in terms of offering a benchmark for domestic and international politics. Combining the
concept of human rights with a concept of humane governance, the dimension of abstract
moral values could provide a pool for claiming abstract rights that protect substantial human
capabilities while taking into account the humane vulnerability in various social contexts. A
moral conception of human rights should be valued as a necessary theoretical viewpoint for
the evaluation of geopolitics.
Implementing human rights against the background of international politics and asym-
metries would require specifying them as rights that human beings and associations possess
to be protected in the ﬁrst instance by and from their governments, and in the second
instance guaranteed due to their belonging to the cosmopolitan community. This distinction
of two scopes is not meant to dissolve the divided responsibilities of states and the inter-
national community. It rather untangles the enmeshment in theory and practice towards a
reasonably clear and realistic conception of human and cosmopolitan rights. The proposal
of a two-dimensional account is similar to Beitz’s ‘two level-model’61 that identiﬁes human
rights primarily as requirements whose object it is ‘to protect urgent individual interests
against certain predictable dangers (“standard threats”) to which they are vulnerable
under typical circumstances of life in a modern world order composed of states’. According
to Beitz, human rights apply in the ﬁrst instance (‘ﬁrst level’) to the political institutions of
The International Journal of Human Rights 15
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states, including their constitutions, laws and public policies. At a second level, human
rights are matters of international concern. In case of a government’s failure to carry out
its ﬁrst-level responsibility, the second-level agents outside the state have to take
action.62 Beitz’s two-level model offers an attractive example for how to structure the prac-
tical dimension of human rights.63 In light of Beitz’s recent gesture towards moral con-
ceptions by considering the value of human dignity, such a model could reasonably be
proven compatible with the draft of a moral conception of human rights.64
Conclusion
This study proposed to overcome the established – but inherently vague – distinction
between moral and political conceptions of human rights in philosophical debate. There-
fore, Gilabert’s distinction between abstract and speciﬁc human rights was adopted to
bridge both readings in a complementary way. The substantial conception of human
rights advocated in this article seeks to reshape the debate to a more clear and practicable
concept of human rights that is debated on moral grounds, practically operative, but avert-
ing the risk of being determined by power political decision-making or political instrumen-
tal interpretation. It is clearing a space for approaching the question of humanity within
human rights discourse without being restricted by strategic political considerations from
the very beginning. It is such a (at least to a minimal degree) freestanding – and contingent
– moral conception of human rights that allows the expression of political claims and the
criticism of domestic and international politics by reference to moral values and the require-
ments of social life as earlier outlined under the recognition theoretical perspective. While
assuming an intrinsic value shared by human and cosmopolitan rights, the proposed model
emphasises especially the distinction between requirements of a moral human standpoint,
from where abstract human rights are derived and must be transmitted into speciﬁc human
rights, and an extended cosmopolitan standpoint, from where abstract cosmopolitan rights
are derived and have to become transmitted into speciﬁc cosmopolitan rights.
Having argued for the necessity of a moral conception of human rights if and only if
understood by means of relational, social criteria, it has to be asked why this model provides
a better foundation than the classical moral conception of absolute values when it comes to
derive human rights. How are these human rights distinguished from merely traditional
individual rights? To what degree does the new conception allow for a better response to
the criticisms against classical moral conceptions? The included social dimension that
complements the understanding of intrinsic values might serve as a foundation to mark
them out as rights that genuinely carry the investment of a social and, by implication, a pol-
itical dimension. As Joshua Cohen writes, human rights are rights that always frame the
membership-conditions of the individual within a community.65 The intersubjective,
social dimension that is already included in the basic normative deﬁnition of human
rights in the outlined conception is a distinct feature mostly put in second place in liberal
individual (atomistic) conceptions of human rights. This feature incorporates a contingent
social dimension of human life into the conceptualisation of human rights that serves to
mitigate the objection against moral foundationalism.
Not to put too ﬁne a point on it, questions about the self-understanding of the human
being, about what implications this self-understanding should carry for personal, social,
national and cosmopolitan orientation and claims cannot be answered on the basis of an
ultimate anthropology. As Emil Angehrn writes, the deﬁnition of the human being must
not be one that we ﬁnd in nature or in the order of things, but one that the human being
gives to itself.66 An anthropological anchoring of human rights with a transcultural validity
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claim can therefore only be articulated as the shared human potential to create and reﬂect
about ends and values. The aspiration of political conceptions of human rights to decide and
deliberate about human rights is thus no longer bound to the standpoint of powerful global
actors, but to the normative standpoint of a human being as a ‘self-interpreting animal’,67
able to reﬂect and to shape its relation to self and other in a social and political environment.
By this theoretical shift of the prerogative of interpretation, an obligation is gained to
monitor cosmopolitan rights decisions through a ‘magnifying glass’ of this very human
standpoint.
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T H E  H U M A N  R I G H T  T O  D E M O C R A C Y   
A Critical Evaluation  
Is there a human right to democracy? The philosophical literature offers a 
plethora of studies on the topic. The present book aims at providing an over-
view of the current state of research. It distinguishes two dimensions, descriptive 
and normative, which serve as the focal points in the debate. The normative—
more controversial—dimension is further refined by raising the question wheth-
er there should be a Human Right to Democracy (HRD). What are the most ex-
pedient arguments to support or undermine the normative claim? Answering 
this question demands a systematic comparison and critique of the different 
theoretical positions. Using a fourfold distinction between (i) intrinsic political 
conceptions, (ii) instrumental political conceptions, (iii) intrinsic moral concep-
tions, and (iv) instrumental moral conceptions, this book maps the correspond-
ing theoretical claims in favor of or opposed to HRD.  A detailed and nuanced 
comparison of these claims shows that a human right to democratic political in-
stitutions has been widely rejected, whereas an (individual) human right to par-
ticipation, minimally in the form of a “right to voice,” appears to be consistent 
with all positions.  
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INTRODUCTION  
The moral philosophical question whether there should be a human right to 
democracy (HRD) developed as an offshoot of the global justice debate in the 
1990s. Within the global justice debate, authors such as Franck,1 Ezetah,2 and 
Fox and Roth3 claimed that there was a trend in international law of growing 
worldwide acknowledgement of an enforceable right of peoples to democratic 
government. Concurrent debates in political philosophy on the limits of nation-
al self-determination in an age of globalization and international interdepend-
ency, and on the possibilities of global governance, put democratic peace at the 
center of global policy concerns.4 Democratic process came to be seen as a pre-
condition for achieving global justice by establishing the requisite rights and 
norms. Since the end of the Cold War, the issues of the right to democratic gov-
ernment have featured prominently in the discussions concerning the US, and 
other Western countries’, policy of intervention. While, initially, the right to 
democratic government was understood as a right of a national collective body 
(the demos), it was increasingly employed as an argument to justify military 
 
1 Thomas M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,” 86(1) American Journal 
of International Law (1992): 41–91. 
2 Reginald Ezetah, “The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry,” 22 Brooklyn Journal of In-
ternational Law (1996–97): 495. 
3 Gregory Fox and Brad Roth, “Democracy and International Law,” 27 Review of International 
Studies (2001): 327–52. 
4 Georg Kohler, “Otfried Höffe, Demokratie im Zeitalter der Globalisierung,” in Manfred 
Brocker (ed.), Geschichte des politischen Denkens (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2008), 790–806, at 790. 
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humanitarian interventions on the international level of politics. The question 
whether there is a collective right to democratic government transformed into 
the question whether there is a human right to democracy. Reflecting the politi-
cal turn in contemporary debate on human rights, which frames the philosophi-
cal questions of global justice in terms of human rights,5 the question whether 
the claim to democratic government is justified from an individual rights per-
spective rose to the forefront of concerns. Justifying humanitarian interventions 
at a human rights level, rather then from the standpoint of political decision-
making, gained currency in international law reasoning. The two distinct tracks 
of argumentation within the general human rights debate correspond with those 
in the particular debate on whether there is a human right to democracy. On 
the one side, human rights are understood to be rights human beings have in 
virtue of being humans, corresponding to their needs, capacities and interests. 
On the other side, human rights can be rather understood as practical tools of 
international politics ensuring minimal standards of collaboration and disa-
greement. Applied to the particular HRD question, on the one hand, the con-
trasting readings lead to an understanding of a human right to democracy in the 
form of an individual right to certain forms of political participation and politi-
cal decision-making. On the other hand, the HRD question is interpreted as the 
universal collective right to self-determination and minimally democratic gov-
ernment. Thus it often includes political claims to establish certain democratic 
institutions. Within the debate, it is thus crucial to explore for each author’s po-
sition whether the moral human rights dimension is distinguished from or con-
sidered as coextensive with the political dimension. The cleavage between mor-
al, human rights argumentation and an argumentation focusing on the feasibil-
ity- and utility-arguments at the international political level additionally points 
to the different consequences a HRD would have on national and on interna-
tional level. On national level, the HRD would require an investigation of the 
democratic reality not just in non-liberal but also in western liberal democratic 
countries. Are all individuals, also minority groups such as the asylum seekers 
 
5 Eva Erman, “The ‘Right to Have Rights’,” in Mark Goodale (ed.), Human Rights at the Cross-
roads (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 72–86, at 72. 
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well enough represented in their human interests? Are they guaranteed to have 
a fair hearing and voice in case of experiences of severe injustice? – On the in-
ternational level, the HRD question throws up the question of whether demo-
cratic institutions and democratic government must become a condition for in-
ternational membership and certain forms of collaboration. Additionally, the 
question of how to deal with non-democratic nations needs to be answered. 
Should there be sanctions applied if a national government systematically de-
nies or violates democratic rights? Is it legitimate to democratize these coun-
tries? Which means and kinds of intervention in the name of democratization 
are justified from a human rights standpoint (developmental aid, humanitarian 
interventions etc.)? Emphasized in various ways, these controversial questions 
provide inseparable and recurring parts of the HRD debate. According to Alys-
sa R. Bernstein, for example, several of the military interventions in Iraq, Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Ruanda, and Albania, which were justified primarily 
by humanitarian concerns, were conducted with the explicit objective of pro-
tecting or establishing democratic governance.6 Bernstein problematizes the 
equation of the right to democratic governance and the human right to democ-
racy, claiming that the trend in international law to support an enforceable hu-
man right to democratic governance extends to the argument that the interna-
tional community should not recognize as legitimate any non-democratic gov-
ernment.7  
Obviously, the conjunction of moral human rights questions and political 
reasoning thus generates conceptual and normative difficulties. Whereas the 
demand for a collective right to democratic institutions entails a political func-
tional claim for a kind of governance that protects and guarantees human 
rights, the human right to democracy is understood as a subjective, individual 
rights claim comparable to other freedom-related rights. As such, the human 
right to democracy must be understood as a right potentially against one’s own 
government or people, even if it is democratically established. For example, this 
 
6 Alyssa R. Bernstein, “A Human Right to Democracy? Legitimacy and Intervention,” in Rex 
Martin and David Reidy (eds.), Rawl’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 
278–298, at 278. 
7 Bernstein, “A Human Right to Democracy? Legitimacy and Intervention,” at 278. 
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could be the case if a democratic government is transformed into a tyranny of 
the majority through the power of a people’s ideology.8 Thus, the idea of a hu-
man right to democracy acquires its normative force by being interpreted as 
protective of the value of individual self-determination rather than of collective 
self-determination. The idea includes the primary demand that human beings 
not only enjoy freedom, but also decide about their liberties beyond their na-
tional identity or of the place of residence.9  
Overall, the philosophical question whether claiming a human right to de-
mocracy is morally justified is closely related, but not identical, to the question 
whether there should be a collective right to democratic institutions. Therefore, 
to have a clear view of the many levels of this debate, it is important to keep in 
mind the distinct human rights theories involved and the presumed distinct con-
tents of the concept of democracy. “Democracy” can be understood either as a 
concrete governmental organizational structure with (at least minimal) demo-
cratic institutions, decision procedures, and the rule of law, or as a societal ideal 
or “ethos” referring to the intrinsic value of self-government and participation 
for citizens, ethnic or minority groups, and nations. Democracy as a societal 
normative ideal usually serves as a reserve of imagination generative of more 
concrete demands for democratic institutions. Carol C. Gould’s global democ-
racy ideal provides an example of this kind of approach. According to her un-
derstanding of democracy, democracy denotes a manifold social and political 
model for interaction between the members of a political community that serves 
as the precondition for an internalized and convinced habitus and shared ethos 
for political participation and decision-making.10 Gould’s example represents 
one pole of the spectrum of understandings of democracy. Other authors such 
as Thomas Christiano represent a distinct conception, a “minimal egalitarian 
 
8 Georg Lohmann, “Liberal and Republican Understanding of the Relationship Between De-
mocracy and Human Rights,” in Margot Brown, Anne-Marie Eekhout, and Yoanna Baleva 
(eds.), DARE in ACTION, Vision and Practice for Democracy and Human Rights Education in Europe (Ber-
lin: The Dare Network, 2006), 11–14. 
9 Stephan Kirste, “The Human Right to Democracy as a Capstone of Law,” 4 Legal Journal 
“Law of Ukraine” (2013): 144–162, at 144. 
10 Carol C. Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). 
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democracy” including a cluster of rights such as formally equal votes, equal op-
portunity to run for office, or to determine the agenda of decision-making.11 
Apart from the diverging current understandings of democracy, the historical 
transformation of the concept has to be minded. The contemporary transfor-
mation of related political sub-concepts, such as citizenship, also have to be taken 
into consideration. For example, with regard to the establishment of the claim 
of the human right to democracy, contemporary democratic theory has been 
substantially informed by the political philosophical discussion about the chang-
ing meaning of citizenship in the age of globalization and pluralism. This dis-
cussion about citizenship addresses the importance of inclusion and membership 
underlying most minimal-version claims of the human right to democracy, 
worded as a human right to have rights or as a human right to participation.  
This book provides a systematical and critical evaluation of the key philo-
sophical contributions to the debate. It helps the reader understand the main 
difficulties, as well as the potential implications, of what is a most relevant con-
temporary debate. It synthesizes the elements of the debate in an accessible and 
comprehensive way, by enumerating and comparing the different premises and 
arguments. Without compromising the complexity of the debate, the book fore-
grounds the common denominators and points to unresolved conceptual prob-
lems and the overall controversial nature of the claim of a human right to de-
mocracy, which is based on the liberal democratic idea of political equality.  
In order to address the question whether there should be a human right to 
democracy, I focus on the debate in political philosophy over roughly the past 
decade. Arguments that loom large in this debate stem from authors such as 
Joshua Cohen, Charles Beitz, Carol C. Gould, and Thomas Christiano, each 
representing a different thought tradition (in political and moral philosophy, po-
litical science, and law).12 Prior questions have been raised by Jürgen Haber-
 
11 Thomas Christiano, “An Egalitarian Argument for a Human Right to Democracy,” in 
Human Rights: The Hard Questions, ed. Cindy Holder and David Reidy (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013), 301–25. 
12 The most prominent authors of the debate include: Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human 
Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-
Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
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mas, on the grounds of the equi-primordiality of human rights and democra-
cy,13 and also by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice14 and The Law of the Peoples.15 
Joshua Cohen significantly stimulated the current HRD debate in the early 
 
2004), 142–147; Carol C. Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); Carol C. Gould, “The Human Right to Democracy and Its Global Im-
pact,” in Cindy Holder and David Reidy (eds.), Human Rights: The Hard Questions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 285–300; Thomas Christiano, “An Instrumental Argument 
for a Human Right to Democracy,” 39(2) Philosophy & Public Affairs ( 2011): 142–176; Thomas 
Christiano, “An Egalitarian Argument for a Human Right to Democracy,” in Cindy Holder 
and David Reidy (eds.), Human Rights: The Hard Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 301–325; Seyla Benhabib, “Is There a Human Right to Democracy? Beyond Inter-
ventionism and Indifference,” in Christoph Broszies and Henning Hahn (eds.), Philosophical Di-
mensions of Human Rights. Some Contemporary Views (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 191–214; Seyla Ben-
habib, “Gibt es ein Menschenrecht auf Demokratie? Jenseits von Interventionspolitik und 
Gleichgültigkeit,” in Christoph Broszies and Henning Hahn (eds.), Globale Gerechtigkeit. Schlü-
sseltexte zur Debatte zwischen Partikularismus und Kosmopolitismus (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010), 404–438; 
James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2008); David Miller, National Responsi-
bility and Global Justice (Oxford University Press, 2007); David A. Reidy, “On the Human Right 
to Democracy: Searching for Sense Without Stilts,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (April 17, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2041327 (accessed August 20, 2014); Bernstein, “A 
Human Right to Democracy? Legitimacy and Intervention”; Samantha Besson, “The Human 
Right to Democracy—A Moral Defence with a Legal Nuance,” Paper presented at the Defini-
tion and Development of Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty in Europe, Frankfurt a. M., 
May 15–16, 2009. Doc. No. CDL-UD(2010)003, available at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-UD%282010%29003-e (accessed 
August 20, 2014); Rainer Forst, “The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justi-
fication: A Reflexive Approach,” 120(4) Ethics (2010): 711–40; Hilary Charlesworth, “Is There a 
Human Right to Democracy?,” in Cindy Holder and David Reidy (eds.), Human Rights: The 
Hard Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 271–284; Georg Lohmann and 
Gosepath, Stefan (eds.), Philosophie der Menschenrechte (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1998); Georg 
Lohmann, “Demokratie und Menschenrechte” (2011), available at 
http://www.georglohmann.de/ (accessed August 28, 2012); Kirste, “The Human Right to De-
mocracy as a Capstone of Law.” 
13 For the detailed discussion of equi-primordiality, and the reciprocal structure of negative 
and positive liberties, see Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des 
Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1992), at 135ff, 162. 
14 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap University Press of Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1999 [1971]).  
15 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (4th ed., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
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twenty-first century, addressing and rejecting the claim for an HRD in his arti-
cle “Is there A Human Right to Democracy?”16  
The aim of this book is twofold. First, it intends to provide an overview of the 
current philosophical debate about whether there should be a human right to 
democracy (HRD). I show that the claims for, or against, an HRD can be clas-
sified according to a fourfold scheme: as (i) normative political conceptions, (ii) 
instrumental political conceptions, (iii) intrinsic moral conceptions, or (iv) in-
strumental moral conceptions. This fourfold thematic map allows isolating, or-
der, and critiquing the main pro- and counterarguments in a systematic way.  
Second, based on this analysis, I ask what the different conceptualizations of 
HDR have in common, and how their differences could either be reconciled 
when it comes to practical, ethical, and (power) political questions. My aim is to 
show that, despite the practical difficulties accompanying the claim for democ-
racy as a human right, the normative idea of equality in having a voice and 
hearing independently from someone’s residence status is of inestimable motiva-
tional, symbolical, and social value for any member of a political society. The 
claim for a comprehensive human right to democratic governmental institutions 
is seen as unrealistic in overrating the power of an international political regime 
with regard to questions of implementation while at the same time underesti-
mating the necessary change in political self-understanding and practice of citi-
zens and political communities forming a democratic ethos as it is needed for a 
functioning democratic system in the longer term. Whereas I will thus reject the 
claim for a human right to democratic government, the argument for a human 
right to democracy defined as a basic right to minimal political participation (in 
the sense that every individual must have the possibility to object and to claim 
support against the experience of severe injustice that it experiences within the 
political community he or she is living in), will be supported. Instead of a hu-
man right to democracy, I claim a human right to voice, assigning the moral com-
petency to represent one’s own interests and guaranteeing fair hearing inde-
 
16 Joshua Cohen, “Is there a Human Right to Democracy,” in Christine Sypnowich (ed.), The 
Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G.A. Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 226-
250. 
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pendently of one’s place of residence or political affiliation. A human right to 
voice would secure the individual political right to protest, individually or col-
lectively, if a person becomes endangered or harmed within the society he or 
she is living in. 
Altogether, the present book aims at providing an overview of the current 
state of research. It distinguishes two dimensions, descriptive and normative, 
which serve as the focal points in the debate. The normative—more controver-
sial—dimension is further refined by raising the question whether there should 
be a Human Right to Democracy (HRD). What are the most expedient argu-
ments to support or undermine the normative claim? Answering this question 
demands a systematic comparison and critique of the different theoretical posi-
tions. Using a fourfold distinction between (i) intrinsic political conceptions, (ii) 
instrumental political conceptions, (iii) intrinsic moral conceptions, and (iv) in-
strumental moral conceptions, this book maps the corresponding theoretical 
claims in favor of or opposed to HRD.  A detailed and nuanced comparison of 
these claims shows that a human right to democratic political institutions has 
been widely rejected, whereas an (individual) human right to participation, min-
imally in the form of a “right to voice,” appears to be consistent with all posi-
tions.
9 
 
 
 
1   
 
MAPPING THE DEBATE  
1 . 1 .  I N T E R D I S C I P L I N A R Y  SCO P E  
This chapter presents the crucial controversies within the HRD-debate. It in-
troduces the specific cleavage between practical and moral philosophical rea-
soning. Further, the current state of implementation of democratic rights in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is discussed. Finally, provid-
ing the reference theory for most authors of the HRD-debate, John Rawls’ most 
relevant contributions from the A Theory of Justice17 and his human rights ac-
count from The Law of Peoples18 are outlined. 
In order to obtain an overview of the different positions, one must keep in 
mind that the question “Is there a Human Right to Democracy?” has a positive, 
a legal, and a normative dimension.19 Comparing the different approaches that 
provide answers to the HRD-question requires, first, that we take into account, 
not only the final insights of the diverging approaches, but also the diverging 
premises. I argue that certain hot button issues of the interdisciplinary debate 
can be defused by redrawing the boundaries of moral and political concep-
 
17 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (repr. ed., Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1999). 
18 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (repr. ed., Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University 
Press, 2002). 
19 Besson, “Human Right to Democracy,” at 6. 
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tions.20 For example, while many legal or political theories restrict their norma-
tive claims from the outset to the political realm and the possibility of practical 
implementation, others operate at a rather abstract level and tend to neglect 
common human rights practice. The two different emphases seem to imply an 
insurmountable rift between the moral and the political rationales. The task is 
to show that these two perspectives—one practical and political, the other ab-
stract—are the two necessary sides of a more adequate concept of human 
rights, one that keeps its substance and applicability if and only if both, its ideal-
theoretic normative foundation and its political implementations are combined. 
In other words, if human rights are understood as mere political concepts, they 
are bound to be empty, and if they are understood in a merely moral way, they 
are blind. The differences between the moral and the political readings are visi-
ble from the start in the varying definitions of the very concepts of “human 
rights” and of “democracy.” For this reason, I begin with common work defini-
tions of these notions that can be compared to the definitions used by the later 
reviewed authors. Democracy is understood as a constitution based form of 
government that guarantees general personal and political rights. It further 
guarantees fair elections and independent courts.21 Human rights are defined as 
rights antecedent to the state, which are assigned to every human individual 
against organized collective unities such as the state.22 The claim for a human 
right to democracy must not necessarily equal the right to democratic government. 
In a minimal sense, the HRD is defined as a universal individual right to political 
 
20 I discussed the historical separation between moral and political conceptions of human 
rights in Anita Horn, “Moral and Political Conceptions of Human Rights: Rethinking the Dis-
tinction,” International Journal of Human Rights (February 22, 2016), Epub ahead of print, DOI: 
10.1080/13642987.2016.1147433. 
21 “Demokratiegeschichte Schweiz,” Was ist Demokratie? Grundzüge und Geschichte einer 
anspruchsvollen Staatsform, available at http://demokratie.geschichte-schweiz.ch/definition-
demokratie.html (accessed October 21, 2014) 
22 “Was sind Menschenrechte?—Definitionen,” 
Informationsplattform Humanrights.ch (last update December 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.humanrights.ch/de/menschenrechte-einfuehrung/was-sind-menschenrechte/ (ac-
cessed 21 Oct 2014). 
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participation. As will become apparent, the reviewed authors represent each dif-
ferent readings of the HRD claim. 
 
1 . 2 .  T H E  F O R K I N G  P A T H S  O F  
T H E  H U M A N  R I G H T  T O  D EMOCR AC Y  
In theory, there are a number of minimal democratic claims already embedded 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Articles 21 and 25 of 
the UDHR23 demonstrate the degree to which the international community 
acknowledges citizens’ right to political participation—in contrast to non-
citizens— as a cornerstone of a hypothetical HRD. The specific wordings—for 
example in article 21.2: “[e]veryone has the right of equal access to public service 
in his country” (emphasis added)—already raise the question of the role of citi-
zenship and state sovereignty in the implementation of the principle of universal 
equality as claimed by the UDHR preamble. What is often overlooked in advo-
cating the universal application of rights24 entrenched in the UDHR, is the fact 
that these rights—even if not restricted by race, color, sex, language, religion, 
birth, and social status—are bound up with the condition of citizenship. The in-
terest of national sovereignty seems to take precedence, and it precludes human 
rights from universally protecting individual human interests (also acts as a pro-
tection against the state authority one is subjected, whether as a citizen or a 
non-citizen).25 
From a practical point of view, the following questions can be raised: How 
would a legal HRD impinge on how the receiving countries deal with non-
citizens? What political authority would enforce the HRD, and by what means? 
Could the HRD be legitimately based on national, cultural, or political identity, 
 
23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Resolution 217 A(III), December 10, 1948, 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/pages/Language.aspx?LangID=eng. (accessed Ju-
ly 8, 2013). 
24 See e.g. Charles R. Beitz, “What Human Rights Mean,” 132(1) Daedalus (2003): 38–39. 
25 For a constructive idea to deal with the sometimes blurred responsibilities between nation 
state and international community, see Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, ch. 17. 
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or should it not rather be granted to every individual that is subjected to and af-
fected by (any) political community in which she or he lives.26 The answers to 
these questions seem to presuppose a general position regarding whether, and 
under what social and political circumstances, democratic rights and democrat-
ic institutions can be claimed as universal values that prove to be beneficial to 
every human being in every kind of society. Thus, the normative form of the 
HRD question becomes paramount. Asking whether there should be an HRD 
helps refine the more controversial, normative dimension at the heart of discus-
sions in political philosophy. Which arguments are most expedient in supporting 
or rejecting the claim for a moral HRD? Does the  
(dis-)approval of a moral HRD necessarily amount to rejecting a claim for a polit-
ical, legal human right to democracy?  
Obviously, the debate about whether an HRD should be claimed opens up a 
number controversies in political philosophy: namely, concerning the relation 
between (i) individual rights and popular sovereignty, (ii) majoritarian decision-
making and protection of minorities, and (iii) legitimate authority and the re-
sponsibility of supranational organizations (particularly dominated by Western, 
liberal democratic views) towards sovereign states with different governmental 
systems. The formulation and practical implementation of the various answers 
provided by philosophers and political scientists to the HRD question requires 
an awareness of the underlying different human rights rationales.  
 
1 . 3 .  R A W L S ’  L O N G  S H A D O W  
John Rawls’s contribution to political theory has become a cornerstone for the 
current debate around the right to democracy. In his seminal Theory of Justice 
Rawls conducts an ideal–theoretical thought experiment of the veil of igno-
rance,27 before presenting the basic argument for moral equality and distribu-
tive justice. Rawls claims that a modern democratic constitutional state must 
 
26  Robert E. Goodin, “Enfranchising all Affected Interests, and its Alternatives,” 35(1) Philoso-
phy & Public Affairs (2007): 40–68. 
27. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 
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uphold two principles of justice: the principle of equal liberty and the principle of 
difference, which set a standard for establishing political rights and for political 
conduct). A condensed version of Rawls’s liberal account of a modern constitu-
tional democracy is given in The Law of Peoples,28 which extends the social con-
tract theory into an international arena primarily on the basis of the concept of 
public reason. The aim of the text is to propose a political model, a “law of peo-
ples,” that reasonable liberal and non-liberal states and citizens could regard as 
legitimate and adopt. Public debate on political questions is meant to facilitate 
agreement under conditions of reasonable pluralism in contemporary societies, 
without presupposing a shared comprehensive doctrine of the good life on reli-
gious, philosophical, or moral grounds.29  
The Rawlsian ideal-theoretical model—now extended into the international 
domain—provides a conceptualization of human rights that presupposes public 
agreement on minimal political (but not moral) values in the international 
community. According to Rawls, human rights “express a special class of urgent 
rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) 
of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.”30 
Rawls explicitly distinguishes human rights from constitutional rights, on the 
one hand, and from rights of liberal democratic citizenship, on the other. The 
list of human rights he proposes is a narrow one, and it does not encompass the 
right to a democratic government or to political participation:  
The core human rights include rights to subsistence, security, personal prop-
erty, and formal equality before the law, as well as freedoms from slavery, 
protections of ethnic groups against genocide, and some measure of liberty of 
conscience (but not, as we have seen, a right to democratic participation). 
These core human rights are the minimal conditions required for persons to 
 
28. Rawls, Law of Peoples. 
29 Ibid., at 31. 
30 Ibid., at 79. 
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be able to engage in social cooperation in any real sense, so any well-ordered 
society must protect them.31 
Rawls’s exclusive set of universal human rights is used in The Law of Peoples in 
order restrict justifications of war and to set the limits to a regime’s internal au-
tonomy.32 The political function of human rights is central and binding for all 
regimes, since “the fulfillment of human rights is a necessary condition of the 
decency of a society’s political institutions and of legal order”; “their fulfillment 
is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by other peoples, for 
example by diplomatic and economic sanctions, or in grave cases by military 
force”; and “they set a limit to the pluralism among peoples.”33  
There are many reasons why Rawls’s theory continues to be a productive 
reference in the HRD debate; I will name only a few. First, the more parsimo-
nious a theoretical list of human rights claims, the more likely it is to garner in-
ternational consent and to be implemented. Rawls provides an elegant political 
theory applicable to the current conditions of pluralist societies. The second rea-
son for Rawls’s relevance is his theory’s distinctive normative foundation and its 
liberal democratic ideals. Third, Rawls’s theory presupposes two moral powers 
of personality—“an effective sense of justice,” and “the capacity to form, to re-
vise and to rationally pursue a particular conception of the good,”34 which are 
attractive to morality-, agency-, and capability-based approaches.  
Despite its apparent attractiveness, the reliance on Rawls’s political theory in 
the human rights debate presents a fundamental difficulty: it is first of all de-
signed for the specific audience of liberal democratic nations, and against the 
background of the method of wide reflective equilibrium. It takes for granted 
 
31 Leif Wenar, “John Rawls,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2013), available at URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/rawls/ 
(accessed August 20, 2014). 
32 Rawls, Law of Peoples, at 79. 
33 Ibid., at 80. 
34 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980”, 77(9) 
Journal of Philosophy (1980): 515–572, at 525. Further discussed with a view on the comparison of 
Rawls and Hegel in Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, “Rawls, Hegel, and Communitarianism,” 19(4) Po-
litical Theory (1991): 539–571, at 551.  
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the existence of liberal democratic basic rights and liberties and the understand-
ing of citizens as free and equal individuals. These normative assumptions con-
cern the citizens in a liberal democratic society but are not claimed to be uni-
versal moral values. The aim of Rawls’s earlier Theory of Justice is not to justify 
individual human rights but to provide an account of democratic institutions 
under the ideal theoretical assumption of a social contract (“the veil of igno-
rance”). 35 Arguing from the standpoint of a rational choice, Rawls posits the 
precedence of “right” over “good.”36 The moral justification of basic (human) 
rights—if understood as individual rights—remains hollow for two reasons. 
First, within the political framework of liberal democratic people, certain values 
of the “good” (freedom, autonomy, equality, etc.), in which individual rights are 
supposed to be grounded, are already assumed to be implicit in a liberal demo-
cratic society. Second, the equation of human rights with individual rights pre-
supposes a universally shared conception of the human “good”; however, as 
Rawls argues in Political Liberalism, even under liberal democratic political condi-
tions of a pluralist society public consent is imaginable only regarding political 
values and not regarding a substantive conception of the good. Rawls’s interna-
tional elaboration of “justice as fairness” is based on his renouncing the claim of 
a universal, comprehensive conception of the (human) good. The claim of polit-
ical, but not moral, autonomy becomes part of his political conception of jus-
tice.37 Against this background, it stands to reason that the specific discussion 
about the nature of human rights Rawls has given in The Law of Peoples (1999) is a 
political one that includes only a minimal substantive account for individual 
rights under non-democratic conditions. The validity of an account of human 
 
35 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, at xii: “In particular, I do not believe that utilitarianism can pro-
vide a satisfactory account of the basic rights and liberties of citizens as free and equal persons, a 
requirement of absolutely first importance for an account of democratic institutions. I used a 
more general and abstract rendering of the idea of the social contract by means of the idea of 
the original position as a way to do that. A convincing account of basic rights and liberties, and 
of their priority, was the first objective of justice as fairness. A second objective was to integrate 
that account with an understanding of democratic equality, which led to the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity and the difference principle.” 
36 Ibid., at 396. 
37 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), at 42. 
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rights rests on its ability to achieve wide international consent. By reducing uni-
versal human rights to a degree of “minimal conditions required for persons to 
be able to engage in social cooperation” (subsistence, security, personal proper-
ty, formal equality before the law, freedoms from slavery, protections of ethnic 
groups against genocide, and some measure of liberty of conscience), Rawls 
wants to provide a most plausible account of human rights. It must satisfy the 
condition of having a realistic chance of garnering international public consent. 
This standpoint, however convincing it might be from a methodological per-
spective, does not account for (nor does it exclude) the more complex justifica-
tion of human rights as individual rights: rights that every human being should have 
in virtue of simply being a human being. As soon as we aim for human rights 
conceptualized as universal individual rights, more substantive and human sub-
ject oriented criteria have to be brought in. 
17 
 
 
 
2   
 
POLITICAL CONCEPTIONS:  
FROM THE TOP DOWN  
This and the following chapter review and analyze contemporary arguments 
advocating or opposing a human right to democracy (HRD). I first subdivide 
these arguments into moral and political, before drawing a map of four major 
themes. An approach can be said to be political if it emphasizes either the logic 
and optimization of the existent supranational system or general political nor-
mative goals, such as the right of a political community to collective self-
determination, minimal social justice, or, more broadly, peace. A political for-
mulation of an HRD is framed and conditioned by larger international political 
or legal issues. Conceptions classified as moral, on the other hand, reason from 
the bottom up, as it were, and address the question of an HRD from the moral 
standpoint of a rational human being. These two rationales can be then 
mapped depending on the form of argumentation: either normative, intrinsic or 
instrumental. Using the resulting heuristic distinction between (i) normative po-
litical conceptions, (ii) instrumental political conceptions, (iii) intrinsic moral 
conceptions, and (iv) instrumental moral conceptions, four possible types of an-
swers to the HRD question are presented. Turning to the political categories 
first, the political answers to the HRD question can be determined as follows:  
Normative political conceptions aim at a legitimate and just social and political or-
der. They emphasize political ideals and principles concerning the welfare of 
2 · Political Conceptions 
18 
societies such as justice, equality, popular sovereignty, or collective self-
determination. A successful normative political claim for an HRD must show that demo-
cratic rights or institutions are an intrinsically valuable precondition to realizing such principles 
and ideals. 
 
1. Instrumental political conceptions emphasize the role that human rights 
play in international relations as political and public instruments. 
Partisans of this approach consider empirical reasons from a “norma-
tive” perspective and define legitimacy as practical applicability and 
efficiency of human rights in international political contexts. A success-
ful instrumental political claim for an HRD must show the value of strategic, po-
litical goals of the international community, for example, as a legitimate instrument 
to impose sanctions on regimes that violate other human rights. 
 
2. Political conceptions primarily define human rights as instruments 
structuring politics in international relations, in order to, for instance, 
justify war or to specify limits on a regime’s international autonomy 
(as Rawls argues). Empirical questions and questions concerning the 
worldwide implementation define important criteria in deciding 
whether an HRD should be claimed.  
 
On the side of the normative political conceptions, a distinguished strength in 
reasoning can be described in the attempt to find a reasonable equilibrium be-
tween substantive normative theory and the requirement of implementation in 
political reality. The debate-characterizing contribution of Joshua Cohen is dis-
cussed at lengths as it includes comprehensive coverage of the debates most 
controversial questions. Promoting the idea of membership and the principle of 
collective self-determination as normative criteria to measure the legitimacy of 
human rights claims, Cohen distances himself from a particular HRD claim. 
Nevertheless, the critical discussion of his membership idea and the demon-
strated relation between collective and individual self-determination will allow a 
first delineation of the idea of a human right to voice. Further discussed contri-
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butions in the category of political normative conceptions stem from Alyssa R. 
Bernstein and David A. Reidy. 
Authors representing an instrumental political focus are generally open to 
promoting their political arguments rhetorically, using moral philosophical ar-
guments, but are not willing to stake their definition of human rights on a sub-
stantive moral foundation. They refrain from explicitly drawing on abstract 
principles of moral or political theory with regard to obeying the law of parsi-
mony, and in favor of the likelihood of realistic consensus-occurrence in inter-
national discourse. When it comes to the conceptualization of human rights, the 
political and legal feasibility in terms of international relations and/or the 
reaching of some form of public consensus are the crucial criteria. Thus, unlike 
normative political conceptions, instrumental political conceptions are concep-
tualized independently of a comprehensive normative political theory, such as 
The Theory of Justice,38 and they are distinctively working under a pragmatic, so-
lution-oriented, and international relations focus. The contributions of Charles 
C. Beitz and Allan Buchanan are associated with this category of political in-
strumental conceptions. One central insight of instrumental political concep-
tions is that political legitimacy has to be understood in a multilateral, not only 
in a national context. The praxis of human rights is based on an international, 
global legitimacy discourse. Correspondingly, the definition and implementa-
tion of human rights depend on multilateral negotiations and specific judicial 
orders. The issue of legitimacy arises mainly with respect to the question how 
human rights can be established as standards of international and global au-
thority in real terms, and how human rights standards themselves can be justi-
fied.39  
 
 
 
 
38 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap University Press of Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1999 [1971]). 
39 Fabienne Peter, “Das Menschenrecht auf politische Partizipation, Hinterfragt—Der Ethik,” 
Podcast: Philosophisches Seminar der Universität Zürich (August 23, 2013), available at: 
http://www.ethik.uzh.ch/hinterfragt.html (accessed August 20, 2014). 
2 · Political Conceptions 
20 
2 . 1 .  N O R M A T I V E  P O L I T I C A L  CONC E P T I O N S   
2.1.1. The Normative Idea of Membership (Joshua Cohen) 
While the Rawlsian account is a point of reference for many HRD authors, I 
will focus in this section on Joshua Cohen. Cohen follows Rawls in distinguish-
ing between rights founded on justice and human rights, and, like Rawls, he denies 
that the right to democracy belongs in the realm of human rights. Consistent 
with the Rawlsian tradition, Cohen emphasizes the idea of (global) public reason as 
encompassing the conception of human rights, and claims that a human rights 
rationale “cannot be formulated by reference to a particular moral or secular 
moral outlook.”40 However, in contrast to Rawls’s account of public reason41 in 
Political Liberalism, in his conception of human rights Cohen abandons the idea 
of individuals as being free and equal in the presumed context of democratic cit-
izenship; instead, he prioritizes the normative idea of membership, or inclusion, in a 
(not necessarily democratic) political society. According to Cohen, respect for 
the ideals of membership should become the minimal moral criterion in a legit-
imate political system. The idea of membership is demarcated from the right to 
democracy, which Cohen understands as an individual equal right to political partici-
pation.42 In contrast, the rights of dissent, free expression, and conscience are 
subsumed in the idea of collective self-determination, and thus belong to the 
category of human rights—while the right to democracy does not.43  
Cohen’s emphasis on the ideal of global public reason and the deliberative, 
participatory ideals of membership, tolerance, and collective self-determination 
seems to be at odds with his rejection of a human right to democracy. However, 
Cohen’s position might become clearer if we take a closer look at his conceptu-
alization of “human rights” and “democracy.” 
 
40 Joshua Cohen, “Is there a Human Right to Democracy,” in Christine Sypnowich (ed.), The 
Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G.A. Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), at 
237, 226-250. 
41 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), at 213, 217–218.  
42 Cohen, “Human Right,” at 236. 
43 Ibid., at 238. 
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In Cohen’s view, human rights are entitlements that serve to ensure the bases 
of membership in a community. Human rights represent what is owed by all 
political societies to individuals “in light of basic human interests and the char-
acteristic threats and opportunities that political societies present to those inter-
ests.”44 These rights are (a) universal, and owed to all individuals in every political 
society; (b) requirements of political morality whose force as such does not depend on 
their expression in enforceable law; and (c) especially urgent requirements of po-
litical morality.45 Cohen’s methodological assumption is that an account of hu-
man rights must meet a condition of fidelity46 to the main human rights instru-
ments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Human 
rights are also open-ended, meaning that their identification and enumeration is 
an unending process and that there may emerge rights that had previously not 
been stipulated; open-endedness also means that, due to their abstract language, 
rights must always be interpreted concretely.47  
As a corollary to Cohen’s conception of global public reason, human rights serve 
as a shared basis for political argument that expresses a “common reason,” up-
on which adherents of conflicting religious and ethical traditions might reason-
ably be expected to agree.48 The claim of an equal right to participate in de-
 
44 Ibid., at 232. 
45 Ibid., at 229–230. 
46 Ibid., at 230: “I have not yet explained how I understand “human rights” as a distinct nor-
mative category. As a preliminary, then, I will say that human rights have three features: 1. They 
are universal in being owed by every political society, and owed to all individuals. 2. They are 
requirements of political morality whose force as such does not depend on their expression in 
enforceable law. 3. They are especially urgent requirements of political morality. These features 
are suggested by the remark in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that human rights 
are “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.” I also make two meth-
odological assumptions. First, I assume that an account of human rights must meet a condition 
of fidelity: if there are human rights, then at least some substantial range of the rights identified 
by the principal human rights instruments—especially the Universal Declaration—are among 
them. The rights identified in those instruments represent “provisional fixed points” in our re-
jection on the nature and content of human rights. Second, I assume a condition of open-
endedness.” 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., at 226. 
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mocracy, however, exceeds such a common standard of achievement. Despite 
the considerable advantages of democracy in promoting justice, the condition of 
“especially urgent requirements of political morality” seems not to be a given: 
Justice requires democracy: that is true for everyone, for us—so to speak—as 
well as them. A world with more democracy would be a more just world, be-
cause it gives people the treatment as equals to which all are entitled. But de-
mocracy, with its equal right to participate, is not part of the common stand-
ard of achievement, defensible on the terrain of global public reason, to which 
global public responsibility extends.49  
An assessment of the demanding prerequisites that a conception of equality re-
quires is pivotal for Cohen’s rejection of the HRD. Referring to Robert Dahl’s 
“logic of equality,”50 Cohen names three components of a right to participate 
suggested by the classical liberal democratic understandings of democracy: (i) 
equal rights of participation; (ii) a strong presumption in favor of equal votes; 
and (iii) equal opportunities for effective political influence.51 Criticizing the 
right to participate because it demands “equal opportunity for effective political 
influence rather than equality of influence,”52 which implies that the demand 
for influence is unreasonable if claimed irrespectively of one’s own actions or of 
the convictions of others, Cohen steps back from a human-rights claim for polit-
ical equality, although he has no doubts regarding the intrinsic validity, and the 
moral truth, of the principle of equality. But the insight that “right now, this 
truth is not part of global public reason”53 explains why the human rights claim 
for political equality cannot become incorporated in human rights theory as a 
universal premise (“truth argument”54). Apart from distancing himself from 
fundamental value premises like equality and freedom of persons, the idea of 
equal political capacity is seen as standing in possible cultural conflict with Islamic 
 
49 Ibid., at 246. 
50 Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). 
51 Cohen, “Human Right,” at 241. 
52 Ibid., at 241–242. 
53 Luigi Caranti, “Human Rights and Democracy,” in Thomas Cushman (ed.), Handbook of 
Human Rights (London; New York: Routledge International, 2012), 85-99, at 94–95. 
54 Cohen, “Human Right,” at 243. 
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or Confucian conceptions (Cohen’s bootstrapping argument55). In search of a com-
promise, instead of the far-reaching claim of equal political participation, Co-
hen introduces a normative idea of membership. From the normative idea of mem-
bership he derives the “normative requirement of collective self-
determination”56 as the basis for any conception of human rights. As previously 
mentioned, the claim of collective self-determination is less demanding than the 
requirement of democracy,57 but it is still connected to some minimal political 
claims of individual members such as rights of dissent, expression, or con-
science:  
The central feature of the normative notion of membership is that a person’s 
good is to be taken into account by the political society’s basic institutions: to 
be treated as a member is to have one’s good given due to consideration, both 
in the processes of arriving at authoritative collective decisions and in the con-
tent of those decisions. For this reason, an idea of collective self-determination 
of a kind that I mentioned earlier is a natural correlate of the requirement of 
treating all as members.58 
Cohen’s argument concerning collective self-determination as a legitimate human 
rights claim, independent of a superior HRD-claim, is based on his assumption 
that the three conditions of collective self-determination can be satisfied in an 
undemocratic political context. That is, collective self-determination requires: (a) 
binding collective decisions resulting from, and accountable to, a political pro-
cess that represents the diverse interests and opinions of those subject to (and 
expected to comply with) the society’s laws and regulations; (b) rights of dissent 
from, and appeal to, collective decisions; and (c) the expectation for the gov-
ernment to publicly explain its decisions which must be founded on a concep-
tion of the common good.59 According to Cohen, these conditions could also be 
fulfilled under a theocratic government, which permits only adherents of a par-
ticular religion to hold official representative positions or to acquire certain priv-
 
55 Ibid., at 244. 
56 Ibid., at 233. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., at 233, 237–238. 
59 Ibid., at 233. 
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ileges. Further, these representatives need not be selected through democratic 
partisan elections, but can be elected by separate social groups.60 
Cohen contrasts norms of justice with norms of political obligations and emphasizes 
the idea of tolerating reasonable differences.61 Political obligation is shown to be 
partially independent (from a public reason perspective) of the moral adequacy 
of a government’s decisions. According to Cohen, a limited degree of injustice is 
accepted by citizens, and it is inevitable even under democratic regimes. The 
standards to which all political societies must be held accountable (the appro-
priate common standards of achievement) are necessarily less demanding than 
the standards of justice.62 In a nutshell, Cohen reflects on two possible human 
rights perspectives and promotes the second over the first. The first defines hu-
man rights as a form of universal truth about human beings and their moral 
standing; human rights must be understood as an aggregate of ethical insights 
resulting from the historical learning process. The second sees human rights as 
part of the conception of global public reason with the distinct political aim of 
presenting “standards that one can reasonably expect others to accept.”63 The 
difference between a normative notion of membership, which claims that a per-
son’s good “is to be taken into account” by political institutions and representa-
tives, and the democratic claim that every human being has to be given the op-
portunity to participate and represent its interests within a political context is 
only a gradual one, since even the normative conception of membership needs 
to claim a certain equality of persons as well.  
Cohen’s prioritizing of the (moral) right to membership as a right “to have 
one’s good given due to consideration, both in the processes of arriving at au-
thoritative collective decisions and in the content of those decisions,” and the 
corollary priority of his (political) conception of collective self-determination, 
leave open the question whether and how the right “to have one’s good given 
due to consideration” is realized in decent societies. To guarantee the consider-
ation of one’s good a minimal right to participation, for example, in the form of 
 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., at 234–235. 
62 Ibid., at 235. 
63 Ibid., at 243. 
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a right to a “hearing” or—in Albert O. Hirschman’s terminology to a “voice”—
in cases of individuals’ experiences of serious injustice within their community 
seems to be needed at minimum. Hirschman, a prominent sociologist and 
economist from the 1970ties onwards, discussed the logic of voice and exit re-
garding consumer reactions in the face of an efficiency loss of companies and of 
the state. His sociological reflections about the dynamics between exit and voice 
are helpful to understanding political participation processes in general. In his 
book Exit, Voice and Loyalty64, Hirschman provides a definition of “voice” which I 
would like to introduce at this point. “Voice” is the act of objecting or protesting 
with the intention of achieving directly a recuperation of the quality that has 
been impaired.”65 The normative idea of membership as defined by Cohen 
therefore necessarily entails the human-rights claim for minimal participation, 
at least in the form of an individual’s recourse in case of extreme injustice 
caused, or tolerated, by the community of which he or she is a member. An in-
dividual human right to voice66, protected at either the national or international 
level, seems essential from the perspective of Cohen’s conception of member-
ship. 
Although Cohen includes the rights to dissent from and appeal to collective 
decisions in his argument for collective self-determination, “the expectation of 
public explanation by the government for its decisions” has to be founded “on a 
conception of the society’s common good.”67 But what happens if, for example, the 
individual’s conception of his or her own good differs from the society’s concep-
tion of common good? If an adult daughter of a Muslim couple decides that her 
need for liberty obliges her to cast off the burka in public, or to claim free choice 
of her own husband, this claim seems not to be covered by Cohen’s human 
right to membership. A necessary precondition to the right to membership, 
therefore, is an individual right to voice against decisions of his or her member-
 
64 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States (Cambridge Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 1970). 
65 Albert O. Hirschman, “Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An 
Essay in Conceptual History,” 45(2) World Politics (January 1993): 173–202, at 176. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Cohen, “Is There a Human Right to Democracy?,” at 233.  
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ship community, decisions that may be severely unjust or violent. Such a right is 
more than a mere right to free expression or non-discrimination. A human right 
to voice ascribes to persons the moral and political competence to stand up for 
one’s basic interests, needs, and rights if the own community one is living in re-
fuses to listen to, or support, individual members even though they suffered in-
justice or harm. In such cases, the responsibility of the international community 
is to support the particular individual. If such support cannot be provided in the 
infringing country, a way out of the unbearable situation has to be found within 
the community with the support of international human rights organizations. 
The provision of individual political security raises the question of how, and 
when, the international community would have to secure the conditions of fair 
membership and legitimate “collective” self-determination, and whether it 
would have to establish specific institutions, such as an ombudsman office, that 
could guarantee the individual’s “right to voice”.  
The most crucial point of contention remains Cohen’s conceptualization of 
collective self-determination and the lack of specific discussion about its relation 
to individual self-determination. Karin Schnebel, for example, pointed out in 
the spirit of Kant, Hegel, and Taylor, that normative ideas of individual and 
collective self-determination are necessarily interconnected.68 The normative 
justification of collective self-determination depends from its function to enable 
the individual self-determination within the political community. According to 
Habermas’s system of rights (which he grounds with the help of the discourse 
principle), the relation of mutual presupposition between private and public au-
tonomy69 is tantamount to the relation of mutual presupposition of individual 
and collective self-determination. Arguing that human rights and the principle 
of popular sovereignty still constitute the only ideas capable of justifying modern 
law, and putting the relation between human rights and popular sovereignty in 
a kind of analogy to the relation between the historical concepts of self-
determination and self-realization, the legitimate claims for human rights, popu-
 
68 Karin B. Schnebel, “Individuelles und kollektiv ausgeübtes Menschenrecht als Selbstbes-
timmungsrecht,” Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (January 2008): 26-46, at 32.  
69 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1996), at 84, 128. 
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lar sovereignty (collective self-determination), individual self-determination, and 
self-realization are based on democratic opinion- and will-formation:  
So the sought-for internal connection between popular sovereignty and hu-
man rights lies in the normative content of the very mode of exercising political au-
tonomy, a mode that is not secured simply through the grammatical form of 
general laws but only through the communicative form of discursive processes 
of opinion- and will-formation.70 
Beyond the discussion of a discursive process of opinion- and will-formation in 
Habermas, Marc Weller further exemplifies the link between individual and 
collective self-determination. According to Weller, 71  individual self-
determination is crucially determined by the liberal values of individual freedom 
and autonomy, and, nowadays, democracy. He argues that collective self-
determination should be understood as a kind of “onion-concept”: the inner 
layers represent the ideal of individual self-determination, enveloped (and or-
dered) by the outer onion skin—representing the collective self-determination. 
From the perspective of international law, the individual self-determination rep-
resents an entitlement to participate in the political, economic, or cultural sys-
tem of a given state, and “might be regarded as co-extensive with the right to 
some form of democratic governance.”72 At a group level, self-determination is 
understood as the right of certain groups, such as national, religious, ethnic, or 
linguistic minorities, to enforce their interests. Self-determination is therefore 
seen as congruent with minority rights. Self-determination extended to peoples 
implies for example a unilateral right to secession, namely “to initiate a change 
in the status of a territory through an act of will of the population of that entire 
territory.”73 Finally, self-determination of states means, for example, the possibil-
ity to consent or disagree about international and multilateral standards and 
cooperation in the “concert of states.”74  
 
70 Ibid., at 99, 103. 
71 Marc Weller, Escaping the Self-Determination Trap (Leiden/Boston: Nijhoff, 2008). 
72 Ibid., at 23. 
73 Ibid., at 28. 
74 Ibid., at 23ff. 
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However strong the relationship between individual and collective self-
determination is, its implication with regard to Cohen is clear. The question be-
comes: does Cohen’s normative idea of membership meet the requirements of 
an individual right to self-determination? If Cohen’s membership rights of dis-
sent, expression, and conscience meet the minimal requirement of an individual 
right to voice, they therefore also represent the minimal kernel of a democratic 
individual right of self-determination. Thus, Cohen’s rejection of a human right 
to democracy becomes questionable, as the membership idea can then no more 
exclude the (democratic) claim for political equality. On the contrary, if the 
normative idea of membership does not imply a minimal individual right to 
voice, the individual members of a group lack basic protection against acts of in-
justice or violence that are justified by common interests of the membership 
community.  
Even if the assumption of the relation of mutual presupposition between in-
dividual and collective self-determination is rejected, according to Caranti, one 
would still be needed to clarify who is the (collective) “self” determining the in-
terests of a people at an international level.75 Caranti presents further objections 
to Cohen’s arguments of obligations and tolerance. He considers it a mistake to 
draw a “dubious analogy between political obligation in a liberal democracy 
and political obligation in a hierarchical society” and “an equally dubious pro-
hibition of external interference within autocratic polities.”76 He further points 
out that the assumption that “global toleration cannot be identical with liberal 
toleration” undermines the existing transcultural agreement on the value of 
non-discrimination and equality.77 Finally, he criticizes Cohen for being “over 
neutral” when the latter denies (in favor of political consensus and moral flexi-
 
75 Caranti, “Human Rights and Democracy,” at 90–91: “Yet, even if the preference to live un-
der a hierarchical society is authentic, in the sense that a vast majority endorses a non-
democratic form of government, there is no guarantee that elites’ decisions will take into due 
consideration the interests of all, in particular of those minorities that would see their rights bet-
ter defended by liberal institutions. If this is the case, the “self” in the self-determination would 
be a rather oppressive majority.”  
76 Ibid., at 92. 
77 Ibid., at 94. 
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bility) a minimum claim for formal equality or a confession to the golden rule 
together with the HRD: 
More importantly, one wonders whether, in allowing the moral flexibility, 
Cohen is not betraying a common-sense notion of justice that is already part 
of a rising global public conscience. After all, the idea of a fundamental enti-
tlement to equal respect is grounded in general moral rules considered as 
common to all “civilizations.”78 
Caranti rightly shifts the attention back to Cohen’s own aspiration, which is not 
to undercut growing consensus,79 but to support it further. However, the sharp 
critique of “self-undermining” should itself not undermine Cohen’s remarkably 
sophisticated effort toward intercultural mediation and conceptualization. Nev-
ertheless, with the normative conception of membership and the rational moral 
assumption of “global public reason as a terrain of reflection and argument ra-
ther than a list of determinate rules, as part of the term ‘reason’,” some substan-
tial premises remain open. Cohen aims for a global public reason,80 conceptual-
ized on the model of the Rawlsian idea of public reason that provides public consent. 
According to Rawls, public consent is supposed to work in liberal democratic soci-
eties. But does not global public reason already imply a minimal notion of democ-
racy? If it does,81 then arguing against the HRD by falling back on the genuine-
 
78 Ibid., at 90–91. 
79 For instance, the commitment to the principles of freedom, justice, and equality is also part 
of the preamble of the Arab Charter of Human Rights and could be seen as a common denom-
inator to deliberate about legitimate claims of political equality. Arab Charter on Human 
Rights (May 22, 2004, entered into force March 15, 2008), 12 International Human Rights Reports 
(2005): 893. 
80 Cohen, “Human Right,” at 236. 
81 Joshua Cohen and Charles F. Sabel, “Global Democracy?,” 37 International Law and Politics  
(2005): 763–798, at 797. Cohen and Sabel reflect on the possibility of a global public administra-
tion that would finally lead to the development of a cosmopolitan demos that is democratically 
organized. While they leave open the question of whether global democracy is feasible, their 
conceptualization of human rights allows the speculation that Cohen in fact does understand 
human right as a part of the idea of a global democratic equality standard: In the first place, 
human-rights claims can be presented as elements of a global standard—a global public reason, 
itself part of the world of global politics—that sets out conditions of acceptable treatment, re-
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ly democratic concept of public reason would certainly seem ironic. Cohen ex-
plicitly rejects the need of peoples to endorse “the democratic idea of society as 
an association of equals”. Peoples don’t need to participate in global public rea-
soning but only need to accept the norms of membership.82 According to Co-
hen, the degree of equality required to accept equal right to membership is 
smaller than the degree of democratic political equality. However, the threshold 
between democratic equality (rejected in the membership approach) and non-
democratic political equality (required by the membership approach) is left un-
clear. The conditions and procedures under which global public reason in Co-
hen’s sense could be exercised require further clarification. Insisting that global 
public reason “is better understood as a terrain of reflection and argument than 
as a list of determinate rules: that is part of the force of the term ‘reason’”83 does 
not help to clarify which actors would have the right to take part at the level of 
international, global reasoning about human rights (and for what reasons). Are 
there procedures, other than democratic, that could structure and legitimate 
such considerations at a multilateral level?84 Cohen gives only a vague overview 
of the realization of global public reason: 
The precise ways of exercising the responsibility of interpretation, monitoring, 
and enforcement—who exercises it (international courts and other institu-
tions, regional bodies, individual states, non-governmental organizations) and 
with what instruments (ranging from monitoring, to naming and shaming, to 
sanctions, to force)—vary widely. Although the agent and reach of the reason 
are global, often acting on the principles of global public reason may consist 
principally in observing the implementation of its principles by separate polit-
ical societies, or perhaps in assisting in their implementation.85 
 
quiring in particular that political societies assure conditions of membership for those who live 
in their territory. The requirement of respecting human rights, understood as a condition of 
membership, does not depend on liberal ideas of person and agent, but can find resonances in a 
wide range of ethical-religious traditions.  
82 Cohen, “Human Right,” at 235. 
83 Ibid., at 237. 
84 For Cohen and Sabel’s further reflections on a global administration, see Cohen and Sabel, 
“Global Democracy?” 
85 Cohen, “Human Right,” at 236. 
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Measures such as those described would certainly also fit into a Habermasian 
conception of deliberative democracy. However, because Cohen uses a narrow 
definition of democracy, he succeeds to stay on the (logical) track of argumenta-
tion against a HRD. Overall, tracking Cohen’s understanding of the key terms 
of global public reasoning, membership, and self-determination gives some indication of 
the complexity of the debate. By promoting a conception of human rights based 
on a normative conception of membership, Cohen’s project is to enlarge the 
“common denominator area” under the ideal of global public reasoning between 
democratic and non-democratic peoples. From the viewpoint of this attempt at 
mediation, arguing for an HRD would seem biased. In fact, Cohen walks the 
line between giving a “light version” of an HRD under the title of “norms of 
membership” and aiming to recognize the boundaries of cultural, social, and 
political understandings by the other. 
 
2.1.2. Yes, there is a Human Right to Democracy 
—but not yet (Alyssa R. Bernstein) 
Alyssa R. Bernstein’s approach equates Cohen’s normative political conception 
and his rejection of an HRD, but she puts stronger emphasis on distinct moral 
arguments and a direct comparison to, and reconstruction of, the Rawlsian 
human rights conception in The Law of Peoples. Bernstein adopts the classical in-
terpretation of human rights as moral rights, as “rights all human beings have 
just in virtue of being humans sharing the same vital needs and interests,”86 and 
she takes them to be axiomatic. The moral basis of human rights is seen as “in-
dependent of the character of any current or past international political or eco-
nomic relationships”87. They must be based theoretically on principles of justice, 
but their legitimacy does not depend on the practical approval of the basic hu-
man rights by all states: “Regardless of whether all states have legally committed 
 
86 Alyssa R. Bernstein, “A Human Right to Democracy? Legitimacy and Intervention,” in Rex 
Martin and David Reidy (eds.), Rawl’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 
278–298, at 279. 
87 Ibid. 
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themselves to respect and secure these rights,” the international community 
may legitimately enforce them worldwide.88  
The strong link between basic human rights and the consequent claim for in-
ternational interventions to protect them can be identified as Bernstein’s most 
distinct (even if rather provident than logically chosen) argument against an 
HRD (corresponding to Rawls’s).89 She argues for the exclusion of political 
rights of procedural democracy from the list of internationally enforceable basic 
human rights, but, since they are grounded in conditions of governmental legit-
imacy, as outlined in Rawls’s Law of Peoples,90 she proposes to classify them as 
“derivative” human rights. To make sure “not to interpret the idea of basic hu-
man rights in a way that logically presupposes or requires democratic govern-
mental institution (nor, conversely, in a way that logically implies that they can-
not require them),”91 Bernstein reproduces Rawls’s idea of public reason in rela-
tion to his conceptualization of justice, reciprocity, reasonableness, and over-
lapping consensus.92 The basic institutions of a just society in a Rawlsian under-
standing can be justified by reference to a public conception of justice accepta-
ble for all society’s participants. In spite of the variety of different comprehen-
sive doctrines and value systems, public reason allows us to identify an “over-
lapping consensus” about what is politically reasonable for every society and 
about a “freestanding political conception” that is acceptable by all participants, 
irrespective of their conceptions of the good life:  
When an overlapping consensus obtains, the members of the society can use 
what Rawls calls “public reason” when offering justifications to one another 
for “laws and policies that invoke the coercive powers of government concern-
ing fundamental political questions,” and for the basic structure of their 
 
88 Ibid. 
89 “What I oppose is unjustifiable use of coercive force in the name of democracy, specifically, 
non-defensive international military action with the aim of establishing procedurally democratic 
political institutions, as distinct from the aim of stopping grave violations of basic human rights” 
(ibid., 294). 
90 Ibid., at 282, 292. 
91 Ibid., at 287. 
92 Ibid., at 283. 
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shared social and political world. Such justifications can be offered to and 
freely accepted by all participants.93 
Reaching agreement on a “freestanding political conception” does not presup-
pose procedural democracy but is framed by two requirements of public reason: 
the “criterion of reciprocity” and a “minimum-respect-for-justice condition.” 
According to the criterion of reciprocity, the “terms of cooperation may be re-
garded as fair only if those proposing them have good reasons to regard them as 
acceptable to all of the participants, who are thought of as equals acting freely 
and not subject to domination, manipulation, or the pressures generated by an 
inferior social, economic, or political position.”94 Regarding the cooperation of 
the peoples, at a minimum, non-liberal peoples have to act reasonably and with 
mutual respect in relation to other states, “although they might be less than rea-
sonable as regards their domestic structure of political and economic institu-
tions.”95 Societies that do not accept the liberal criterion of reciprocity are not 
entirely just according to this conception.  
In Bernstein’s view, the minimum-respect-for-justice condition as a precondi-
tion to participation in public reasoning in a society of peoples requires some 
kind of political structure and civil society that would allow citizens to express 
freely and publicly their disagreement with their respective governments on 
matters of justice and to claim their rights. The sovereignty of a state and the le-
gitimacy of its government depend on the fulfillment of this condition.96 Bern-
stein argues for sticking to the substantive requirement of the minimal-respect-
for-justice condition by distinguishing between procedural and substantive conceptions of 
democracy and the indefensibleness of a mere procedural democracy on an egali-
tarian basis.97  
However, even if Bernstein denies that participating in democratic self-
government has a value sufficiently great enough to justify a basic human-rights 
 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., at 284. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., at 285–286. 
97 Ibid., at 289. 
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claim, she also shares the Rawlsian long-term motive standing behind the re-
straint: The incremental transition of non-liberal societies into liberal democra-
cies in the process of history: 
Moreover, Rawls argues, following the Law of the Peoples is the best way to 
bring into stably peaceful international society of decent peoples, thus secur-
ing everyone’s basic human rights. And doing so is the best morally permissi-
ble way to increase the likelihood that nonliberal societies will become liberal 
democracies. All societies change over time, at least gradually, and since de-
cent societies allow a right of dissent and require that governmental officials 
reply to the criticism respectfully, by addressing the merits of the question, 
such societies may well evolve in a liberal-democratic direction, unless imped-
ed by liberal states’ ill justified coercive interventions.98  
Bernstein’s argument against an HRD seem to consist in part in a defense of 
“decency,” insofar as the hope for a long-term progress, such as domestic evolu-
tion of non-liberal peoples towards liberal democracies,99 forbids imposing a 
specific deadline on democratization of non-liberal peoples. From a liberal per-
spective, this forbiddance is both a consequent concession of negative liberties 
to other states, and a sign of restraint of (militarized) “colonial,” or paternalistic, 
interventions against decent states. Otherwise, the question of what role an 
HRD could play for citizens in burdened or outlaw states fades against the back-
ground of the relation between (non-liberal) decent and liberal states. If the “de-
cency” of a state depends explicitly on whether it guarantees its members 
“democratic” features—such as a substantial political role in making political 
decisions, a right to be consulted, and a right to dissent—these claims could be 
expected to have an even greater relevance in burdened and outlaw states. The 
moral argument against an HRD in relation to the meaning that such a right has 
for individual human beings seems to be underdetermined.  
Altogether, apart from rather insubstantial reasons against classifying the 
right to equal participation as a basic human right, the denial of an HRD seems 
 
98 Ibid., at 290–291. 
99 Beitz refers to that Rawlsian idea as “an empirical hypothesis about political development.” 
See Charles R. Beitz, “Human Rights as a Common Concern,” 9(2) American Political Science Re-
view (2001): 269–282, 276. 
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to stand (at least partly) for a symbolic commitment to the principles of non-
interference and of respect for sovereignty. Refraining from a human-rights-
claim, such as an HRD, that is closely related to a specific liberal-democratic 
idea of good government, can be seen as a strategic political move, consistent 
with democracy, making it possible to invite non-liberal representatives to the 
table where public reasoning takes place. Contrary to the rejection of an HRD 
understood as a human right to a democratic government, both the criteria of rec-
iprocity and the minimal respect for justice equate substantive claims supporting 
an individual right to democracy if understood in a minimal sense as a claim for 
the guarantee of reciprocity and respect within one’s political community.  
 
2.1.3. Realizing the Human Right to Democracy Step by Step 
—Without Promoting it as such (Matthew Lister) 
In his article, “There is no human right to democracy. But may we promote it 
anyway?,”100 Matthew Lister addresses a widespread readers’ disappointment 
with the Rawlsian rejection of the human right to democracy. Rawls rejects the 
HRD despite simultaneously upholding the claim that democracy is required 
for justice and that it provides many important advantages for the protection of 
human rights and participation in the international community.101 Although he 
affirms the view that what the international community can demand is that a 
state respect human rights, but not that it establish a system of democratic gov-
ernment, Lister mediates between the positions in favor of and against the claim 
of a human right to democratic institutions. He suggests that there are legiti-
mate interventions aiming at promoting democratic structures in non-
democratic states without having to claim an HRD. In classifying states accord-
ing to their level of democratic development, Lister uses three sets of examples 
to illustrate the ways of promoting democracy without running the danger of il-
legitimate interventionism. First, he proposes that certain general-purpose in-
 
100 Matthew J. Lister, “There Is No Human Right to Democracy,” 48(2) Stanford Journal of 
International Law (2012): 257-276. 
101 Ibid., at 276.  
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ternational bodies with membership open to all states (such as the United Na-
tions, the World Trade Organization, or the International Labor Organization) 
could limit or condition membership, and the benefits it entails, on the re-
quirement of certain basic liberal democratic principles. Hereby, he supports 
placing higher standards (compared to the Rawlsian minimal standard for de-
cent societies) on would-be members of organization such as the European Un-
ion. Lister advocates such higher standards as – to the extent that membership 
in such groups is seen as beneficial – he expects them to induce democratization 
without being an intervention. 102  Further, a particular condition could be 
placed on the signing of bilateral or multilateral investment or defense trea-
ties.103 As another way of promoting democracy in a way compatible with the 
Rawlsian view, Lister names “encouragement of cultural exchange and educa-
tional visits by different members of society in the society targeted for re-
form”104. For example, such programs can involve reciprocal facilitation of 
travel between states for pleasure or business reasons. Exchange programs for 
government officials, teachers, students, and others are also seen as “useful 
means of promoting democracy”. 105 Whereas the attractiveness of democratic 
life needs direct visits in liberal countries, or, as Lister suggests the stationing of 
Peace Corps volunteers in non-democratic countries, the promotion of democ-
racy in the political arena needs much more prudence. Lister proposes careful 
but reliable support of states or political parties at the time of elections. Offering 
neutral provision of technical assistance for elections, or independent election 
monitoring, could help realizing this third direction of impact in promoting 
democratic development.106 
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2.1.4. Human Right to Democracy: Morally Affirmed, Politically Rejected (David A. Reidy) 
David A. Reidy continues the Rawlsian tradition by making explicit the unre-
solved tension between the basic moral desirability of the HRD and its rejection 
for political reasons—as in Cohen’s and Bernstein’s arguments. Reidy starts out 
by drawing a clear distinction between a universal moral right to democracy, which he 
supports, and a legal human right to democratic political institutions possessed by each and 
all persons against the state to which they belong, which he rejects. Reidy suggests that 
an explicit assertion of a universal, justice-based moral right to democratic insti-
tutions does not necessarily imply its transformation into a human right to democ-
racy.107 Human rights must represent a “universal moral right, fidelity to which 
is a necessary condition of a polity’s recognition, status, membership, or full par-
ticipation within the international community, or at least its central institutions 
and law-making practices.”108 One way to preserve their special status in inter-
national community is to limit coercion and maximize peace in international re-
lations with publicly shared principled deontic criteria.109  
According to Reidy, suggesting that, as a matter of legal rights within inter-
national law, there is a human right to some meaningful measure of political 
participation does also not necessarily amount to an HRD to democratic politi-
cal institutions.110 To amount to a human right, the moral substance of a hu-
man right to democratic political institutions would have to be conclusively 
identified as being of special significance or of concern for the international 
community.111 Reidy denies that possibility by criticizing both William Talbott, 
who argues that legitimate political authority must aim at the common good of 
the subjected individuals, and Thomas Christiano, who makes an empirical 
point of showing the positive effect of democratic political institutions and the 
fulfillment of basic human rights, for adopting a selective, incomplete perspec-
tive with regard to the international function of human rights.112 Both of these 
 
107 Reidy, “On the Human Right to Democracy,” at 181. 
108 Ibid., at 177. 
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accounts will be discussed in more detail in the sections about moral intrinsic 
and moral instrumental conceptions in part 3. 
 
2 . 2 .  I N S T R U M E N T A L  P O L I T I C A L  CONC E P T I O N S  
2.2.1. Two Level Model of Human Rights but no Human Right to Democracy 
(Charles Beitz) 
Charles Beitz advocates the idea that human rights should be defined as a polit-
ical construction stemming from the aftermath of World War II. In his article 
Human Rights as a Common Concern113, he detaches the classical philosophical in-
terpretation interlinking human rights and moral rights in natural law tradition. 
Beitz does not consider the linkage between human rights and moral rights to 
be a necessary component of justifying universal human rights. A relation be-
tween human rights and moral rights and beliefs is possible, “but it would be an 
error to identify these more fundamental moral beliefs with a political doctrine 
of human rights.”114 Beitz uses “Asian values”, “the Islamic oppression of wom-
en”, and female genital mutilation, he underpins that local moralities sometimes 
turn out to be irreconcilable with  international human rights.115 He substanti-
ates the insight that the UDHR and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights are not and do not have to be seen as entirely culturally or polit-
ically neutral and impartial. The UDHR is a negotiated agreement fulfilling 
several important roles in international relations, such as (a) constraining the 
domestic constitutions of states and the fundamental rules of international or-
ganizations and regimes; (b) prescribing goals for social development applicable 
to all contemporary societies; (c) offering the grounds of appeal in situations of 
human rights infringement by a range of international and transnational ac-
tors—not just governments but also officials of international institutions and 
 
113 Charles R. Beitz, “Human Rights As A Common Concern,” The American Political Science 
Review 9, no. 2 (2001): 269–82. 
114 Beitz, “Common Concern,” at 277. 
115 Ibid., at 271. 
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nongovernmental organizations acting in their capacity as citizens of global so-
ciety.116  
Beitz does not propagate the Rawlsian “hypothesis about political develop-
ment” because, in his view, it reduces human rights to a function of legitimizing 
military interventions. In contrast to the Rawlsian approach, Beitz insists that to 
be justified, human rights should be acceptable to reasonable individuals, not 
groups.117 The way Beitz refrains from a human right to democracy therefore 
differs, for example, from Bernstein’s interpretation, insofar as Beitz argues on 
behalf of persons (even though, like Bernstein’s, his approach is pragmatic). For 
example, in the case of a fictional authoritarian regime in which a minority 
claims democratic reform by invoking the Covenant on Civil and Political rights 
(whereas the majority repudiates democratic reform), Beitz argues, an interna-
tional intervention would rely on unjustified paternalism.118 The three possible 
arguments to justify a paternalistic intervention119 that involves coercive inter-
ference in some people’s liberty cannot be seen as a given. The “urgency of the 
interests at stake” of the rebellious minority has to be examined in relation to 
the “costs of interference and its probability of success.” As Beitz states:  
[I]f a significant portion of the population lacks democratic sympathies, then 
it is not likely that democratic institutions will be sustained even if a democrat-
ic insurgency attains its immediate objectives. In that case it could be true 
 
116 Ibid., at 277. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid., at 278. 
119 “Normally, the justification of a paternalistic choice has at least three elements: (1) a claim 
that the subject is unable to choose rationally for himself owing to a failure of reason or will; (2) 
evidence that the choice is guided by knowledge of the subject’s own interests, to the extent they 
can be known, or by a reasonable conception of the interests it would be rational for the subject 
to have; and (3) a reasonable expectation that the subject will come to agree that the agent’s 
choices on his behalf are the best that could be made under the circumstances. In my example, 
because a significant portion or even a majority of the population does not share democratic po-
litical values, for this portion of the population the second element (and possibly the third) of the 
justification would fail. The interference does not appear to take seriously the moral beliefs of 
those whom it coerces” (ibid). 
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both that there is a human right to democratic institutions and that interfer-
ence in support of a prodemocratic insurgency would be wrong.120  
Given the complex historical and social process leading up to institutional 
change and a shift in political belief, Beitz refrains from a categorical conclusion 
about the sufficiency of democratic reform.121 He returned to this earlier posi-
tion and elaborated it in his book Idea of Human Rights122: taking inspiration from 
Joshua Cohen, he concluded with a discussion of a human right to collective 
self-determination (replacing the HRD claim). The “double” normative re-
quirement of an HRD to protect the underlying interests of the politically sub-
jected, and prescribe a particular kind of institutional purpose, has to be ques-
tioned empirically. Given the second normative requirement, two common in-
strumental justifications cannot be empirically verified. On the one hand, the 
advantage of policy performance in democratic regimes is inconclusive from an 
empirical perspective and dependent on contingent social and economic factors. 
On the other hand, the success of democratic transitions is challenging and 
hardly predictable. More specifically, there is a greater instability of transitional 
regimes in poor societies. 123 Similar to Cohen and Bernstein, Beitz does not call 
the familiar justification of democracy in standard cases into question; instead, 
he challenges the idea that this justification extends to all contemporary socie-
ties.124 He further seems to coincide with Cohen in categorizing a right of col-
lective self-determination to be “a better candidate for a human right to regu-
late the political constitutions of societies.”125 Gathering Cohen’s three features 
of self-determination, 126  and understanding the right of collective self-
 
120 Ibid., at 279. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Charles R. Beitz, Idea of Human Rights, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 174–186.  
123 Ibid., at 177–180. 
124 “Since human rights must be both universal and action-guiding, the proper inference from 
the fact that there are circumstances in which the absence of democratic institutions would not 
generate (even pro tanto) reasons for outside agents to act is that the doctrine of human rights 
should not embrace such a right” (ibid., at 185). 
125 Ibid. 
126 Cohen, “Human Right,” at 228. 
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determination to be, among other things, “a right not to be (forced to be) demo-
cratic,”127 he concludes with three developments of the discussed claim for a 
human right of collective self-determination. First, he claims that the require-
ment that societies be self-determining is too demanding to be precisely formu-
lated for practical human-rights purposes, and it goes against the classical inter-
national law doctrine that political constitutions are subordinate to a given 
country’s domestic jurisdiction. Second, the human right to collective self-
determination would have to face similar empirical uncertainties as those faced 
by the HRD. Third, claiming a human right to collective self-determination is 
equivalent to fostering democratic institutions as an important goal of interna-
tional political action:  
To agree that there is a human right of collective self-determination is to 
agree that violations provide reasons for political action. In social circum-
stances in which the satisfaction of this right can only come about through 
democratic institutions, threats to such institutions would supply reasons for 
outside agents to defend them.128 
In the end, Beitz fails to clarify his position regarding a human right to collec-
tive self-determination. On the one hand, he seems to propose an attractive 
compromise, but, on the other, he never resolves the basic issues of justification 
of such a right. The human right to collective self-determination presupposes al-
ready strong democratic premises. 
Overall, Beitz’s analysis constitutes a nuanced, pragmatic approach that is 
able to address contemporary challenges and empirical issues concerning the 
phenomenon of democracy and human rights. However, there seems to be a 
gap between his explicit renouncement of distinct moral philosophical concep-
tions of justifying human rights in favor of a politically constructed human 
rights conception, the justification of which depends on practical benefits and 
various functions in terms of international relations, on the one hand, and his 
implication of a kind of “side track” justification of human rights from the per-
 
127 Beitz, Idea of Human Rights, at 182.  
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spective of persons. Despite his adoption of a practical international approach 
he borrows from a (not further explained) moral perspective, allowing him to in-
troduce a moral principle of cultural deference129 or a conception of moral pa-
ternalism in a self-evident way. Such a twofold justification tries to absorb part 
of the fundamental tension of the contemporary political situation: The oppor-
tunity to participate in public affairs, on the one hand, should be granted to all 
citizens; on the other hand, there seems to be a trend of international law to 
recognize a universal right to democratic institutions in a top-down way. How-
ever, in his comprehensive human-rights theory in The Idea of Human Rights, 
Beitz establishes a distinction between two levels of understanding and imple-
menting human rights. At first instance, human rights are understood as claims 
against the state (first level). Provided that the state neglects its obligation to pro-
tect the citizens’ interests, this protection falls under the responsibility of the in-
ternational community (second level).130 Such splitting of responsibilities is valu-
able pragmatically—even if it does not resolve the tension between moral and 
political justifications of human rights. The model unwittingly expresses the 
fundamental interdependency between moral and political rationales already in 
the beginning when Beitz elaborates a distinct political, instrumental conception 
of human rights. The hereby expressed interdependency of moral and political 
rationales and its meaning for the specific HRD will further occupy us when 
talking about the intrinsic moral conceptions of authors who are particularly 
oriented to models of deliberative democracy. 
 
2.2.2. Minimal Democracy as a Legitimate Claim: Three Arguments (Allan Buchanan) 
Allan Buchanan is a political philosopher and philosopher of international law 
who is dealing with human rights concerns not just from the theoretical but also 
from the practical side. Active as a member of the Tucson Samaritans, he is en-
gaged in the support of Mexican migrants on the borders of Sonoran Desert. 
This active moral prioritizing of practical humanitarian support over the previ-
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ous legal incorporation of human rights is mirrored also in his theoretical ac-
count in which the moral and the legal dimension of human rights can exist in-
dependently from each other.131 
According to Buchanan, the question whether a right to democratic partici-
pation, and hence a right to participate in democratic institutions, is a human 
right, requires moral theories to answer two central questions about democracy:  
 
(1) Should international law include the requirement that individual 
states be governed democratically (and, if so, should this requirement 
take the form of an international legal human right to democratic 
governance ascribed to individuals, and what understanding of de-
mocracy should it employ)?  
 
(2) Is democracy (in some form) a requirement for the legitimacy of the 
international legal system itself, that is, must the system be democrat-
ic for it to be morally justifiable and for the legitimate enforcement of 
its rules)?132 
 
Focusing on the first question, Buchanan discusses three main arguments in fa-
vor of international law requiring the governments of states to be democratic:  
The first provides support for the conclusion that democratic governance is a 
human right properly speaking by grounding democracy in equal considera-
tion for persons. The second, instrumental argument, contends that democra-
cy ought to be required of governments because democratic governance is the 
most reliable way of ensuring that human rights properly speaking are re-
spected. The third holds that only if governments are democratic is it appro-
priate to treat them as agents of their peoples and hence as legitimate.133 
 
131 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), at 145. 
132 Ibid., at 142. 
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In addition to the moral argument in favor of the HRD (1), he provides an em-
pirical (2), and further a logical argument (3). Underlying the first claim (the 
equal consideration of persons argument) is the moral equality principle, which, Bu-
chanan suggests, is the best justification for human rights in general. Despite his 
international focus, Buchanan thereby holds on to an inseparability of moral 
and politically normative claims. Democracy is seen as an important element of 
the institutional recognition of the equality of persons, fostering equal consid-
eration of interests such as respect for autonomy and concern for wellbeing by 
requiring that all persons have the same fundamental status and are considered 
as equal participants in political decision-making in their societies.134  
The second argument (the instrumental argument) asserts the instrumental 
value of democracy in the protection of human rights which “ought to be re-
quired of all governments as a condition of their legitimacy under international 
law.”135 Citing Amartya Sen’s finding that democratic governments’ expectable 
accountability prevents them from persisting in the mismanagement that is a 
key contributing factor in famines, Buchanan underlines the role of democracy 
in safeguarding the right to subsistence resources and thus to the general protec-
tion of human rights.136 Buchanan further refers to the democratic peace hy-
pothesis, which states that democracies tend not to make war with each other 
and therefore reduce the violation of human rights.  
The third argument (the agency argument) carries the normative claim that 
governments have to represent, and serve as the agents of, their citizens. Inter-
national law should require states to be democratic because democratic institu-
 
134 Ibid., at 143. 
135 Ibid. Henry Shue formulated that argument in the maybe best known version. For Shue, 
basic rights are only those the enjoyment of which is essential to the enjoyment of all other 
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its enjoyment is seen as an integral part of enjoyment of rights in general. Henry Shue, Basic 
Rights. Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 
and 67, 82. 
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tions are necessary positioned within the international political system so as to 
reach state consent and enhance the moral value of consensual decisions.137  
Whereas the first argument shows that the HRD is a moral human right, the 
second and the third support its inclusion to the list of international legal human 
rights. By making this clear distinction, Buchanan can postulate that, in general, 
it is possible for both moral and legal human rights to exist independently of 
each other’s counterpart: 
In some cases, the best justification for recognizing a legal right to X is not 
that it is the legal counterpart of a moral right to X, but rather that including 
X as a legal right best serves to protect some moral right Y or, in the case of 
the third argument, to ensure that appropriate conditions of agency or repre-
sentation are satisfied.138 
By losing the necessary linkage between moral and legal human rights, Buchan-
an enhances the practical possibilities of justifying human rights. One does not 
have to decide on a ultimative way in order to claim for a right to be a human 
right or to choose between either instrumental or intrinsic justifications. Thus, 
Buchanan says that the case for an HRD is reasonably strong because positive 
arguments for democracy can be advanced from three directions: equal-
consideration-of-persons argument, the instrumental argument, and the agency 
argument. The minimal conception of democracy he then suggests includes as a 
key notion the accountability of the government towards its citizens. Buchan-
an’s conception of democracy is constitutional, “with entrenched civil and polit-
ical rights that provide constraints on majoritarian decision-making.”139 The 
conditions of accountability are threefold: (i) there must be representative, ma-
joritarian institutions for making the most general and important laws, such that 
no competent individual is excluded from participation, (ii) the highest govern-
ment officials must be elected to representative bodies, accountable to the peo-
ple, and subject to removal from office, and (iii) there needs to be a modicum of 
institutionally secured freedom of speech, association, and assembly required for 
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reasonably free deliberation about political decisions and for the formation and 
functioning of political parties.140 The minimal conception of democracy in-
cludes these three elements as requirements for the recognition of legitimacy of 
any state, and it represents the content of the HRD claim. Buchanan further 
proposes that new entities seeking recognition as sovereign states, including 
those formed by secession, should be required to satisfy this minimal democracy 
criterion.141  
Buchanan’s pragmatic account accommodates several ways of strengthening 
the role and legitimacy of human rights as an efficient tool for structuring and 
norm international as well as domestic politics. Although highly prized, the 
moral foundation of human rights is kind of a “normatively nourishing accom-
plishment” strengthening human-rights-claims; it is a necessary, albeit not suffi-
cient, condition to justify what falls under the term. I want to point out that the 
flexibility and public-reason-accessibility of Buchanan’s conception of human 
rights is convincing especially by taking it as a given that human rights, in gen-
eral, and the HRD in particular, have to be seen as complexes characterized by 
the genuine moral, political, and legal content.  
 
2 . 3 .  C O N C L U D I N G  R EM ARK S   
The authors discussed above define and interpret the concepts of democracy 
and human rights in different ways. The comparison between political norma-
tive and political instrumental accounts shed light on a variety of possible con-
ceptual relations between democracy and human rights. The question of 
whether there should be a HRD is answered differently depending on whether 
moral, political or legal arguments get prioritized. At this point, the results can 
be recapitulated for the two types of political conception: normative and in-
strumental.  
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2.3.1. Normative Political Conceptions:  
An Argument on Behalf of the Interests of the Political Collective 
All the authors discussed in this chapter reject the HRD. Cohen doubts that the 
consensus on the HRD’s underlying principle of political equality can be 
reached by a global public reason. He substitutes the HRD with his normative 
idea of membership and a claim for collective self-determination. We owe the 
distinction between human rights and rights of justice mainly to political nor-
mative conceptions like Rawls’s and Cohen’s, who insist on only a minimal 
range of human rights for reasons of political feasibility and differences in politi-
cal culture. Following a specific understanding of collective self-determination 
(“the onion-concept”), I criticized that notion of collective self-determination 
which is itself dependent on minimal political equality and cannot be claimed in 
a consistent way without also claiming a human right to individual self-
determination—in the sense of our right to individual voice—within the social 
and political community in which a person lives (what corresponds to a minimal 
HRD claim). The normative value of the right to collective self-determination (a 
principle that often leads to the rejection of the claim for a human right to demo-
cratic institutions) has been shown as being closely intertwined with the concept 
of minimal individual self-determination. If the normative value of collective self-
determination is to be understood as being legitimized by the normative value 
of individual self-determination, the question arises what basic human right cor-
responds to the claim for individual self-determination. I suggest that a minimal 
democratic right to participation in the form of individual recourse via the right 
to voice can function as a vehicle representing the human rights relevance of 
individual self-determination. My point is that every individual must possess a 
minimal degree of self-determination—in the form of recourse and probably a 
correlating right to exit from one’s society. This minimal self-determination is 
necessary for the individual’s free interpretation and realization of his/her own 
basic needs and interests within any community . In this sense, a minimal right 
to self-determination must be a the heart of collective self-determination, for on-
ly so can there be certainty the individual’s interests are truly taken into ac-
count. Only on the basis of an individual human right to self-determination, in 
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at least this minimal sense, can a human-rights-claim for collective self-
determination be made in a consistent way.  
In my criticism of Cohen, it remained open on what principle other than the 
principle of minimal democratic equality, Cohen’s normative idea of member-
ship could effectively be based. In another way, more explicit than Cohen’s, 
Bernstein claims that—given the strong link between human rights and the 
claim of international interventions to protect them—a legal HRD in contem-
porary global political context would entail such a strong violation of the princi-
ple of non-interference and sovereignty that it would endanger the idea of a 
democratic world-peace. Bernstein justifies her distancing from the legal HRD 
claim by invoking the belief in an incremental historical development towards 
democratization; at the same time she does not question the normative belief 
and the relevance of democratic rights for a humane life. Likewise, resolving the 
paradox between the Rawlsian reservations toward the HRD and the claim that 
democratic structures are required to realize justice in a society, Lister proposes 
several low-threshold measures to promote democracy in non-democratic coun-
tries without the need to demand a human right to democratic institutions. 
Such a middle way is helpful in terms of practical realization of democratic de-
velopment. However, apart from the pragmatically useful solution, the paradox 
in argumentation is not fully accounted for.  
In contrast to these approaches, Reidy’s normative political (but not moral) 
conceptions are more distinctly formulated: whereas the moral human right to 
democracy should be approved (at least in terms of a minimal meaningful politi-
cal participation), the legal human right to democratic institutions cannot be rea-
sonably demanded in our world. The priority of the political and the legal func-
tion of human rights in argumentation, but also the failure to prove that a hu-
man right to democratic institutions would actually help rather than hinder uni-
versal political aims (such as collective self-determination, world peace, free-
dom, and justice) plays a decisive role in Reidy’s conclusive rejection of the 
HRD claim.  
In addition to reflecting on political and legal limits of implementation of a 
HRD claim, however, I suggest that the moral claim for a minimal (individual) 
human rights demand to voice within one’s own community is already implicit in 
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Cohen’s account of the right to membership and in the individual’s right of dis-
sent from collective decisions, and also in terms of Bernstein’s norms of mini-
mal-respect and the condition of reciprocity. Lister’s approach provides practi-
cal measures for promoting democracy that can be interpreted as (non-military) 
interventions aimed at fostering self-determination and by extension the right to 
voice of individuals and minorities. The right to voice is also compatible with 
Reidy’s account due to his affirmation of a human right to some meaningful 
measure of political participation. 
 
2.3.2. Instrumental Political Conceptions: 
International Interventions on Behalf of Human Rights 
Beitz separated the question of whether there is a human right to democratic 
individual rights from the question whether there is a human right to be gov-
erned democratically that is to say: a right to democratic institutions. For in-
stance, he strengthens the representation of the interests of the individual mem-
ber if opposed to those of the social community, and he explicitly links the hu-
man right to collective self-determination to the international obligation to pro-
tect interests of those politically oppressed. Human rights violations must result 
in political action but only after weighing up the individuals and the common 
social interests. Beitz is focused on elaborating actual measures and the institu-
tional implementation of human rights. He introduces an elaborate two-level 
model aiming to distribute the responsibility for human rights implementation 
between the national and international levels. Apart from distinguishing be-
tween the two levels of  human rights and correlating responsible actors imple-
menting them, Beitz defines the UDHR as a negotiated agreement and identi-
fies its two instrumental functions. First, human rights are understood to be in-
dividual claims against the state the task of which is to protect them; second, in 
the event that states neglect their duty to protect human rights, the international 
community becomes responsible for protecting the citizens’ human rights. The 
second-level enactment by the international community is crucial for the politi-
cal role of the UDHR. It allows the international political community, for ex-
ample, to constrain domestic institutions of states.   
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Buchanan also highlighted the instrumental value of an HRD in internation-
al law. He claims that the inclusion in legal international law of a human right 
to a minimally democratic government is a necessary prerequisite for accounta-
bility of any government towards its citizens. Civil and political rights are criti-
cal because they provide constraints on majoritarian decision-making. Further, 
Buchanan’s view included a minimal-democracy criterion, which sees collective 
self-determination as necessarily based on an—at least minimal—individual 
self-determination. As democracy in some form, therefore, is a requirement for 
the legitimacy of the international legal system itself (if that system wants to be 
morally justifiable in enforcing its rules), such minimal democratic accountabil-
ity must be required of every would-be member state. However, whatever the 
political instrumental argumentations conclude in this section: they all argue 
from the priority of the political, legal function of human rights in the frame-
work of contemporary international politics, and this political function deter-
mines the specific normative claims for the HRD. Current empirical conditions 
and agreements of international and supranational politics are the main frame-
work that justifies the possible HRD claim and make such human rights feasi-
ble. However, this position seems compatible with the suggested argument for 
an individual right to voice. 
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MORAL CONCEPTIONS:  
BOTTOM UP  
After the discussion of political conceptions in part 2, this part deals with moral 
conceptions and the several answers to the HRD-question they provide. 
Whereas the majority of political conceptions rejected the HRD, moving on to 
moral conceptions of human rights the amount of affirmations of the HRD 
claim rises. Authors of moral conceptions understand the HRD as an individual 
right rather than as a collective right to comprehensive political institutions. 
Thus, the demand for “democracy” in the HRD is usually concretized and 
narrowed down to a content that allows to be justified from a singular human 
standpoint. Inasmuch as collective, political normative aims such as a liberal 
democratic ethos or peace-building play a role in evaluating the HRD-question, 
their importance is linked to specific human needs, requirements for self-
realization, capabilities or interests. Some authors who reject the comprehensive 
HRD nevertheless include minimal institutional claims such as a human right to 
participation or to specific democratic rights (such as the right to vote) in their 
reasoning. By this inclusion they show their support of the basic democratic 
principle of equal say that stays unchallenged in the moral conceptions. 
Turning to the two sub-categories of the moral conceptions, the intrinsic and 
the instrumental answers to the HRD question can be determined as follows:  
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(1) Intrinsic moral conceptions derive human rights from assumptions con-
cerning human nature and general human capabilities and needs. It 
is postulated that they protect essential human features (such as par-
ticular understandings of human dignity) and foster the growth of in-
dividual potential and capabilities by guaranteeing basic rights and 
the satisfaction of basic needs. The line of reasoning of authors asso-
ciated with this category usually begins with a discussion of moral 
rights and obligations. Some theorists using an intrinsic moral con-
ception belong to the natural rights tradition. A successful intrinsic 
moral claim for an HRD must show that it is a right that each human 
has simply in virtue of being a human being. Democratic rights or in-
stitutions must have intrinsic value for maintaining a dignified human 
life. 
 
(2) Instrumental moral conceptions argue, as do intrinsic moral conceptions, 
from the wellbeing and vulnerability of individuals. Disparaging of 
intrinsic moral conceptions, they emphasize the contingency of hu-
man rights due to their practical, historical, and political construc-
tiveness. Human rights are seen as instruments to protect humans 
from injuries, which are defined as human rights violations referring 
to contemporary public reason, and the use of empirical knowledge. 
Characteristic of these accounts is a reference to the principle of par-
simony in dealing with essential, anthropological assumptions con-
cerning human nature. This is to assert the culturally sensitive and 
politically correct universal applicability of human rights. A successful 
moral instrumental claim for an HRD must show that other human 
rights are thereby guaranteed or that political preconditions for a 
dignified life are secured. 
 
At the center of intrinsic moral conceptions lies the attempt to prove the indis-
pensability of an HRD from a substantial, individual perspective. Human rights 
are usually conceptualized as rights human beings have in virtue of being hu-
man. The claim that rights belong to each and every human being assumes the 
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fundamental principle of equality. A closely related principle that is shared by most 
conceptions is the principle of deference. The principle of deference is understood to 
be a universal relation of recognition that likewise entitles and obligates individ-
uals to respect and claim human rights and human dignity.142  
The distinction between the two categories of moral rationales—intrinsic 
and instrumental—is not to be seen as sufficient but as heuristic, that is, helping 
to point out that the direction of argumentation is in each case different. For in-
trinsic conceptions, the study of human nature, human conditions, capabilities, 
and needs leads to (or does not lead to) the derivation of the HRD claim. Intrin-
sic moral conceptions understand human rights primarily as universal agency-, 
capability-, or interest-based moral rights. To mention some examples, James 
Griffin’s On Human Rights143 serves as a textbook example for a (normative) 
agency-based approach, just as Martha Nussbaum’s book Capabilities and Human 
Rightst144 does for a capabilities approach. In the footsteps of Habermasian, Sey-
la Benhabib endorses the HRD from a discourse-theoretic account while Rain-
er Forst develops a human rights understanding from the standpoint of one spe-
cific superior right, the basic right to justification. Carol C. Gould provides an 
alternative approach that tries to mediate between agency- and interest-based 
accounts by deriving a “social relational” human rights conception from a supe-
rior “theory of positive or effective freedom.”145 Moral instrumental conceptions 
try to prove the value of democracy by showing—often underpinned by empiri-
cal analysis—their utility for the protection of human interest that may or may 
not be derived from a particular intrinsic, moral conception of human nature 
but can also be established by referring to contemporary political consensus or 
to historical experience of injustices that call for institutional amendment.  
 
 
142 Christoph Menke and Arnd Pollmann, Philosophie der Menschenrechte (Hamburg: Junius, 2007), 
40. 
143 James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
144 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Human Rights,” 66(2) Fordham Law Review, 
(1997): 273–300.  
145 Carol C. Gould, “The Human Right to Democracy and Its Global Impact,” in Cindy 
Holder and David Reidy (eds.), Human Rights: The Hard Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2013), 285–300, at 290–291. 
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3 . 1 .  I N T R I N S I C  M O R A L  CONC E P T I O N S  
3.1.1. The Human Right to Democracy is not a Basic,  
but an Applied Human Right (James Griffin)  
According to James Griffin, the concept of human rights superseded the con-
cept of natural right over the course of the Enlightenment. Criticizing a sub-
stantial indeterminacy of the contemporary concept of human rights, he tries to 
define them starting from the notions of personhood and normative agency. Person-
hood denotes the substantial content and values that go together with an under-
standing of the human being as a “functioning human agent”. A functioning 
human agent is a person able to execute his normative agency. Human rights 
are defined as protections of normative agency, of the differentia specifica that en-
ables persons, as functioning human agents, to develop and determine their own vi-
sions of a life worth living.146 The three basic rights—autonomy, liberty, and mini-
mum provision—serve as abstract measures to derive human rights. According to 
Griffin’s distinction, autonomy is primarily understood as self-decision, self-rule 
or self-legislation. In contrast, liberty means having the inner and outer possibil-
ity to form and aim for the realization of one’s particular concept of the good 
life. Minimum provision denotes the minimum of education, information and 
material resources that are necessary for the functioning human agent to have a 
real choice between several options daily life. Personhood and practicalities serve as 
the two conditions for the existence of a human right. To establish the existence 
of a universal human right, first it has to be shown that this right protects “an 
essential feature of the human standing.” Second, it has to be shown that the 
determinate content of the right in question results from practical considera-
tions (practicalities).147 It might be unexpected to read that Griffin’s liberal au-
tonomy and liberty based account does not allow one to derive a universal hu-
man right to democratic participation in the strict sense. Griffin defines the right 
 
146 Griffin, On Human Rights, at 45. “We reflect and assess. We form pictures of what a good life 
would be—often, it is true, only on small scale, but occasionally also on a large scale. And we try 
to realize these pictures. . . . Homo sapiens can form and pursue conceptions of worthwile life” 
(at 32). 
147 Ibid., at 43. 
3 · Moral Conceptions 
55 
to democratic participation as an “applied human right” that can be legitimate-
ly claimed under contemporary conditions but cannot be consistently derived 
from the theoretical standpoint as a universal, basic human right: 
There are two kinds of derived rights: rights derived solely from fundamental 
ones, thus retaining universality, and rights derived by applying universal 
rights to particular conditions, not therefore universal. The human right to 
democratic participation, I want to say, is an applied right.148 
According to Griffin, one major difficulty with the HRD claim is due to the fact 
that human rights and democracy have been historically developed to meet 
“quite different needs”:  
Human rights grew up to protect what we see as constituting human dignity: 
the life, autonomy, and liberty of the individual. Democratic institutions grew 
up in our need for a decision procedure for groups—a procedure that is sta-
ble, manages transfer of power well, appropriate to a society whose members 
are more or less equal in power or worth, reconciles losers in social decisions 
to the basic structures of the society, and tends to promote the common-
weal—that is, order, justice, security, and prosperity.149 
The distinction between the directed collective goals of democracy and the pro-
tection function of human rights directed to the individual seems to explain at 
least part of the gap that Griffin identifies to exist between autonomy and dem-
ocratic participation. The distinction between the individual level of human 
rights and the collective level of decisions for groups and the commonweal hin-
ders Griffin to equate private autonomy and democratic participation. Formu-
lating one’s own conception of a worthwhile life, and making laws for everyone, 
expresses a potential contradiction between autonomy understood as self-
legislation and public legislation that can stymie self-legislation.150 Therefore, in 
a second step, Griffin tries to argue for an HRD by reference to the basic right 
of liberty, understood as the right to form and pursue one’s own conception of a 
 
148 Ibid., at 254. 
149 Ibid., at 249. 
150 Ibid., at 247. 
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worthwhile life free from constraint from other actors, to a degree that is com-
patible with equal liberty for all.151 But just “as one vote among millions will not 
protect one’s actions from being stymied by public legislation,” democratic par-
ticipation does not seem to be a necessary condition of liberty, either.152 Even 
though Griffin admits that democracy may be more likely than other forms of 
government to respect the domain of personhood, the inclusion of such a non-
universal empirical premise would transgress his Spartan rational approach. Al-
so, he is arguing that the requirement of fair political procedures cannot be de-
rived from human rights alone.153 After the rejection of a human right to demo-
cratic participation, Griffin discusses whether there is a weaker right to political 
(not necessarily democratic) participation. Objecting that a right to political par-
ticipation can but need not protect anything valuable – if for example a biased 
ruler listens to the opinions but cannot fully understand or respond to it, the 
right to participation does not help to protect anything that is human rights rel-
evant according Griffins conception: dignity and personhood.  
But a true human right must be in some way grounded in our human digni-
ty—the dignity due to our personhood—and an entitlement merely to be lis-
tened to by a ruler who may be dismissive of one's views is hard to see in that 
light.154 
Despite the conclusion that in the strict sense the rational, logical viewpoint 
does not allow the claim that human rights require democracy, Griffin admits 
for example strong empirical correlations such as the one between democratic 
governance and avoidance of famine.  Reflecting about the complex modern 
conditions of society, he finally concludes that “human rights may require de-
mocracy in a weaker sense of ‘require’,”155 and finally, “I am inclined to think, 
despite my inexpertise, that, in modern conditions, human rights do indeed re-
 
151 Ibid., ch. 9. 
152 Ibid., at 247. 
153 Ibid., at 242. 
154 Ibid., at 250. 
155 Ibid., at 248. 
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quire democracy.”156 Despite his belief that human rights to not encompass cer-
tain requirements of justice, fairness, and well-being, the empirical evidence, 
and the probability that a right to democracy can be morally justified because it 
ads forms of respect not yet included in human rights, leads him to a pragmatic 
ending: Responding to the question Do human rights require democracy?, he con-
cludes: “Yes and No, depending upon circumstances.”157  
Griffin has been criticized for his conception of personhood that implies that 
only functioning human agents, i.e. capable and rational human beings, belong 
to the legal entity of human rights. Such criteria of capabilities and rationality 
are not necessarily fulfilled, for example, by children, mentally incapacitated 
and handicapped persons. In a strict sense, these persons get excluded from the 
amount of so defined human beings and are thus also not entitled to claim 
“human” rights. Apart from this fundamental point of critique, Griffin’s moral 
opposition to a HRD is logically consistent and unequivocal given the theoreti-
cal premises of his account. The practical, instrumental advantages of democra-
cy compel him to end the chapter with a personal reservation against his own 
rejection of the HRD and with the partial affirmation of an HRD claim in 
modern conditions. Instrumental, consequentialist justifications of a human 
right to democracy thus prove to be intuitively vital even for the most hardcore 
rational moral philosophers. That the human right to democracy transcends a 
clear distinction between individual and collective dimension, between moral 
and political philosophical issues, as well as it transgresses the former sacrosanct 
is–ought dichotomy, seems inherent in the very nature of the debate. The practical, 
instrumental advantages of democracy for human wellbeing (the “is” aspects) 
are intuitively convincing even though the moral “ought” of an HRD is obvi-
ously difficult to derive from a strict moral theoretical viewpoint. The Griffin 
discussion shows that if human rights are strictly understood as protectors of 
human dignity, autonomy, and well-being, the intrinsic value of democratic 
participation must be shown apart from normative political, collective goals. 
Whereas this intrinsic value is questioned from Griffin, according to our next 
 
156 Ibid., at 254. 
157 Ibid., at 255. 
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author, Martha Nussbaum, active political participation is required for the de-
velopment of practical reason and thus counts as a substantial requirement for 
the development of individual capabilities. 
 
3.1.2. Empowering Human Development instead of Enacting a Human Right to Democracy 
(Martha Nussbaum) 
Shifting the attention from a modern Kantian approach to a neo-Aristotelian 
capabilities approach, the main focus in shifts to the question what basic condi-
tions and (human) rights need to be guaranteed for an individual to develop his 
or her capabilities. The paradigmatic modern capability approach was designed 
from the Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen’s. Arguing that in 
economic theory wellbeing must not only be measured by the factor of income, 
but must also include the criterion of what a human being needs for a good life. 
Martha Nussbaum, who closely worked together with Amartya Sen to further 
development of the capability approach, created a list of core capabilities, the so 
called “thick and vague conception of the good life” which can be summarized 
in a list of ten “human functioning capabilities”.158 Nussbaum’s basic assump-
tion is that the task of political arrangement cannot be understood, or per-
formed well, without a “thicker” comprehensive theory of the human good than 
modern liberal theories provide. According to Nussbaum, we need an “intui-
tively powerful idea of truly human functioning that has roots in many different 
traditions and is independent of any particular metaphysical or religious 
view.”159 The primary task of politics is then to ensure that no citizen lacks in 
sustenance. Each and every human being has to be brought first across a 
threshold into a condition in which a truly human functioning can be lived, at 
 
158 Martha C. Nussbaum, Woman and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 78–80. 
159 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in Aristide Tessitore (ed.) Aristotle 
and Modern Politics. The Persistence of Political Philosophy (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2002), 47–104, at 53; Martha C. Nussbaum, Woman and Human Development. The Ca-
pabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), at 101. 
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least at a minimal level.160 To outline a general structure of a human life, and to 
identify human ends across all areas and understandings of human life, Nuss-
baum designs a “thick vague conception of the good.” She focuses on central 
“human functional capabilities” summarized under the following terms: 1. life, 2. 
bodily health, 3. bodily integrity, 4. sensation, imagination, thought, 5. emo-
tions, 6. practical reason, 7. affiliation, 8. other species, 9. play, and 10. control 
over one’s environment.161 The central claim behind her list of functional capa-
bilities is “that a life that lacks any one of these, no matter what else it has, will 
be regarded as seriously lacking in humanness.”162 According to Nussbaum, the 
core idea is that of the human as a dignified free being who shapes his or her 
own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others, rather than being passively 
shaped by the world like a “herd” animal.163 She understands a life that is genu-
inely human as a life that is shaped throughout by human powers of practical 
reason and sociability, which leads her to include democratic claims such as 
“expressive and associational liberty” and “freedom of worship” in the list of 
requirements to enable the development of core capabilities. 164 Nussbaum con-
ceives capabilities as having a close relationship to human rights. Preferring a 
“language of capabilities” to a “language of rights,” she suggests that the lan-
guage of human rights should remain close to the ethical role of basic capabili-
ties, “in the sense that the justification for saying that people have such natural 
rights usually proceeds by pointing to some capability-like feature of persons (ra-
tionality, language) that they actually have on at least a rudimentary level.”165  
Nussbaum’s famous article “Aristotelian Social Democracy,”166 which intro-
duced her essentialist capabilities approach, along with her concept of a “thick 
vague conception of the good,” precedes the core HRD debate as evaluated by 
 
160 Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” at 74–75. 
161 The central human functional capabilities are hereby listed in their slightly revised form, as 
given in Nussbaum, Woman and Human Development, at 78–80. An earlier version can be found in 
Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” at 62–73. 
162 Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” at 71. 
163 Nussbaum, Woman and Human Development, at 72. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid., at 100. 
166 Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy.” 
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Cohen onwards. Combining Aristotelian and selected liberal insights, she origi-
nally intended to provide the philosophical basis for a particular form of social 
democracy.167 Her approach was further elaborated and—with an eye to politi-
cal philosophical questions—slightly modified in Woman and Human Development: 
The Capabilities Approach. Although it is not explicitly linked to the HRD debate, I 
include her capabilities approach because it paradigmatically represents a high-
ly influential “species of a human rights approach”168, and because her list of 
central human functional capabilities includes practical reason, affiliation, and 
(political and material) control over one’s environment, which lead her to par-
ticular claims for democratic rights such as the right of political participation, 
the protection of free speech and for association.169 The connection to the HRD 
debate is further revealed insofar as the political liberties not only play an in-
strumental role in preventing material disaster (as was shown by Amartya 
Sen)170, but that they are in Nussbaum’s view valuable in their own right.171 For 
political purposes, where adult citizens are concerned securing “capability, not 
functioning, is the appropriate political goal” because “citizens have to be left 
free to determine their own course” in respect to their potential functioning. 172 
Social-democratic ideals thus underlie Nussbaum’s universal political goals, 
as well as her thesis that political change is based on a bottom-up recognition 
process that is both enacted and driven by individuals and constitutive of peo-
ples. Despite the hope that the capabilities list will “steer the process of globali-
zation, giving it a rich set of human goals and a vivid sense of human waste and 
tragedy,” its realization will be contingent on a functioning social and proce-
dural relation between citizens and nation states:  
 
167 Ibid., at 47. 
168 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Human Rights,” 20 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
(2007): 21–24, at 22. 
169 Nussbaum, Woman and Human Development, at 78ff. 
170 In the Introduction to Woman and Human Development, Nussbaum explains the relation be-
tween Sen’s and her own understanding of the capabilities approach. (Nussbaum, Woman and 
Human Development, at 11–15.)  I will return to Sen’s approach in the following section.  
171 Ibid., at 96. 
172 Ibid., at 87. 
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Nonetheless, even a highly moralized globalism needs nation states at its core, 
because transnational structures (…) are insufficiently accountable to citizens 
and insufficiently representative of them. Thus the primary role for the capa-
bilities account remains that of providing political principles that can underlie 
national constitutions; and this means that practical implementation must re-
main to a large extent the job of citizens in each nation.173 
Approaching Rawls’s conception of public reason, and the related process of 
reaching a reflective equilibrium with an eye to international relations, Nuss-
baum reminds us of the fundamental importance of the nation state, as well as 
the long process of reaching any transnational consensus on the capabilities list. 
Whereas consensus about certain elements on the list already exists, an effective 
pursuit of many of the items on the list requires far greater international coop-
eration among nations.174 Although social, as well as liberal democratic, ideas of 
a just society clearly supply a background telos to Nussbaum’s approach, her 
commitment to civil and political democratic liberties, along with her profound 
understanding of human development processes, seems to be the reason why 
she refuses to claim a prescribed universal top-down HRD. For Nussbaum, en-
couraging consensus in a Rawlsian growth-minded manner is done by fostering 
soft power and development aid in order to promote capabilities, rather than by 
the implementation of any straightforward human rights legislation. Finally, her 
strong commitment to universal validity of the capabilities approach is support-
ed by five arguments: 
 First, multiple realizability: each of the capabilities may be concretely realized in 
a variety of different ways, in accordance with individual tastes, local circum-
stances, and traditions. Second, capability as a goal: the basic political principles 
focus on promoting capabilities, not actual functioning, in order to leave citi-
zens the choice whether to pursue the relevant function or not to pursue it. 
Third, liberties and practical reasons: the content of the capabilities list gives a cen-
tral role to citizens’ powers of choice and to traditional political and civil liber-
ties. Fourth, political liberalism: the approach is intended as the moral core of a 
specifically political conception, and the object of a political overlapping con-
sensus among people who have otherwise very different comprehensive views 
of the good. Fifth, constraints on implementation: the approach is designed to offer 
 
173 Ibid., at 105. 
174 Ibid., at 103–105. 
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the philosophical grounding for constitutional principles, but the implementa-
tion of such principles must be left, for the most part, to the internal politics of 
the nation in question, although international agencies and other govern-
ments are justified in using persuasion—and in especially grave cases econom-
ic or political sanctions—to promote such developments.175 
Nussbaum’s comprehensive approach explicitly addresses individual, social, na-
tional, and international interdependencies and conditions that shape human 
development processes. She links a distinct moral philosophical, essentialist 
standpoint to a Rawlsian political conception of human rights. The approach 
has proved an inspiring base for human rights thinkers who aim to bridge the 
gap between anthropological, social and political focuses.176  
 
3.1.3. The Universal Value of Democracy (Amartya Sen) 
Amartya Sen, the “inventor” of the modern capabilities approach in human 
rights theory, represents a slightly different version of the capabilities approach 
compared to Nussbaum’s. Sen is stressing that human rights and capabilities are 
not to be seen as congruent. Whereas many human rights “can be seen as rights 
to particular capabilities” others, like human rights to important process free-
doms, “cannot be adequately analyzed within the capability framework”:177  
“Capabilities and the opportunity aspect of freedom, important as they are, 
have to be supplemented by considerations of fair processes and the lack of vio-
 
175 Seyla Benhabib criticizes the close relation Nussbaum claims to exist between human capa-
bilities and rights: “Nussbaum envisages a one-to-one correspondence between a philosophically 
derived list of human rights, based upon a moral theory of capabilities, and the enactments of 
specific legislatures. She thereby neglects how legitimate variations in the interpretations, con-
textualization and application of human rights can emerge across self-governing polities” (ibid., 
at 105). 
176 Seyla Benhabib, “Is There a Human Right to Democracy? Beyond Interventionism and 
Indifference,” in Christoph Broszies and Henning Hahn (eds.): Philosophical Dimensions of 
Human Rights. Some Contemporary Views (Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York: 
Springer) 191-214, at 201.  
177 Amartya Sen, “Human Rights and Capabilities,” 6(2) Journal of Human Development 
(2005): 151–166, at 151. 
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lation of people’s right to invoke and utilise them.”178 Sen criticizes Nussbaum’s 
lack of distinction between rights understood as moral principles compared to 
rights understood as legal entitlements that would lead to a “canonical list” how 
it could not be chosen without further specification of content. But such a speci-
fication would involve a substantive diminution of the domain of public rea-
son.179  Sen considers public reason to be the legitimate source where process 
freedoms and related human rights are discussed and established. Earlier, Sen 
stipulated democracy to be a universal value, citing intrinsic, instrumental and 
constructive reasons: 
Viewed in this light, the merits of democracy and its claim as a universal value 
can be related to certain distinct virtues that go with its unfettered practice. 
Indeed, we can distinguish three different ways in which democracy enriches 
the lives of the citizens. First, political freedom is a part of human freedom in 
general, and exercising civil and political rights is a crucial part of good lives 
of individuals as social beings. Political and social participation has intrinsic 
value for human life and well-being. To be prevented from participation in 
the political life of the community is a major deprivation. Second, as I have 
just discussed (in disputing the claim that democracy is in tension with eco-
nomic development), democracy has an important instrumental value in en-
hancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting their claims 
to political attention (including claims of economic needs). Third—and this is 
a point to be explored further—the practice of democracy gives citizens an 
opportunity to learn from one another, and helps society to form its values 
and priorities. Even the idea of “needs”, including the understanding of “eco-
nomic needs,” requires public discussion and exchange of information, views, 
and analyses. In this sense, democracy has constructive importance, in addi-
tion to its intrinsic value for the lives of the citizens and its instrumental im-
 
178 Ibid., at 157. See also Amartya Sen, “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights,” 32(4) Philos-
ophy & Public Affairs (2004): 315–356, at 336: “Although the idea of capability has considerable 
merit in the assessment of the opportunity aspect of freedom, it cannot possibly deal adequately 
with the process aspect of freedom, since capabilities are characteristics of individual ad-
vantages, and they fall short of telling us enough about the fairness or equity of the processes in-
volved, or about the freedom of citizens to invoke and utilize procedures that are equitable.” 
179 Benhabib, “Interventionism and Indifference,” ch. 10.3; Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), at 333–334. 
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portance in political decisions. The claims of democracy as a universal value 
have to take note of this diversity of considerations.180  
First, Sen posits the intrinsic value of political and social participation as an es-
sential part of human life and well-being. Human freedom is defined as an in-
dispensable part of a self-realizing existence. The lack of political freedom as a 
part of this human freedom is considered a major deprivation. Sen explicitly 
claims civil and political freedom to be crucial for the good life, and the right to 
political participation to be vital. Freedom is valued “for the substantive oppor-
tunity it gives to the pursuit of our objectives and goals.”181 As further elaborat-
ed in Rationality and Freedom and by reference to social choice theory, Sen advo-
cates the thesis of a reciprocal relationship between rationality and freedom. 
The assessment of freedom requires a person’s reasoned preferences and valua-
tions; whereas rationality depends on freedom of thought.182 The second argu-
ment emphasizes the instrumental value democracies can have in strengthening 
hearing and political attention for the claims of the citizens. The more elaborate 
the democratic procedures are, the more should they allow an effective interest 
representation. Additionally, democracy proofs an educational function. If the 
citizens have to practice democracy, they gain democratic competences. The 
processes of active deliberation, public opinion-making and particular interest 
representation lead to the citizens’ formation of priorities and values, and to an 
exchange of information that potentially rises the recognition of diversity. The 
deliberative impact Sen points out as an intrinsic value of democracy is further 
elaborated by the following two authors who are both representatives of con-
temporary Critical Theory: Rainer Forst and Seyla Benhabib. 
 
 
 
 
180 Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” 10 (3) Journal of Democracy  (1999): 10. 
181 Sen, Rationality and Freedom. 
182 Ibid., at 5. 
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3.1.4. The Right to Justification as a Right to Democratic Procedures (Rainer Forst)  
In the tradition of Critical Theory, Rainer Forst presents a constructivist con-
ception of human rights. In his outstanding article “The Basic Right to Justifica-
tion: Toward a Constructivist Conception of Human Rights” he shows the right 
to justification to be the origin of any legitimate human rights claim. The article 
pre-dates the publication of Cohen’s article (and thus also the main HRD de-
bate) but is nonetheless indispensable for the HRD discussion of human rights. 
Forst’s approach is informed by a confrontation with some of the basic objec-
tions that have been brought against conceptions of universal human rights, 
such as the problem of cultural relativity, and of Western, capitalist domination 
over other societies (“neocolonialism”). The objection that human rights are a 
historical project of Western states leads to the conclusion that their normative 
validity can hardly be promoted as “universal”; rather, they must be seen as cul-
turally and politically relative. The further objection that “Western” human 
rights are a tool used to dominate non-Western societies also casts doubt on the 
political interpretation and application of human rights.183 Taking these con-
cerns seriously, Forst aims to provide a conception of human rights “that is cul-
turally sensitive as it is culturally neutral—a conception that proves to be inter-
culturally non-rejectionable, universally valid, and applicable in particular cas-
es.”184 Assuming that a proper examination of the relevant intra-cultural dis-
courses is a proviso for an inter-cultural discussion about human rights, Forst ar-
gues for a basic right to justification to be the minimal normative core from which 
such a conception should be derived.185 The right to justification is understood 
as a kind of reciprocal and general aspiration that is undeniable and can be de-
manded. It is a basic moral right in the sense that it itself need not be a specific, 
intersubjectively grounded, and practically accepted human right, but rather 
the basic condition for deriving concrete rights. The right to justification ex-
presses the most general and basic claim of human beings to be respected as au-
 
183 Rainer Forst, “The Basic Right to Justification: Toward a Constructivist Conception of 
Human Rights,” 6(1) Constellations (1999): 35–60, at 35. 
184 Ibid., at 36. 
185 Ibid. 
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tonomous moral persons, at least in the sense that one cannot treat them with-
out also giving them an adequate reason for the way they are being treated. On 
this conception, the integrity of individual members of a society is closely inter-
linked with the integrity of the society as a whole. Respecting the sanctity of per-
sonal integrity within a society, and the cultural integrity of the whole—and un-
derstanding it to be an autonomously grown cultural structure with a particular 
self-understanding—leads the way to the (subordinate) normative claim of polit-
ical self-determination.186  
“Integrity” is an appropriate term in this context, since it implies that the cul-
ture in question is a self-understanding and, in a certain sense, “complete” 
unity, as well as a sense-bearing, quasi-organic whole that meets certain 
standards of genuineness and respectability. The culture is, so to speak, a fully 
integrated unity full of integrity. On this basis, every single external en-
croachment can be regarded as a violation of this integrity that forces the cul-
ture to compromise its values and thereby its authenticity. The imposition of 
an “external” morality of human rights is thus considered to be such an en-
croachment.187 
From the high value of integrity it follows that every social-cultural structure 
and its moral legitimacy depend on the members recognition of the reciprocal 
and hermeneutical processes between themselves and the society as a whole. If 
the recognition on one side is challenged, the questioning must be accounted for 
by reasons, not by force. Human rights thus spring from the human demand for 
reasons, for the justification of certain rules, laws, and institutions, where the 
reasons people have already been given are no longer convincing.188 The de-
mand for human rights arises from the members’ experience of injustice within the 
culture; the language of human rights becomes the language of social emancipa-
 
186 Ibid., at 37–38. “What is more, the claim to be a respectable, fully integrated unity full of integrity de-
pends on the claim that otherwise the integrity of the members of this culture would suffer.” (Emphasis added.) 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid., at 40: “In such a situation of internal conflicts there arises—not necessarily, but under 
certain conditions and in our day as a rule—the demand for human rights: it arises ‘from within’, 
and is directed to something “internal” (Emphasis added)”. 
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tion.189 As Forst points out, rights do not come from an authoritative source 
(such as the state, a divine power, or nature), but are a collective project of a 
sovereign political community: 
Thus a political community is to be regarded as “sovereign” in the sense that 
its members regard it as a collective project of establishing just institutions 
founded on the citizens’ recognition of one another as persons with the right 
to justification. . . . Rights are not “granted” vertically by a state, but instead 
are accepted and conferred horizontally in processes of justification, and thus 
are an expression of mutual recognition.190 
Human rights and the sovereignty of a political community are considered to be 
equally primordial. The justified establishment of a basic social structure leads 
to a democratic state of law in which “the citizens are subjects of political justifi-
cation as citizens” as well as “the subjects of law as legal persons.”191 Forst’s 
general conception of human rights, justified in a discursive theory of moral 
constructivism that represents “the normative center of a plurality of possible 
politically constructivist concrete interpretations” is thus distinctively aimed to 
establish a more just social order—“one that actually justifies itself to those who 
are its subjects.”192  
The distinction between the core moral right of justification and the con-
crete, legal human right sets apart the moral and the legal dimensions of human 
rights. However, the concrete process of establishing universal human rights 
from the bottom up, originating from local communities, would seem to necessi-
tate the direct involvement and political recognition of human rights in a glob-
ally realized inquiry. Human rights could only be “universal” if they fall into a 
globally shared intersection of human rights claims. The fact that the justifica-
tion and democratization processes have been historically nonuniform over the 
face of the earth raises considerable difficulties for Forst’s theory. Guaranteeing 
the human right to justification (as a variant of the human right to democracy) 
 
189 Ibid., at 41–42. 
190 Ibid., at 49. 
191 Ibid., at 50. 
192 Ibid., at 56. 
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is, on the one hand, the prerequisite for a political community to discuss and 
claim human rights. On the other hand, such an “authoritarian” imposition of 
the human right to justification must be post facto. Forst tries to solve this con-
flict in Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice by proposing a principle of 
minimal transnational justice:  
To break the vicious circle of multiple, internal and external domination and 
to establish a political autonomy both within particular states and within the international 
system, a principle of minimal transnational justice is called for. According to this 
principle, members of societies of multiple domination have a legitimate claim 
to the resources necessary to establish a (minimally) justified democratic order 
within their political community and that this community be a participant of 
(roughly) equal standing in the global economic and political system.193 
The principle of minimal transnational justice seems to put the international 
community in charge to realize minimal democratic conditions in all member 
states.194 However, this authorization can only be legitimate as long as the in-
ternational community stays accountable and provides justified reasons for its 
actions to the members.  
If we understand and summarize Forst’s right to justification as a human 
right to democracy claim, it’s one that gets his particular justification out of the 
intersubjective nature of the human being. The right to justification thus repre-
sents the human need to ask for and provide reasons, to be heard and involved 
in the social of political community one is living in. As for a just society the suc-
cessful communication between individual and public sphere is crucial, the re-
 
193 Rainer Forst, “Toward a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice,” 32(1–2) Metaphilosophy 
(2001): 160–179, at 174. Original Emphasis. 
194 Ibid., at 175–176: “Whether the institutionalization of minimal justice and the results of justi-
ficatory discourse on the basis will lead to a federation of states in a subsidiary “world republic” 
or to something like a “world state” is hard to predict and not to be predetermined; it is a mat-
ter of the kind of institutions that are seen to be necessary to fulfill the demands of justice. Still, 
the realization of the minimum already presupposes a much higher degree of institutionalization 
than the present one, both for safeguarding the social minimum within states and for establish-
ing (roughly) equal standing between states.” 
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sponsibility for the basic right to justification is on both, the individual and the 
political actors level. 
 
3.1.5. Legitimate Political Decision-Making Depends on Democratic Self-Government 
(Seyla Benhabib) 
Alike Forst, Seyla Benhabib can be associated with the critical theory tradition. 
Her focus on the the discourse-theoretical model and the idea of freedom of 
communication of Jürgen Habermas is more explicitly pronounced in compari-
son to Forst’s thinking. For Benhabib, the normative core principle of human 
rights is Hannah Arendt’s claim of “the right to have rights.” Pointing to phe-
nomenological conditions of human existence, Benhabib shows that the relation 
to the other is guided by the norms of equal worth and complementary reciprocity.195 
She thus extends Arendt’s “right to have rights” to a principally political “right 
to membership in a political community” by proposing a non-state-centered 
conception of the right to have rights. She understands the latter as “the claim 
of each human person to be recognized and to be protected as a legal personali-
ty by the world community.”196 The justification of human rights is considered 
to be a dialogical procedure taking place under the premise that the recognition 
of your right to have rights serves as a proviso that enables you to accept or reject 
my rights claims.197 Benhabib enforces the claim that human rights have to be-
come transmitted into legal rights. Human rights are moral principles that are 
reliant on becoming embedded into a democratic system of legal norms bridg-
ing the “gap between moral and justice.”198 Self-determination is a fundamental 
human-rights-claim indispensable for interpretation and discourse: “My thesis,” 
explains Benhabib, “is that without the right to self-government, which is exer-
 
195 Benhabib, “Interventionism and Indifference,” at 197. 
196 Ibid., at 195. 
197 Ibid., at 195ff. 
198 Ibid., at 196, 206. 
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cised through proper legal and political channels, we cannot justify the range of 
variation in the content of basic human rights as being legitimate.”199  
Democratic legitimacy and diversity spring from the normative principles of 
justification that bear fruit under the condition of self-determination. “Integrity” 
and “democratic itineration,” which continuously improve the process of dis-
cursive justification, are concepts of importance comparable to the conception 
of the basic right to justification in Forst. After following Habermas’s thesis that 
the principle of democracy should establish a procedure of legitimate law-
making, and that the principle is based on the condition that only those “stat-
utes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent (Zustimmung) of all citi-
zens in a discursive process of legislation which has been legally constituted.”200 
Benhabib insists on the claim that the rhetoric of interventions should become 
clearly distinguished from the human rights discourse. Whereas political ethics 
must be concerned with the weighing of intentions and consequences, of re-
sponsibility and dispositional ethics, the moral philosophical fundamental de-
bate about the philosophical justification of human rights and its directive, 
awareness-raising function should not be devalued by obvious difficulties hin-
dering the implementation of the theoretical claims in international relations.201 
Forst and Benhabib are committed to the discourse-theoretical approach 
that takes democratic values and the procedural advantages of democratic law 
and governmental structures to be the only adequate context of a just society 
characterized by a vivid culture of reciprocal justification and recognition. Both 
authors are attentive to the need for a clear distinction between moral and polit-
ical dimensions of human rights. However, there are unanswered questions 
concerning the concrete realization of a critical theory of transnational justice or 
of the universal claim for the right of justification. The structural weakness iden-
 
199 Ibid., at 207. 
200 Ibid., at 208. 
201 Nevertheless, as Kant observed, there is a distinction between a “political moralist,” who 
misuses moral principles to justify political decisions, and a “moral politician,” who tries to re-
main true to moral principles in shaping political events. The discourse of human rights has of-
ten been exploited and misused by “political moralists”; its proper place is to guide moral politi-
cians, be they citizens or leaders. All that we can offer as philosophers is a clarification of what 
we can regard as legitimate and just in the domain of human rights themselves. Ibid., at 212. 
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tified by Brunkhorst in Hannah Arendt’s claim of the right to have rights comes 
up again: the fundamental normative rights (rights of justification / right to 
have rights) are moral philosophical settlements lacking democratic legitimacy. 
The “worldwide civil right to have civil rights” requires a federal, republican 
political system.202 Such a presupposition necessarily also reduces the pluralism 
of human life forms and cultural diversity, which gives the fundamental rights 
claim an absolutist note. However, Benhabib counters the reproach by pointing 
to the hermeneutical (circular) structure of practical reason:  
[W]e always already have to assume some understanding of equality, reciprocity 
and symmetry in order to be able to frame the discourse model in the first 
place, but each of these normative terms are then open to reflexive justifica-
tion or recursive validation within the discourse itself. Such “recursive valida-
tion” of the preconditions of discourse has been misunderstood by many as 
indicating a vicious circle. I disagree with these claims which often ignore the 
“hermeneutical structure” of practical reason and wish to have practical rea-
 
202 Carol Gould referred to the problem by calling it “the consitutional circle.” She identifies 
the problem that rights agreed to in a democratic process of constitution making would already 
have to be constrained by rights. Constructively interpreting the circularity, she suggests the ev-
idence for primary “constitutional” claims to be experiental or phenomenological as it presents 
itself to us in the structures of everyday action and social interaction:  
What reveals these rights, practically speaking, is the daily and recurrent recognition by indi-
viduals of others as being like themselves, namely, as agents with claims to the conditions for 
their self-developing or self-transformative activity. This recognition characteristically takes 
place in several ways: first, in the basic reciprocity in which individuals make claims on one an-
other to be free from harm and from constraints on their actions; and in exchange grant this 
same recognition of negative freedom and equality to the others; or else expect a benefit in re-
turn for benefit done. This level of instrumental or tit-for-tat reciprocity acknowledges the right 
of the other by virtue of an assertion of the reciprocal validity of one’s own claim; that is, in as-
serting one's own right, one acknowledges the validity of the other’s claim as a right by virtue of 
reciprocally recognizing it as like one’s own. Beyond this minimal reciprocity, a more socialized 
recognition of the other as having rights develops in the context of shared activity with others in 
pursuit of commonly agreed-upon ends. Where there is social agency or cooperation required in 
joint activity oriented toward common goals, the reciprocity is one of mutual recognition of 
those common rights that apply to such cooperative activity – notably, rights of participation in 
the determination of common goals and of the process of achieving them. (Carol C. Gould, 
Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 41).  
See also Gould, “Global Impact,” at 286.  
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son proceed as if it were theoretical reason—that is, from uncontested first 
premises.203 
By simply admitting that, from a logical perspective, a first (non-democratical) 
positing of basic values foregoes every democratic validation, moral criteria for 
such positing become relevant. Benhabib shifts the attention to the utmost ne-
cessity that human rights be defined and legitimized through their political 
function of guaranteeing fundamental rights (such as the right to have rights) to 
the individual, rather than their function of providing reasons for interference by 
international authorities. The condition that human rights values have to be 
confirmed by public reasoning (even if this is sometimes only retroactively pos-
sible) sets an example in underlining the conviction that the Western (power) 
political human rights setting in the longer term should recede in support of so-
cial, deliberative recognition criteria and processes. Human rights are first of all 
meant to clear up unjust social, cultural, and political life conditions that are le-
gitimately identified from the perspective of affected individuals themselves. The 
public reasoning has to integrate the views of different individuals who are ex-
periencing and reflecting about social reality, and who are learning to form or 
adopt the perspective of a general moral standpoint. 
 
3.1.6. The Human Right to Democracy as the Capstone of International Law 
(Stephan Kirste) 
In his “Human Right to Democracy as the Capstone of Law,” Stephan Kirste 
aims to provide a reconstruction of law on the basis of freedom. Understanding 
freedom as the highest moral value and as the normative benchmark to evaluate 
moral human rights claims, he supports the HRD claim. According to Kirste, 
the individual right to active participation secures legal freedom, which is why 
the HRD is defined as the capstone of international law.   
In the tradition of critical theory, Kirste conceptualizes the HRD as “a right 
to participate in the deliberating, decision-making and interpreting procedures 
 
203 Benhabib, “Interventionism and Indifference,” at 198–199. 
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of general rights and duties.”204 He argues that the HRD has to be justified by a 
common principle of human rights and democracy, namely the principle of le-
gal freedom. Taking self-determination as the modern understanding of free-
dom, he distinguishes between negative freedom (i.e. the independence of the 
self from heteronomy) and positive freedom (i.e. the ability of the self to deter-
mine the motives of its action).205 Legal freedom is secured if legal norms pro-
vide for individual rights. Only through the attribution of individual rights (and, 
in the global context, of human rights), the human being is transformed into a 
legal person, an autonomous subject. Thus, legal freedom is seen as “the possi-
bility for a person to determine his or her own actions not being subjected to 
any other person.”206 Reviewing several positions about the human right to de-
mocracy, Kirste assumes it is generally accepted that human persons should not 
only enjoy freedom, but also decide about their liberties. Referring to Georg 
Jellinek’s use of the Hegelian concept of the status activus, Kirste argues for dem-
ocratic participation as an end in itself, ensuring the political autonomy of the 
individual:   
Without negative human rights law is self-contradictory, since it is necessarily 
directed towards freedom: without active human rights in the status activus, the 
catalogue of human rights is incomplete. Both are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the reconstruction of law on the basis of freedom. The active 
status of political autonomy as the basis of a right to democracy then rounds 
up the legal status.207 
Because of the reflexive structure of law, the HRD is not seen as a “right that 
the legal order paternalistically grants the people as this would mean granting 
and withholding the right to democracy at the same time”:  
People rather realize the right to democracy in the foundation of the legal or-
der itself—be it guaranteed by a national, supranational or international legal 
 
204 Kirste, “The Human Right to Democracy as a Capstone of Law,” at 17. 
205 Ibid., at 13. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid., at 15. 
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order and be it united in an explicit right to democracy or be it a unifying 
principle for a couple of rights securing aspects of it.208 
Kirste understands human rights as intrinsic to the international law, its organi-
zation and democratic legitimation. He claims that the human right to democ-
racy is the capstone of the concretization of the potential of freedom in the con-
cept of law.209 Kirste replaces the Habermasian conception of co-originality of 
human rights and democracy with a justification of the intrinsic coherence be-
tween human rights and democracy based on law as an order of freedom.210 
The human right to democracy is not primarily a positive right to democratic 
institutions or a negative right to be protected from political domination; it is 
primarily the authorization of the individual participant to involve him- or her-
self into the political process, to be a part of the community that not only adapts 
but co-determine rights and duties:  
A particular legal order that does not only protect and limit freedom, but in 
which the enactment of its norms is organized in a way that the individual 
takes part in it, builds the complete structure of law on freedom.211 
The right to participate in the political process of one’s community becomes the 
condition of the self-realization of individual freedom. The HRD constrains the 
realization of human rights in actu, because it empowers the right-holders not 
just to claim but also to actively create, revise, and execute human rights: “The 
demos is the demiurgos of its legal identity.”212  
 
3.1.7. Social Democracy as a Global Vision (Carol C. Gould) 
In both her book, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, and in an article “The 
Human Right to Democracy and its Global Impact,” Carol C. Gould presents a 
 
208 Ibid., at 17. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid., at 2. 
211 Ibid., at 16. 
212 Ibid., at 18. 
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comprehensive approach that argues in favor of an HRD against the back-
ground of a broad, substantial conception of social democracy. She is particu-
larly concerned with the question of what the universal demand and recognition 
of an HRD would imply for global governance. She begins with considering the 
main objections against an HRD brought up by Cohen and other authors in the 
Rawlsian tradition: (i) an HRD would require an unrealistic obligation to en-
force it by means of international interventions; (ii) it would violate the premier 
human right to self-determination, and thus is not sufficiently tolerant towards 
decent societies; (iii) the HRD involves “a Western or liberal imposition on soci-
eties organized around a common good or social harmony conception”; and (iv) 
democracy requires equality, which is a too demanding a request for some soci-
eties, and exceeds a minimal list of human rights.213  
To the first two objections Gould replies that no direct connection between 
recognizing and criticizing human rights violation, and intervening to stop such 
violations, must be postulated. It is a separate question what measures should be 
taken to help people recover their human rights. Further it has to be asked what 
would be involved in putting institutions in place to fulfill these human rights.214 
The recognition of democratic participation as a human right entails neither a 
right nor a duty to establish democracy globally through forceful intervention, 
for the functions of human rights, prior to any interventions, are normative and 
moral functions of serving as goals for the development of institutions and as a 
basis for social and political critique and change.215 Gould’s broader “social and 
relational” conception of democracy exceeds electoral democracy and does not 
call for a particular governmental structure. Her social and relational approach 
is mainly defined through its reference to a concept of people’s agency as 
emerging through social practices, including practices of reciprocity.216 Gould’s 
crucial assumptions concern the (universal) request standing behind the idea of 
human rights which should identify and realize “the material, social and politi-
cal conditions needed for the development of people’s agency, where this agen-
 
213 Gould, “Global Impact,” at 285–286. 
214 Ibid., at 287. 
215 Ibid., at 288. 
216 Ibid., at 290. 
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cy is taken in the first place as human life activity and in a fuller sense as the de-
velopment of capacities and the realization of long term projects over time.”217 
Indirectly replying to objection (iii) above, i.e. the criticism that an HRD would 
be a Western imposition, Gould refers to universal human conditions and the 
potential of a conception to mediate between agency-, capability-, and interest-
based accounts. A human rights conception thus always implies a certain 
amount of shared values. However, this by no means implies that a common 
good or social harmony conception has to be implemented; her conception of 
justice as equal positive freedom promotes equality rights to the conditions of self-
transformation.218  
Responding to Cohen’s equality-objection—(iv) democracy requires equality, 
which is a too demanding request for some societies, and exceeds a minimal list 
of human rights—Gould convincingly points out that human rights entail a 
strong commitment to equality, “perhaps even a stronger one than democracy 
does, or at least a more universal egalitarian commitment.”219 Gould distin-
guishes her conception of agency from Griffin’s Kantian agency conception by 
a stronger emphasis on the social and relational needs. In contrast to Griffin’s 
emphasis on terms of human dignity or on a reference to a “high-level-
purposiveness” of the person, Gould takes social and relational needs as primary 
criteria for normative reasoning.220 The equal basic agency of all social beings 
leads to the requirement of access to conditions for people to develop capacities 
and realize projects.221 Proceeding from an “account of positive or effective 
freedom” that views people as equal agents, Gould points out the correlative 
distinction that exists between “basic agency (whether in individual or social 
forms) and its development” and “basic human rights (as conditions for any 
human activity and non-basic (though still essential) human rights, which are 
conditions needed for people’s fuller flourishing.”222 Further, Gould sees her ac-
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218 Ibid., at 291. 
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count as closely related to the capability approaches but “without giving exclu-
sive weight to these capabilities to the neglect of the fundamental capacity to 
choose, on the one hand, or of the realization of long-term projects, on the oth-
er.”223 It is crucial to pay attention to social practices in order to understand 
Gould’s overall conception: 
I suggest that the relevant practices that lay the ground for the acceptance of 
human rights are more elementary ones, evident in both interpersonal and in-
stitutional contexts. They involve the practices of reciprocal recognition found 
in everyday experience, in which people implicitly or explicitly recognize the 
equal agency of others. These practices include not only the fundamental 
forms of communicative interactions, which Habermas has emphasized, but 
also the range of non-verbal interactions through which people reciprocally 
recognize each other, e.g., in ordinary greetings, or in Goffman-type “vehicu-
lar interactions”; in which people reciprocally navigate their encounters with 
others, whether as pedestrians or drivers.224 
Human rights specify the conditions such as “absence of constraints such as 
threats to bodily security, or restriction on basic liberty (including freedom from 
domination)”, availability of enabling material and social conditions (such as 
means of subsistence, health-care, education, support for crucial social relation-
ships etc.), and various democratic rights such as freedom of expression and as-
sociation.225 Apart from these instrumental arguments for democracy, the ar-
gument of democracy should itself be seen as a human right:  
Various democratic rights—e.g., freedom of expression and association—play 
an important role in protecting people’s basic liberty and also their further 
flourishing. But beyond this, we can see the argument for democracy as itself 
a human right. Inasmuch as people are social beings, or what I have called 
“individuals-in-relations”: engaging in common or joint activities with others 
can be seen as itself one of the prime conditions for their freedom. Common 
activities are here broadly understood to be activities oriented to shared goals. 
 
223 Ibid., at 290. 
224 Ibid., at 291. 
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If none are to dominate others in these joint activities, they must have equal 
rights to participate in determining their course.226  
Democracy is thus seen as a normative form of decision-making that involves 
equal rights of participation among the members of any given community. 
Gould’s expansive conception of democracy “supports the extension of demo-
cratic forms of decision-making to institutions beyond the political.”227 Such an 
extension of democratic forms of decision-making could be installed f.e. in eco-
nomic firms through the requirement for workers’ self-management (work-place 
democracy). In several social, cultural and political areas, the democratic ethos 
should be actively cultivated. The particular understanding of democracy must 
be “social and relational” in a way that it supports to cultivate intersubjective 
and cooperative human relationships. By this, the superior goal of individual 
and social self-transformation understood as positive freedom within his social, 
cultural and political can become realized in society. The understanding of sub-
stantial democracy and human rights is complemented by a cross-border reflec-
tion. Gould explains the additional need for new forms of global democratic 
participation by the impacts that decisions and policies of institutions of global 
governance and other powerful actors like nation states and corporations have 
on people “who are distantly situated and not part of these institutions or com-
munities.”228 Applying the two criteria for justifying democratic participation 
and deliberation and for determining their scope at domestic level—the com-
mon activity principle and the all-affected principle229—Gould suggests that af-
 
226 Ibid., at 292. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid., at 292–293. 
229 According to Gould, justice has the normative priority over the requirements of democracy. 
Justice may legitimately constrain the democratic process when it leads to outcomes that violate 
individuals’ right to equal freedom. Thus, two principles to justify democracy as a substantial 
conception are given: the common activities and the all-affected criterion. The first criterion appeals to 
rights of democratic participation among the members of a political community.  
[People are] individuals-in-relations, … engaging in common or joint activities with others can 
be seen as itself one of the prime conditions for their freedom. Common activities are here 
broadly understood tobe activities oriented to shared goals. If none are to dominate others in 
these joint activities, they must have equal rights to participate in determining their course. This 
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fected people (in terms of an appeal to the fulfillment of basic human rights) 
should have significant input into the decision or policy in question, though not 
necessarily fully equal rights of participation: 
Perhaps we could specify “all affected” as “those importantly affected” or 
perhaps “relevantly affected.” Yet another direction would be to add to the 
idea of joint activity a conception of common interests and shared needs. We 
could then argue that not only those who belong to an institutional framework 
have rights of democratic participation, but so do those who have common 
interests in the particular course of action or the policy under consideration, 
even if they are not participants in the activity itself.230 
To overcome this circularity, “if we claim that the human rights to be consid-
ered as affected by a given decision or policy include democracy among oth-
ers,”231 she proposes to distinguish between two senses of democratic human 
rights: Democracy 1 (pertaining to the common activity criterion and standing for the 
requirement of equal participation in common decisions) and Democracy 2 
(pertaining to the relevantly affected criterion, representing a “democratic input cri-
terion” with a global coverage of distant others that must be included into deci-
sion-making if relevantly affected by a decision even if they are outside the 
democratic body that renders this very decision). According to Gould, circulari-
ty would be avoided, “since the claim would then be that Democracy 2 is re-
quired for the fulfillment of Democracy 1.”232 Finally, Gould provides us with an 
 
is a very general principle that pertains to joint activities of diverse sizes. In my view, when such 
common activities are institutionalized, they serve as arenas for democratic decision-making in a 
formal sense, and no langer remain merely casual or ad hoc. Democracy is thus a form of deci-
sion-making involving equal rights of participation among the members of a given community 
or institution. (Gould “The Human Right to Democracy and its Global Impact”, at 292)  
In the second criterion, Gould adapts the disputed all-affected principle that takes intensity 
and extensiveness in being affected by a collective problem or a policy question into concern. 
(Gould Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, at 170). See further Gould, Globalizing Democracy, at 
171ff, 35ff; Gould, “Global Impact,” at 286, 292; Carol C. Gould, Rethinking Democracy. Freedom and 
Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
230 Gould, Globalizing Democracy, at 178. 
231 Gould, “Global Impact,” at 296–297. 
232 Ibid. 
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overview of the possible applications of her approach in transnational decision-
making, namely democratization.233 Gould’s comprehensive, social conception 
of democracy and human rights allows us to bridge several gaps between agen-
cy-, capability-, and interest-based conceptions of human rights. Her wide focus 
on incorporating individual, societal, domestic, and global political levels into 
her considerations gives us an insight into the complex network aspects falling 
under the idea of global-reach democracy. However, it stays often obscure 
whether and to what degree the ideal kind of social relational ethos and the 
normative claims Gould imagines particularly depend on a democratic organiza-
tion of the society. Gould’s concrete democratization proposal—although it 
seems consistent—is highly prescriptive. If global democracy is feasible at all, 
the concrete implementation of a legitimate project of global democracy would 
have to consist in a long-term transitional process justified step by step, over all 
a process that is democratically accepted and effectively demanded by people 
and peoples.  
 
 
 
 
233 Gould proposes a fourfold global governance strategy. First, democratic procedures would 
need to be introduced into all (self-understood) communities and institutions, which are increas-
ingly cross-border or transnational, whether global or not. Goals are a democratic culture and 
individuals democratic personalities, as an important principle serves the notion of subsidiarity, 
“with decisions to be taken at the most local levels possible, but where the local does not neces-
sarily have a geographical interpretation, but instead one of proximity and size (recognizing that 
many of the new communities will cross borders).” Second, she proposes a global democratic 
parliament with the authority to implement a set of global shared ends. Third, she sees a need 
to devise new forms of public input and new modes of transnational representation within the 
institutions of global governance. In this context, she mentions the encouragement by NGOs as 
well as the use of deliberative software and other forms of online interaction or representative 
deliberative polling. Fourth, and in longer term, “the development of a system of delegate as-
semblies, based on the principles of subsidiarity, with real power to determine global policies, 
for example, concerning regulatory matters and labor politics” should be realized. For example, 
such assemblies could be “geographically based for some issues or could be functionally orient-
ed, and would need to involve the election of delegates at higher levels.” Ibid., at 298–299. 
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3 . 2 .  I N S T R U M E N T A L  M O R A L  CONC E P T I O N S  
3.2.1. Empirical Foundation of the Moral Claim for 
Worldwide Minimally Egalitarian Democracy (Thomas Christiano) 
Thomas  Christiano provides particularly important contribution to the HRD 
debate. His advocacy of the HRD is built on a composition of normative claims 
and empirical arguments. He draws on instrumental moral and political argu-
ments. It is his insistence on the moral foundation of his HRD claim that sup-
ported the decision to put his approach into the category of instrumental moral 
(not political) conceptions. I will mainly refer to his two specific articles “An In-
strumental Argument for a Human Right to Democracy”234 and “An Egalitari-
an Argument for a Human Right to Democracy.”235 Christiano addresses two 
main objections against the HRD: (i) that the moral philosophical right to de-
mocracy conflicts with the law of the peoples to collective self-determination, 
and (ii) that new democracies often violate basic moral citizenship rights and are 
in danger to end up in tyranny of the majority (what comes down to a conflict 
between the HRD and other human rights). He refutes the first objection by 
claiming that democracies in general officiate as reliable protectors of urgent 
and broadly accepted basic human rights, and that non-democracies and partial 
democracies inevitably fail to protect these rights. Christiano’s core assumption 
is that the moral HRD is based on, and legitimized by, its crucial role in pro-
tecting other fundamental moral rights in political and international societies. 
He goes on to give a threefold instrumental argument for democracy as a moral 
human right: i) the domestic peace argument, ii) the international significance 
argument, and iii) arguments against potential objections to potential objections 
to his instrumental arguments.236  
 
234 Thomas Christiano, “An Instrumental Argument for a Human Right to Democracy,” 39(2) 
Philosophy and Public Affairs (2011), 142-176. 
235 Thomas Christiano, “An Egalitarian Argument for a Human Right to Democracy,” in 
Cindy Holder and David Reidy (eds.) Human Rights: The Hard Questions (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013) 301-325. 
236 Christiano, “Instrumental Argument,” at 142–144. 
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According to Christiano, rights of personal integrity are presupposed; they com-
prise “an intuitive and widely accepted list of very urgent moral goods (the pro-
tections of the right not to be tortured, the right not to be arbitrarily impris-
oned, and the rights not to be murdered or disappeared by the state).”237 He ar-
gues that there is an HRD because “the institutional structure made up by the le-
gal and conventional rights that constitute democracy are normally necessary 
and reliable in protecting basic rights to personal integrity and that thus it is 
strongly morally justified.”238 Christiano perceives a “strong moral justification 
for states to adopt or maintain the institutions of minimally egalitarian democ-
racy and that it is morally justified for the international community to respect, 
protect, and promote the right of each person to participate in minimally egali-
tarian democratic decision making concerning their society.”239 A minimally 
egalitarian democracy is defined as a democracy with a (formal or informal) 
constitutional structure that ensures that individuals are able to participate as 
equals in the collective decision-making of their political society.240 This concep-
tion of democracy includes a cluster of rights such as formally equal votes; equal 
opportunity to run for office, to determine the agenda of decision-making, and 
to influence the process of deliberation; and the freedom to organize, join, or 
abandon previous political associations. It further requires that there be robust 
competition among parties and a variety of represented parties in the legisla-
ture. The political actors (alike all public and private actors in society) must act 
in accordance with the rule of law. There must be an independent judiciary that 
checks on executive power. This cluster of rights, required for “minimally egali-
tarian democracy” is at the center of Christiano’s claim for democracy.241  
Taking a closer look at the threefold empirical and instrumental domestic 
peace argument, Christiano first explains that minimally egalitarian democracy 
 
237 Thomas Christiano, “An Egalitarian Argument" , at 317. 
238 Ibid., at 145. 
239 Ibid., at 145–146. 
240 According to Christiano, a paradigm instance of minimally egalitarian democracy can be 
more precisely characterized by the following three conditions: Christiano, “Egalitarian Argu-
ment,” at 303. 
241 Ibid. 
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is normally a reliable method of protecting the least controversial of human 
rights (personal integrity rights) and that societies whose institutions are not 
minimally egalitarian are normally unreliable in this respect. In contrast to oth-
er societies, minimally egalitarian democracies stand in a positive correlation 
with the protection of personal integrity rights and serve as an important inde-
pendent variable explaining the protection of those rights. Furthermore, Chris-
tiano finds evidence to support the idea that one must first introduce minimally 
egalitarian democracy before the protection of human rights can become sub-
stantial, and he creates a model to show why minimally egalitarian democracy 
has these effects while other conceptions of democracy do not.242  
Second, Christiano says that the international community has good moral 
reasons to be concerned with whether a society is democratic or not. He con-
cludes that the international community is morally justified in protecting and 
promoting human rights of personal integrity; however, the international com-
munity must also find a moral justification for protecting and promoting mini-
mally egalitarian democracy.243 At this crucial stage in his argument, Christiano 
“asserts that democracies do not go to war with one another and that this dis-
tinguishes democracies from other types of regimes.”244 He thereby supports the 
idea that the widespread presence of democracy is a global collective good. Ad-
ditionally, Christiano stresses the evidence that democratic regimes comply with 
international law and that they are more likely to create and sustain interna-
tional institutions than non-democracies.245  
Third, Christiano argues that the right to democracy should not be rejected, 
because it does not have any highly problematic effects on other rights.246 With 
regard to the assessment of assumed general empirical advantages of democratic 
regimes, other scholars disagree significantly with Christiano. Beitz for example 
insists that the rights and peace guaranteeing quality of democratic regimes de-
pends from the particular situational and historical circumstances in a country. 
 
242 Christiano, “Instrumental Argument,” at 160. 
243 Ibid., at 161. 
244 Ibid., at 163. 
245 Ibid., at 164. 
246 Ibid., at 147–148. 
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He concludes that democratic structures alone are not reliable for a successful, 
politically stable transition. He’s objection states that in many impoverished 
states, the process of democratization has stalled over the last thirty years and 
instead produced political regimes that are “as likely to violate the human rights 
to personal integrity as autocratic regimes.”247 The positive correlation between 
income and democracy is discussed by Beitz as one reason why the internation-
al community is not able to implement long-lasting democratization in poor 
countries. Replying to this objection, Christiano points out a number of success-
ful transitions to democracy, and the constructive role the international com-
munity played in assisting in those transitions. Other research would show that 
poverty does not seem to rule out a transition to effective democracy or the pos-
itive involvement of the international community.248 
Moreover, these arguments support the idea that democracies tend to protect 
the human rights to personal integrity even when per capita GDP is con-
trolled for and the GDP is controlled for and that GDP per capita has a small 
effect on human rights protection.249 
The challenges of the democratization of poor countries do not, according to 
Christiano, undermine the moral justification of the international community’s 
attempts to carry it out. At the same time, however, a valid moral justification 
for democratizing intervention does not automatically translate into direct 
measures to carry it out.250  
A second objection Christiano is confronted with says that democracy—even 
if it does better in some respects—does worse in others. Admitting that there 
might be some outlier cases, Christiano rejects them as irrelevant to the validity 
 
247 Ibid., 167. 
248 Christiano, “Instrumental Argument,” at 167–168. 
249 Ibid., at 168. 
250 Christiano forms an analogy between parents and the international community to illustrate 
his point: “To have a moral justification for attempting to achieve a certain outcome X does not 
entail that one must always be doing something to achieve X. Parents have a moral justification 
to try to get their children to be decent human beings. But there are many times when it is best 
to stand back and hope for the best” (Christiano, “Instrumental Argument,” at 169). 
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of the HRD: “So while the human right to democracy may be defeasible in 
highly unusual circumstances of large-scale failure, it normally serves as a con-
straint on the activities of officials.”251 The main objection is directed at a viola-
tion of legitimate self-determination that is caused by the moral commitment of 
the international community to protect and promote minimally egalitarian de-
mocracies, which, according to Cohen and others, amounts to intolerance to-
ward non-democracies.252 By defining legitimate collective self-determination as 
a type of self-determination that implicitly assumes the society’s respect for hu-
man rights, and by stating that legitimate self-determination further implies that 
conditions of unanimity and broad participation are (from a realist standpoint) a 
sufficient, but not necessary, condition, Christiano finds no evidence for the 
HRD limiting the legitimate right to collective self-determination:253 
In reply to the objection, the first thing to note is that … there is substantial 
reason to think that, in tolerating nondemocratic societies, citizens of demo-
cratic societies are tolerating societies that normally violate uncontroversial 
and very urgent human rights. In the normal case, the toleration of nonde-
mocracies amounts to the toleration of severe human rights violations or of 
the high probability that such violations will occur. Normally, the absence of 
minimally egalitarian democracy seems to imply the absence of legitimate col-
lective self-determination.254 
While Christiano outright claims that nonessential assistance to non-democratic 
states can only be offered only on the condition that they take steps toward de-
mocratization, he insists that cooperation can start in a variety of ways and that 
minimally egalitarian democracy does not necessarily mean perfect democracy 
or perfect justice. Minimally egalitarian democracy would also be compatible, 
for example, with consociational and majoritarian democracies; presidential 
and parliamentary systems; proportional representation; and single-member 
 
251 Ibid., at 171. 
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district representation. In all legitimate forms of minimally egalitarian democra-
cy, the fundamental rights of persons serve as substantial limits.255  
In his subsequent article Christiano expands his claim by showing that the 
traditional argument for democracy holds even for those societies that do not 
accept the principle of equality.256 Distinguishing between democracy at the 
domestic level and democracy at the international level, he reaffirms the two 
“sufficient” conditions for the human right to democracy: first, that every socie-
ty ought to realize democratic rights and, second, that the international com-
munity is morally justified in trying to realize democracy in every society, “be-
cause only in this way can the international community itself make law for its 
members that is democratically legitimate and only in this way can democratic 
societies make law for themselves that is fully democratically legitimate.”257 
However, he then mitigates the requirement of collective self-determination and 
toleration for the non-democratic societies. The weaker conception of collective 
self-determination still allows the instrumental argument of freedom from 
forced, or other forms of, intervention; the notion of toleration is understood as 
non-intervention in non-democratic countries (although it implies unreserved 
cooperation of societies with a full equality in the international realm).258 A fur-
ther mitigation concerns the insight that it is important for a society to develop 
democratic institutions on its own because homegrown democratic institutions 
are more stable and satisfying than externally imposed ones.259  
At this point, it is important to come back to Amartya Sen’s oft quoted em-
pirical, instrumental argument that democracies have a significant effect on 
prevention of economic and social disasters such as famine. Sen highlighted the 
significant correlation between political and civil rights and the prevention of 
major economic disasters by showing that political and civil rights give people 
the opportunity to compel governments to attend to general needs and engage 
in appropriate public action:  
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The response of a government to the acute suffering of its people often de-
pends on the pressure that is put on it. The exercise of political rights (such as 
voting, criticizing, protesting, and the like) can make a real difference to the 
political incentives that operate on a government.260 
Rejecting the “Lee hypothesis,” which says that non-democratic systems are 
better at bringing about economic development, Sen points out that the politi-
cal incentives provided by democratic governance acquire great practical value 
especially in periods of crisis. In general, democracy enhances the capacity of 
people’s demand of political action (including the satisfaction of their economic 
needs) to be heard.261 As shown earlier, Sen’s human rights conception exceeds 
the instrumental argumentation. However, according to Allan Buchanan, Am-
artya Sen’s work provides the best support for the argument that democratic 
governance is the most reliable instrument of ensuring that human rights are re-
spected.262  
Christiano’s egalitarian conception, however, which tries to prove that equal 
consideration of interests depends on minimal democracy, has been criticized 
for insufficiently elaborating the deduction of collective, group-rights-based self-
determination from the principle of individual equality.263 The lack of a clear 
distinction between empirical findings at an international level and conclusions 
based on normative principles make the argument unclear. Subsequent to 
Beitz’s criticism, given the uneven findings and several cases of failed democra-
tization in poor countries, empirical advantages of well-functioning democracies 
do not sufficiently support a claim of a (moral) HRD. Unfortunately, little atten-
tion has been paid to cultural and historical differences between democratic and 
non-democratic cultures and values, or to the question of how the mediation be-
tween both could be realized. The latter is important as it provides the basis for 
 
260 Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” at 7. 
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legitimate universal human rights claimed on the basis of one’s own democratic 
convictions. 
 
3.2.2. Individual Moral Autonomy Needs “Rule by the People” (Robert Dahl) 
Whereas Christiano combines empirical and theoretical claims, Robert Dahl 
starts with an explicit distinction between theoretical- and political-reality-
oriented considerations. It is particularly difficult to place his approach on the 
fourfold conceptual map, because it straddles the instrumental and the intrinsic 
moral standpoints. In fact, Dahl’s use of intrinsic moral arguments would justify 
putting his proposal in either category: moral intrinsic and moral instrumental. 
Dahl’s argumentation aims to separate the evaluative comparison of democratic 
and hierarchical governmental systems (the reality-dimension) from the theoret-
ical comparison of ideal democracy and ideal paternalism. Dahl wants to prove 
the hypothesis that democratic systems can be justified by the fact that they 
make it possible to optimally approximate an ideal political system with the 
view to safeguarding the interests of citizens.  
A hardheaded look at human experience, historical and contemporary, shows 
that among political societies that have actually existed, or now exist, those 
that most nearly satisfy the criteria of the democratic idea are, taken all 
around, better than the rest.264 
Dahl starts from the basic assumption that social cohabitation takes a common 
decision-making procedure for granted, which allows us to determine principles, 
rules, laws, and political solutions that are collectively binding for all members. 
He draws a comparison between guardianship and democracy as two contrasting 
models for structuring political processes. The paternalistic variant of govern-
ment, guardianship, means that a small elite with special capabilities, 
knowledge, and virtues is authorized to rule. The democratic variant is defined 
as the “rule by the people” (by the demos). Citizens are thereby considered 
 
264 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), at 84. 
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equals for the purposes of arriving at governmental decisions.265 Dahl takes the 
intrinsic equality, understood as the principle of equal consideration of human in-
terests, as his criterion for evaluating political systems.266 The three fundamental 
human interests are: the achievement of maximum feasible freedom, the possi-
bility to fully develop one’s capacities and potentialities as a human being, and 
the satisfaction of other interests within the limits of feasibility and fairness to 
others. Dahl key claim is that democracy constitutes an essential means of satis-
fying these fundamental interests, even though not a sufficient condition for 
achieving them.267 He then goes on to distinguish three instrumental functions 
of democracy: providing maximum feasible freedom, fostering human devel-
opment, and protecting personal interests.  
A strong historical correlation between democracy and freedom leads Dahl 
to derive the first of three functions of democracy: ensuring the maximum of 
freedom. The logic of a democratic system inherently comprises a fairly broad 
range of important rights such as rights to free expression, political organiza-
tion, opposition, and fair and free elections. These formal presuppositions do 
not exist in isolation but require a political culture that supports the democratic 
order.268  
As a result of the rights inherently required for the democratic process, to-
gether with a political culture and a broader domain of personal freedom as-
sociated with that process, democracy tends to provide a more extensive do-
main of personal freedom than any other kind of regime can promise.269 
Apart from a general (political) freedom, democracy serves to enhance the free-
dom of self-determination and moral autonomy. Self-determination (i.e. self-
governance, capacity for obeying laws one has set oneself) and moral autonomy 
are both considered to be desirable ends.270 A morally autonomous person is 
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understood to be one who is self-governing in the domain of morally relevant 
choices, “who decides on his moral principles, and the decisions that significant-
ly depend on them, following a process of reflection, deliberation, scrutiny, and 
consideration.”271  
The beneficial effect of democracy on the development of desirable qualities 
in citizens (the second function of democracy) is derived from John Stuart Mill’s 
vision that it should be a priority of a good government to promote the virtue 
and intelligence of its subjects. Dahl himself admits that this effect relies on a 
mere empirical hypothesis that remains to be confirmed.272  
In his discussion of the capacity of democracies to protect personal interests 
(the third function), Dahl argues that democratic governments tend to satisfy a 
minimal set of urgent political concerns of citizens. By providing “an orderly 
and peaceful process by means of which a majority of citizens can influence the 
government to do what they most want it to do and to avoid doing what they 
most want it not to do” 273, democratic governments also commit themselves to 
respond to the urgent political concerns of their citizens. Neglecting these ur-
gent political needs and underlying personal interests would foster protest and 
dissatisfaction with the democratic representatives.  
The argument saying that democracy is the best governmental system to pro-
tect and promote personal autonomy in the political process depends on the as-
sumption that the (ordinary) people in general are equally qualified to govern 
themselves.274 Following a “rule of prudence,” Dahl states the presumption of 
personal autonomy, which says that every adult must be treated as if he were 
the best possible judge if a decision concerning his own interests: “In the ab-
sence of a compelling showing to the contrary everyone should be assumed to 
be the best judge of his or her own good or interest.”275  
Dahl’s reasoning provides a textbook example of a liberal democratic justifi-
cation of democracy. While the theoretical side of his model allows to argue in 
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universal terms, the practical side of the model falls short. In addition to several 
objections Dahl himself raises, the broadest criticism must be directed at the 
strong liberal democratic ideals that Dahl claims are unassailable. Building a 
democratic government in a country that does not follow the enlightenment 
tradition would ignore the historical experience of democratization as well as 
the “self-evident” insight that moral autonomy is necessarily a supreme value 
for human beings. Dahl’s approach is nevertheless helpful in unpacking the 
classical value assumptions which more or less explicitly undergird most HRD 
claims. The guarantee of personal autonomy is paradigmatically proved to nec-
essarily depend on the presupposition of a democratically structured political 
system.  
Apart from the subject-oriented moral argument that seems to support an 
HRD, it is important to highlight that Dahl himself denies the possibility of a 
functioning global democracy: “Can international organizations, institutions, or 
processes be democratic? — I argue that they cannot be.”276 One of his argu-
ments is that the size of democratic units correlates with the influence of citi-
zens’ participation,277 and that international foreign politics issues are often to 
abstract and complex to be truly integrated in democratic political culture.278 
Popular control of foreign affairs is almost impossible to realize. Another im-
portant reason for the rejection of international democracy lies in the mutual in-
terdependence between substantial and procedural solutions in a functioning 
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democracy.279 According to Dahl, a functioning democracy depends on the pre-
sumption of a public good; the right (procedural solutions) and the good (sub-
stantive solutions) condition each other. To claim the possibility of consensus 
about public good in foreign affairs is overreaching. Therefore, Dahl proposes 
that international institutions primarily gain their legitimation not through 
democratic organization but through a model of well-reflected guardianship:  
If we judge that important human needs require an international organiza-
tion, despite its costs to democracy, we should not only subject its undemo-
cratic aspects to scrutiny and criticism but also try to create proposals for 
greater democratization and insist that they be adopted.280  
Dahl argues that the merits of international organizations should not rely on a 
democratic structure, as long as they contribute to public human good. This in-
sight entails the idea that legitimate democratization depends on its internal 
support of political culture. Therefore, for the current world situation, Dahl 
proposes a trade-off between ongoing educative assistance in democratization 
and a re-evaluative, well-thought-out modus operandi of (non-democratic) institu-
tions.  
 
3.2.3. International Demoi-cracy on the Grounds of a Legal Human Right to Democracy 
(Samantha Besson) 
In contrast to Dahl’s skepticism about international institutional democracy, 
Samantha Besson provides an account that is based on a necessity of interna-
tional-demoicracy. In giving an ambitiously synthesis of the HRD debate, Besson 
postulates a moral HRD that must be transposed into an international legal 
HRD.281 She points out that the moral and political views could and should be-
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come mediated by a legal perspective. Her initial stipulation is, that—given the 
already existing democratic human rights (Article III of the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen, Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights)—the question whether there is a legal Human Right to Democracy in 
international law has become superfluous. A potent question that remains to be 
answered is whether there should be at all an international or universal human 
right to political participation.282 Besson proposes an “interest-based theory … 
modified by reference to considerations of moral-political status in a given 
community”:283 
More specifically, the proposed account is moral in the independent justifica-
tion it provides for human rights and political in the function it sees them 
vested with as both shields against the state and guarantees of political inclu-
sion. In terms of justification, its moral-political dimension differs both from 
accounts based on a purely ethical justification of human rights, and from ac-
counts that seek a political form of minimalist justification of human rights.284 
The account that is neither fish (“moral”) nor fowl (“political”) is promised to 
salvage the political role of human rights without diluting their moral justifica-
tion. However, this account is said to provide “useful insights about legal hu-
man rights.”285 Besson defines legal rights as legally protected moral interests, 
and understands “the human right to democracy” as shorthand for a human 
right to a given democratic interest. She argues for a moral right to democracy 
qua international human right to democratic participation. She then goes on to 
give several reasons for the legal recognition of a moral right to democracy, in-
cluding security, clarity, and intermediary agreement on a contested right or set 
of interests, effectivity, sanctions, and publicity.  
 
282 Besson orients her approach explicitly at an international or universal human right to dem-
ocratic participation but not (“as it has been traditionally the case”) to a national or local right 
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According to Besson, the legalization of the right to democracy would en-
hance its realization in practice: it would enable democratic processes through 
legal directives and at same time protect such directives “against themselves and 
their own making.”286 The legal recognition of the moral right to democracy 
should then take place through international, rather than national, law. Besson 
gives four primary reasons for the international legalization:  
(i) its personal scope as international human rights have individuals as right-
holders, but also other states and international organizations in the interna-
tional community (through erga omnes duties of the state or through conven-
tional duties based on a human rights treaty), first, and have all individuals re-
siding in a given state and not only citizens as right-holders, second; (ii) its ma-
terial scope as international human rights law may fill gaps in national protec-
tion or at least provide a minimal safety net in case of human rights relapse in 
a given state; and (iii) its territorial scope as international human rights law 
protect not only individuals within state boundaries, but also all individuals 
submitted to its extra-territorial jurisdiction. (iv) Additional reasons may also 
be found in the international mechanisms available to enforce international 
human rights duties, whether political or judicial and whether coercive or 
non-coercive and military or non-military. As Buchanan and Russell have in-
terestingly captured, further reasons may be identified and grouped into self-
regarding reasons and other-regarding or cosmopolitan reasons.287 
The practical advantages of an institutionalized commitment to the HRD claim 
presuppose democracy to be a common interest of states and individuals. The 
democratic legitimation process of an international human right to democracy 
is seen as advancing in a process of itineration and development. What seems to 
be a prima facie circular (setting an international human right to democracy as 
a universal interest of all states without de facto democratic recognition) is only 
of temporary appearance in Bessons view. She sees the relationship between in-
ternational demoi-cracy and the international legal right to democracy as one of 
mutual reinforcement rather than one of logical sequence, as a virtuous circle: 
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Of course, the more democratic, or rather the more demoi-cratic international 
human rights law-making and human rights law enforcement becomes, the 
more legitimate the international legal right to democracy will be. In a global 
community of states and individuals,
 
growing interdependencies imply mutu-
ally affected interests and hence generate the interest and claim of states and 
individuals to decide together over those issues and no longer on their own 
and separately or only very indirectly together.
 
In those circumstances, inclu-
sion and participation at all levels, including the national one, becomes a legit-
imate individual claim and, at the same time, participation in the decision-
making process stems as a common interest. If those conditions pertain, the 
right to democratic participation will no longer be an interest over which only 
national democratic polities can decide, but an interest of the community of 
communities.288 
By referencing the virtuous, mutually reinforcing relation between international 
demoi-cracy and the international legal right to democracy, Besson addresses the 
complexity of the factual international political situation and decides in favor of 
a commitment to an original, authoritative positing in international law. In a 
more systematic way than Christiano (who frequently oscillates between empiri-
cal and moral philosophical arguments), she argues on the level of the moral, 
the political, but additionally on the legal dimension in favor of the claim to a 
HRD. Both authors account for the constitutive and entangled logics of indi-
vidual and collective self-determination. Christiano shows the reciprocal inter-
dependency through his conceptualization of minimally egalitarian democracy. 
Minimally egalitarian democracy  serves as a minimal condition of human 
rights and personal integrity protection. Additionally, it structures the players’ 
cooperation within the international political system. Besson hones the argu-
ment by pointing out the mutual reinforcement mechanism between interna-
tional demoi-cracy and the international legal right to democracy. As soon as one 
assumes that the international community campaigns for a cooperative multi-
lateral system that accounts for democratic principles (international demoi-cracy), 
the claim for an international legal right to democracy must necessarily follow. 
However, compared to Dahl, Besson’s approach falls short of realist considera-
tion of human limits of cognition, learning, and motivation. Her steadfast belief 
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in a self-referential logic of democracy (which is supposed to work by courtesy of 
presumed individuals compliance as soon as it has been procedurally institu-
tionalized and guaranteed) pays little attention to cultural differences, non-
Western patterns and community structures, and international feasibility of de-
mocratization in general. In my view, Besson rightly insists on separating the 
moral, political, and legal dimensions of human rights. However, she fails to 
draw a most original and important conclusion, namely, that a moral set of 
human rights should be defined as a set of values (point of ideal orientation) that 
is intentionally understood to be more comprehensive than the set of institu-
tionalized legal and political human rights, and that it therefore must not neces-
sarily be thought of as congruent with a set of legal or political human rights. 
 
3.2.4. The Right to Democracy is no Fundamental Human Right (Richard J. Arneson) 
Richard J. Arneson challenges the classical liberal-democratic, moral-instrumental 
views that endorse the HRD claim; he is, as he puts it, “swimming upstream” 
by arguing against the “pretheoretical common sense position,” which states 
“that democracy as a political decision procedure is morally justified partly be-
cause this procedure is inherently fair and partly because its operation leads to 
desirable consequences.”289 His response specifically targets Christopher P. 
Griffin’s argument in a debate of the Journal of Political Philosophy. Griffin 
claims that democracy is intrinsically merely a political procedure because its 
rules and practices treat persons in accordance with the requirements of jus-
tice:290  
The argument sketched here for viewing democracy as a requirement of jus-
tice involves translating equal basic moral status into equal shares of political 
power—one person, one vote in a majoritarian decision rule. I claim that 
equality in the distributive shares of political power represents an appropriate 
 
289 Richard J. Arneson, “Debate: Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic 
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extension of equality of basic moral status to equality of basic social stand-
ing.291 
Arneson rejects the claim of intrinsic fairness of democratic procedures, insisting 
that there is nothing intrinsically fair about the procedure of one person–one 
vote that would have to be traded against the goal of producing better conse-
quences.292 Arneson is skeptical that only democracy of choice could express the 
idea that persons have equal basic moral status, and he views the moral assess-
ment of a choice as dependent on whether this choice is supported by good 
moral reasons. Procedural democratic conditions alone are not sufficient to 
produce just outcomes. Like all other procedures, democratic procedures should 
be evaluated “according to the moral value of the outcomes they would be rea-
sonably expected to produce.”293 The promotion of individual rights serves as a 
criterion for selecting specific governmental institutions. The message expressed 
by a practice “depends on what is reasonable to suppose that those to whom the 
message is communicated will take its meaning to be.”294 Arneson calls his fa-
vored instrumental approach to the justification of democracy the “best-results 
account of political legitimacy.”295 Because the exercise of the vote is considered 
to be an exercise of power, and because fundamental moral rights do not in-
clude rights of power over others, Arneson stipulates that the moral right to 
democracy should not be included among fundamental moral rights.296 He sug-
gests that excluding the right to having a say in a democracy amounts to con-
straining the already narrow content of fundamental moral rights.297 Arneson 
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gives clear priority to the fundamental moral rights the content of which has to 
be determined at a more abstract and general level than procedures and institu-
tions. 298  His distinction between fundamental moral rights and non-
fundamental political, legal rights to guarantee these moral rights, allows him to 
advocate the strong statement that fundamental moral rights are intrinsically 
valuable and worthy of being recognized independently of whether are 
acknowledged by means of a (specific) political procedure or by means of their 
manifestation as legal rights. Such a conceptual distinction proves consistency in 
argumentation. However, discussing the strong historical connection between 
the moral individual rights and the development of democratic institutions is 
important, along with the discussion about to whom moral authority is assigned 
(and to what extent), and how it becomes enforced.  
 
3.2.5. A Minimalist Human Rights Claim to Democracy: 
A Human Right to (some kind of) Political Participation (David Miller) 
David Miller contributes to the HRD debate with his National Responsibility and 
Global Justice,299 published in 2007, and his recent working paper300 which direct-
ly addresses the question. Miller accepts the right to political participation as a 
justified moral human right, whereas he sees the right to democratic citizenship 
as a right only specific to liberal societies.301 Against the backdrop of basic hu-
man needs, Miller directly opposes the option of an “authoritative” positing of a 
human right to democracy, for example in the body of international law.302 Ac-
cording to the human needs approach, something is proved to be a human right 
 
content of fundamental moral rights. Whatever rights we deem fundamental, important to satis-
fy just for their own sake “rights” or purported rights to exercise power over other people’s lives 
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if the enjoyment of that right fulfils the basic needs of the right-holder.303 Hu-
man rights are instrumental in guaranteeing the satisfaction of basic human 
needs. Miller’s “humanitarian strategy” takes basic human needs as a common 
foundation of human rights; among these human needs, physical and biological 
needs are the easiest to identify. In addition, Miller claims that an adequate list 
of human rights must include the idea of a minimally decent human life that has 
not just physical but also social components. The basic human needs must be 
recognized as “morally compelling by people everywhere whatever their own 
particular religious or secular world view.”304 The humanitarian strategy “iden-
tifies and justifies human rights by fixing on universal features of human beings 
that can serve as a ground for these rights.”305 Miller proceeds from a descrip-
tive premise to a normative conclusion. According to him, a non-deductive ar-
gument can nonetheless be a valid moral argument:  
“People suffer extreme pain when they are tortured; therefore they have a 
right not to be tortured” is a valid moral argument, even though it is logically 
possible to assert the premise and deny the conclusion. I shall take it for 
granted that such arguments that ground rights in empirical features of hu-
man beings are at least potentially valid.306 
Irrespective of the question whether such a by-the-way neglect of the Humean 
is–ought distinction can be dropped without further explanation, the need for 
empirical evidence to justify basic human needs limits the coverage of human 
rights substantially. Democratic rights, such as the right to equal participation, 
seem insufficient to guarantee the basic human rights needed for a minimally 
 
303 Ibid., at 179: “But what does it mean to have a need? To play such a justificatory role, the 
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decent human life.307 Despite having identified the human right to participation 
as a legitimate human rights claim, Miller puts it in an inferior category of social 
needs, whereby civil rights, rather then human rights, are justified:  
In drawing this line between basic human rights and the longer list that can 
be found in some human rights documents, I am assuming that only certain 
rights‐violations are urgent enough to trigger remedial responsibilities in out-
siders: being denied material subsistence triggers such responsibilities, whereas 
being denied equal participation in politics does not.308 
The needs-based justification of human rights cannot fully account for the value 
of civil and political rights but has to be justified via the construct of societal 
needs and corresponding citizenship rights. Miller promotes this distinction in 
order to remain faithful to his own obligation to provide a human rights con-
ception covering “the global minimum,” and thus plays a central role “in any 
theory of global justice.”309 However, Miller’s aspiration to provide a concep-
tion of human rights that is general enough to achieve practical agreement 
across societies and cultures, and that therefore could be legitimately claimed as 
obligatory for states to respect, goes hand in hand with his skepticism toward 
the suggestion that international law should be seen as an authoritative source 
of obligatory human rights. He describes the content of international law to be a 
matter of interpretation forbidding to “obtain a definitive ruling on, for exam-
ple, the question whether there is a human right to democracy.”310  
In contrast to his updated position, in National Responsibility and Global Justice, 
the absence of the human right to political participation is clearly declared not 
to “harm” humans in fulfillment of intrinsic needs. Its justification as a human 
right is due to its instrumental function as secondary protection of more basic 
human conditions and needs.311 Thus, Miller suggests a two-level account dis-
tinguishing between human rights and citizenship rights. The former cover the 
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basic human needs, the latter cover the societal needs with which the social jus-
tice, civil, and political rights within political communities are associated. The 
right to participation seems still ambiguously classified. On the one hand, the 
right to participation falls into the category of political and civil rights that re-
spond to societal needs; on the other, it is identified as a legitimate human rights 
claim because of its function as a secondary protection of other human rights.312  
Proceeding from his earlier thoughts about the right to participation to the 
question whether there should be a human right to democracy, Miller opens his 
recent article by supporting the relevance of the HRD-debate. He starts off by 
conceptualizing the HRD as a claim for democratic institutions rather then as a 
mere claim for membership and participation. He then extracts the human 
right to participation as question that needs to be asked separately.313 He points 
out that, from a moral philosophical standpoint, we need to clarify whether de-
mocracy matters to us “instrumentally,” for other goods and values it helps to 
promote, or whether it matters “for its own sake.”314 Thus, evaluating whether 
the institutional arrangement of democracy is justified requires an exploration 
of the grounds of human rights. As a second reason, Miller appeals to a need for 
awareness for possible practical consequences of such a claim, namely the moral 
responsibility to ensure that the human right to democracy was realized: 
If there is indeed a human right to democracy, and if, as many believe, for a 
state to be politically legitimate it must respect human rights, it immediately 
follows that the many undemocratic states that exist in today’s world are ille-
gitimate, and don’t deserve the respect that we owe to all legitimate states. 
This would undermine the position of those like John Rawls in The Law of Peo-
ples who envisage a pluralistic but tolerant world in which liberal democracies 
co-exist on terms of mutual respect with “decent hierarchical societies” whose 
political institutions are not democratic.315 
As pointed out in the book’s introduction, these well-justified concerns about 
the feasibility and legitimacy of a project of global democratization, arising from 
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a human right to democratic institutions, represent a basic caveat within the 
debate, if one emphasizes the political philosophical dimension of the HRD-
question. Miller proceeds from a concept of democracy understood as “systems 
that are today conventionally regarded as democracies.”316 Such systems are 
supposed to maintain three features: (1) a constitution that guarantees funda-
mental rights and specifies the powers of each institution; (2) the presence of a 
range of freedoms; and (3) a decision-making mechanism, either direct or 
through representatives, based on political equality and majority rule.317 Dis-
cussing the moral justification of an HRD claim, these three elements of democ-
racy had to be of essential instrumental or intrinsic value in fulfilling basic needs 
for the HRD to be a justified human rights candidate. Miller rejects the instru-
mental value of a human right to democracy for several empirical reasons. He 
mainly argues that a peremptory demand for democratic institutions runs the 
risk of declaring as illegitimate already existing (non-democratic) institutions 
that nevertheless currently provide the best available protection of human 
rights.318 The assumption of an intrinsic value of democracy for human beings 
is discussed on the basis of Allan Buchanan’s version of the principle of moral 
equality. According to this principle, every person as such is worthy of equal re-
gard. Thus, the requirement arises for all persons to receive the same funda-
mental status, as equal participants, in the most important political decisions 
made in their societies.319 Democracy, understood as a system guaranteeing po-
litical equality and the majority rule, is therefore seen as an important element 
of the institutional recognition of the equality of persons. In essence, Miller ar-
gues against assuming equal status as a universal principle. He identifies it with 
a particular self-understanding of Western liberal societies that has not taken 
hold elsewhere.320 Adopting John Stuart Mill’s argument about voting, he con-
cludes that the only legitimate human rights claim for democracy is one that 
provides that nobody be excluded from political participation: 
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[We] can argue that from a human rights perspective, what is essential is that 
no-one should be excluded from political participation. So there is a human 
right to political inclusion, which is more than just the right to free political 
expression. Since the right’s purpose is to contribute to the overall effective-
ness of the set of human rights, it must give the right-holder the power to 
check those who make political decisions, for example by removing them 
from office, or voting against the decisions they have made in a referendum. 
So the human right must include the right to vote in some form, but not nec-
essarily in the form favoured in Western democracies, where it means specifi-
cally the right to choose political representatives through equal votes in geo-
graphical constituencies.”321 
Miller’s current position approaches the Cohen’s right to membership. Propos-
ing a human right to participation that includes more then free political expres-
sion—namely also the right to be heard and represented in one’s own interest—
represents an even more convincing version of Cohen’s human rights claim of 
political inclusion. As Miller explains, such a right “might be fulfilled in a system 
in which representation was tailored to protect the interests of specific religious, 
ethnic or national groups, for example, in a consociational arrangement which 
gave these groups control or veto rights in areas of policy of special concern to 
them.”322 As such, even if viewed as a group right, the right to participation 
seems also compatible with a minimal (individual) human rights claim to voice 
in the face of an experience of severe injustice (meted out by the injured indi-
vidual’s group or government).  
 
3.2.6. The Human Right to Democracy Belongs to the Group of Basic Human Rights 
(William Talbott) 
William Talbott argues in Which Rights Should Be Universal? that the human ca-
pacity for judgment serves as an (historical) experience-based reference point for 
deriving and guaranteeing human rights. Talbott provides a list of nine basic sets 
of rights, the last of which includes “political rights, including democratic rights 
 
321 Ibid., 15.  
322 Ibid., at 15. 
3 · Moral Conceptions 
104 
and an independent judiciary to enforce the entire package of rights.”323 Such a 
straightforward promotion of democratic rights as human rights is rare to find 
even in “intrinsic moral philosophers.” Upon closer look, Talbott’s justifica-
tion—not of human rights in general but of the HRD in particular—relies more 
on the instrumental than on the intrinsic argumentation. This makes him an-
other author who works at the boundary between intrinsic and instrumental 
conceptions. Talbott favors an equilibrium model of epistemic justification324 which 
bridges consequentialist and non-consequentialist rationales. He bases his ap-
proach on Rawls, Habermas, and Mill. His key premise behind the claim for 
democratic rights is that human beings have a first-person authority. Moral inquiry 
proceeds primarily by bottom-up reasoning elabored in an ongoing historical-
social process and characterized by raising awareness of human conditions and 
social, collective, and transnational interdependences.325 The rights-respecting 
democracy is identified to be the adequate political system allowing first-person 
authority to be exercised and the awareness of social and collective considera-
tions to grow. These originally Mill’s ideas state that it is a “universally true em-
pirical fact that over long haul and given favorable background conditions nor-
mally competent adult human beings know best when it comes to judgments re-
garding their own good and well-being.”326 Against this, Reidy objected that the 
Mill’s claim of an individual’s first-person epistemic authority is not necessarily 
bound to democratic restrictions of political authority: 
Now, even if we accept as true this Millian claim regarding each individual’s 
first-person epistemic authority when it comes to judgments regarding her 
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own good, it’s not obvious that only democracies can reliably advance the 
common good of their members.327 
Against that view, Talbott objected on the one hand that claiming first-person 
authority does not imply that one can be infallible in moral judgments. The jus-
tification of strongly universal moral principles is thus social and historically ver-
ified rather than individualistic, “for we depend on others for information about 
the various social practices that exist and have existed, and even more, we de-
pend on others to imagine possibilities that, by ourselves, we never would have 
imagined.”328 The experience of democratic exchange between the citizens, 
however, is important to any individual and political judgments with an author-
itative aspiration.  
Talbott is arguing for universal human rights against the background of a 
“historical-social process of moral discovery paradigm.”329 He sees the guiding 
idea behind human rights in enabling all people’s conduct to develop and exer-
cise autonomy, to become the authors of their own lives.330 Despite his basic 
commitment to the value of autonomy, as Talbotts consideration about the 
ninth basic right of his lists shows, the claim for political, democratic rights (as 
compared to the other eight basic rights of the list) is not that stringent to derive 
from such a basic claim as it could be expected. Autonomy serves as a marginal, 
rather than a decisive, argument to claim democratic rights. Talbott develops 
three conventional arguments to legitimize democratic rights: autonomy, procedure, 
and results.331 He himself argues for a package of political rights including demo-
cratic rights that are particularly founded on the results oriented focus, because of res-
ervations against both the autonomy- and the procedure-oriented argument. 
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The autonomy a person gains through her right to vote is often a very low-impact 
contribution proportional to the thousands of others inputs in the final deci-
sion.332 The problem with a pro-HRD argumentation based on procedural ad-
vantages of democratic rights is that they alone cannot morally justify an out-
come. Defending the importance of democratic rights in procedural terms 
means to hold that a procedure in which each affected person has an equal 
voice in determining the outcome legitimates the outcome.333 Talbott illustrates 
the problematic point of such a claim by giving an example, in which a large 
majority votes to enslave a small minority:  
The problem is that the minority did not agree to be bound by the results of 
the democratic process. However, this procedural explanation is incorrect. 
Suppose each member of the minority group had signed a written agreement 
to be so bound. Perhaps at the time they entered into the agreement, there 
was no prospect of a majority oppressing a minority. Sometime after they 
signed the agreement, a majority coalition formed and voted to enslave them. 
Would they be morally bound by their prior agreement to cooperate in their 
own enslavement? A strict proceduralist would answer yes. That is why I am 
not a proceduralist.334 
The most convincing justification of democratic rights as universal human 
rights, according to Talbott, is that a (rights-respecting) democracy promotes 
appropriately distributed wellbeing and substantively just results. Democratic 
rights are important because they have a distinct influence on government’s ac-
tions, which in turn have a fundamental impact on its citizen’s life-conditions.335 
To be precise, Talbott argues that, in a rights-respecting democracy, (a) legally 
enforced solutions of collective action problems do not override the judgment of 
those it coerces but gives effect to it; (b) in combination with other human 
rights, democratic rights provide governments with feedback on how best to 
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solve their citizen’s collective action problems; (c) democratic rights provide re-
liable feedback and motivate the government to be appropriately responsive to 
that feedback, because the government’s longevity depends on how well it pro-
motes the wellbeing of its citizens; (d) democratic rights contribute to high sta-
bility and to an ongoing improvement of the political system; (e) the system de-
pends on enough of their citizens developing and exercising their moral judg-
ment; and (f) the citizens capacity for empathic understanding is required.336 All 
these interdependent conditions enable Talbott to build a strong moral-
instrumental argument to claim democratic rights as universal human rights. 
He shows democratic rights to have a fundamental mediating function structur-
ing the relation between citizen and government in reciprocal, constructive 
way. Talbott points out further advantages of a rights-respecting democracy, 
such as stability and incremental improvement of the system, the solution of col-
lective action problems, and the educating function of a democratic right that 
require the citizens to have a capacity for empathic understanding and to de-
velop and exercise moral judgment. This allows him to shed light on the various 
networks of social and political relations that come along with democratic 
rights. Talbott emphasizes the insight that the (international) human-rights-
claim for democracy is hardly one that can be understood only in procedural, 
(power) political terms but that it is associated with an essential society- and cul-
ture-forming overall package that depends on the inclusion of an active citizen 
and of rights-respecting governments of the peoples.  
Talbott’s flair to intertwine substantial and functional arguments shows a 
creative and open-angle approach to justify democratic rights. He provides a 
conceptualization of democracy, defining it as a rights-respecting democracy; he  
does not limit it to the procedural side of political institutions, to voting rights or 
majority decisions, but conceives it as kind of a “multi-tasking” model that in-
volves a whole network of substantial, reciprocal relations between the citizen, 
the judicatory, and the government. The belief in progress and experience in-
duced historical human learning processes allows him to stick to credible moral 
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claims that are justified as moral rights by reference to the past human history 
but open for being further developed and adapted in the future. As Reidy states:  
Talbott argues that over time human beings have discovered various universal 
moral truths about the nature and interests of persons and thus the ways in 
which they must be treated by states that claim legitimately to exercise coer-
cive power over them. These truths are discovered through experience. They 
are not derived through a priori reflection. And we may always find ourselves 
mistaken about them. Nevertheless, they are truths about which we can be as 
certain as anything else we are certain of in the empirical realm. Human 
rights express a demand for institutions consistent with these truths.337 
However, Talbott deals with the international dimension of human rights in a 
rather parsimonious way. Reidy criticizes Talbott for taking democratization of 
states that are not yet democratic and liberalization of states that are not yet lib-
eral as a fundamental component on the human rights agenda.338 Talbott’s ar-
gumentation concerning the international enforcement of basic human rights is 
indeed unequivocal. From a moral standpoint, when human rights are being vi-
olated on a large scale and intervention could end the violations with little col-
lateral damage, it is morally permissible for one nation to intervene in interna-
tional affairs. Not explaining further details of the necessary conditions of an in-
tervention he proposes to establish an International Criminal Court to adjudi-
cate rights violations: “It is important that there be an international enforce-
ment body with control over an international police force for the prevention 
and punishment of human rights abuse.”339 – Even though identifying such a 
claim to be “a direction for potential progress in the future” is controversial, 
such an argumentation is indeed the logical consequence of his approach.  
 
 
 
337 Reidy, “Contemporary Perspectives,” at 36–37. 
338 Ibid., 38. 
339 Talbott, Which Rights Should be Universal, at 182. 
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3 . 3 .  C O N C L U D I N G  R E M A R K S  
3.3.1. Lessons from Intrinsic Moral Conceptions  
From the standpoint of intrinsic moral conceptions, moral and anthropological 
assumptions serve as reference points for evaluating whether a human right 
(understood to be a specific right human beings enjoy in virtue of being human) 
is applicable. The spectrum of arguments is very wide. According to Griffin, 
whereas human rights arose to protect life, liberty, and autonomy of individuals, 
democratic institutions arose out of the need for better decision-making within 
groups. For this reason, claiming an HRD is to some extent a category mistake. 
Nonetheless, for instrumental reasons and from a historical perspective, Griffin 
acknowledges that an HRD is of considerable value.  
In contrast to Griffin’s analysis, Nussbaum argues for a closer link between 
democratic rights and human nature: the ethical role of our basic capabilities, 
such as rationality and language, demands the exercise of practical reason, re-
quires human affiliation, and some form of political and material control over 
our environment. These capabilities therefore, can also support particular 
claims for democratic rights, such as the right to political participation, free 
speech, and freedom of association. Taking the complexity of human develop-
ment into account, and approaching the Rawlsian concept of public consensus, 
Nussbaum is not claiming a legal human right that should be implemented from 
top down, but she does seem to be supporting a form of soft power and devel-
opment aid in order to promote capability development on a global scale. Illit-
erate people, for example, can hardly benefit from an HRD before having min-
imal education allowing them to monitor different information procedures. Sen, 
however, differs from Nussbaum in insisting that minimal human rights such as 
the right to political participation—in order to enforce fair processes—are of in-
trinsic value for human beings and thus have to be claimed in addition to capabil-
ity-claims.  
In the case of Forst and Benhabib, however, the basic right to justification is 
claimed to be the right to have rights in Arendtian style and they thereby establish 
the intrinsic value of democratic procedures for human life. The possibility to 
participate as members of equal worth in the political community is shown to be 
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a presupposition for a human life under Forst’s principle of deference: it pro-
tects personal integrity, helps to establish trust and mutual reciprocity in inter-
subjective relations between members of the community, and supports an inter-
nalized understanding of the value of (individual and collective) self-
determination. According to these authors with a discourse theoretical back-
ground, a first (authoritative) setting of normative values such as the principle of 
justification or the right to have rights is legitimate despite objections of circular-
ity. The positing of certain minimal essential values that are needed for a good 
human life (such as minimal political equality) is not seen as a problematic au-
thoritative positing that overrides cultural differences if and only if it underlies 
an ongoing process of reflective reevaluation and if the duty to give reasons is 
fulfilled. Benhabib’s extension of the moral claim of a right to have rights as a politi-
cal right to membership in a political community to a legal claim comes close to Co-
hen’s normative idea of membership. A similar criticism of how a human being 
defends him- or herself against the experience of severe injustice in the political 
or social community in which he or she is living in—independent of his or her 
membership in this particular social or political community but by virtue of his 
or her “membership” in the human family—surfaces again as a crucial aspect of 
the HRD debate. However, making a legal claim to have rights that entails the 
claim of each human person to be recognized and to be protected as a legal personality by the 
world community, Benhabib’s formulation seems very similar to the earlier pro-
posed human right to voice. It is important to emphasize that the world com-
munity must protect an individual right without discriminating on the basis of 
nationality or residence. The human right to voice must most reasonably also 
entail a right to exit and migration in case of unbearable social and political life 
conditions.  
Like Forst and Benhabib, Stephan Kirste operates not from the normative 
principle of political equality, but from the value of legal freedom. The human 
right to democracy represents the guarantee for individual self-determination 
within a community. It is the legal condition of self-realization as it protects 
freedom and limits the violation of freedom. It radically involves the individual 
as a part of the constitution of rights and duties. Thus, Kirste sees the human 
right to democracy as the capstone of law, empowering and justifying human 
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beings as authors and correctors of their rights and duties as human beings and 
as members of their political community. The human right to democracy is 
therefore something like a process right, a right to actively participate in the 
formation of law thanks to one’s HRD-protected legal freedom. 
The recognition-oriented concept of social democracy provided by Gould 
extends minimal-moral-autonomy- and self-determination-oriented focus of the 
Habermasian tradition. Her understanding of democracy goes beyond the mere 
formal, political aspects. With her understanding of human agency as emerging 
through social, relational practices, the scope of democratic measures and insti-
tutional responsibilities increases. State and society need to foster reciprocal 
recognition enabling people to develop their own capacities and realize life pro-
jects. Humans are viewed as social beings, as beings that are always embedded 
in intersubjective relations, while ideally enjoying equal agency. From a global 
point of view, this leads to the formulation that basic human rights are condi-
tions to human activity and non-basic human rights are essential to people’s 
flourishing. The requirement of equal participation in decision-making and the 
need for influence and rights against global decisions respectively to ones affect-
edness leads Gould to the comprehensive claim for global democracy, to a 
HRD claim. All in all, the claim for democracy matches the acknowledgement 
of  a certain way to think worldwide human cohabitation. It assumes that hu-
man beings develop and flourish best in communities that aim to be politically 
and socially democratic and that are fitted out by respective institutions.  
Brought together, moral intrinsic conceptions consider the individual human 
right to democracy (minimally in the claim of a right to have rights) to be a re-
quired component of human social life either with regard to individual capabil-
ity development, gain of autonomy, protection of freedom, social trust, or self-
transformation. The degree to which this claim for democratic participation is 
understood varies from a mere right to justification to comprehensive claims for 
a democratically structured society. The vast majority of authors who affirm an 
(individual) human right to participation also support the claim for a human 
right to democratic political institutions. It is essential to clearly distinguish be-
tween moral and legal human-rights-claims. Benhabib explicitly reminds us of 
the necessity that human rights must be defined and legitimized through their 
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political function of guaranteeing fundamental rights to the individual, not 
through their function in international trial of strength. By this, she again em-
phasizes the original humanist function of human rights. The minimal form of 
an HRD claim as a moral human right to voice seems not only compatible but of 
basic significance for all positions cited in this section. 
 
3.3.2. Lessons from Instrumental Moral Conceptions 
An HRD is legitimately claimed if it is a necessary instrument for realizing other 
human rights or fulfilling certain basic needs. According to Christiano, both the 
implementation of universal human rights and the world players’ cooperation 
within the international political system depend on assured minimal conditions 
of minimally egalitarian democracy. He claims the moral HRD based on the 
normative principle of individual equality and underlines it by his use of empiri-
cal findings that are meant to prove the positive effects of democratic govern-
ment on both domestic and international level. As Beitz and others have point-
ed out, most scholars attach little importance to the negative effects of democra-
tization as well as the challenge of a practical implementation of an HRD. 
Apart from Christiano’s noticeable tendency to liberal democratic optimism, he 
introduces important empirical aspects to highlight the empirical correlation be-
tween human rights and democracy against a political background. His argu-
mentation adds the empirical basis to support the abstract Habermasian thesis 
of equiprimordiality of human rights and democracy.  
Besson argues systematically for a crossover between the moral, the political, 
and the legal dimensions of human rights and democracy. She further argues 
for the mutual reinforcement between international demoi-cracy and the interna-
tional legal right to democracy. According to Besson, as soon as democratic 
principles organize the international organization and collaboration between 
actors, a legal human right to democracy must necessarily follow. Interestingly, 
she says that the HRD is already part of the existing human rights codex (Arti-
cle III of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, Article 21 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), because, in these articles, participation 
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and rights are based on citizenship. These rights do not therefore cover a mini-
mal human right to (democratic) voice that a human being has independent of 
his or her nationality.  
Dahl argues against the possibility of democratic international institutions by 
showing that the particular advantages afforded the citizens by a democratic 
procedural system depend, for instance, on the citizens’ minimal substantial 
identification and understanding of the political matter. The complexity of in-
ternational affairs and the difficulty to agree on a global public good both un-
dermine the influence of individual democratic participation. Therefore, ac-
cording to Dahl, the correlation postulated by Besson between an international 
legal (human) right to democracy and international demoi-cracy is not a necessary 
one. In addition, Dahl’s argumentation seems to support the claim for an indi-
vidual right to democratic participation: His argument promotes democracy 
straight forwardly by pointing out that it is the best form of government to pro-
tect personal autonomy, to account for intrinsic equality of humans and to en-
sure the principle of equal consideration of interest.  
Distancing himself from the necessary linkage between human rights and 
democracy, Arneson claims that the moral right to democracy should not be in-
cluded among basic moral rights, as the exercise of the vote is considered to be 
an exercise of power. He prioritizes the promotion of intrinsic individual rights 
as criterion for a just society. The decision for a specific governmental form 
needs to be evaluated by the criterion of how well it serves to enforce individual 
rights. Rejecting the assumption of democratic procedures as necessarily just 
procedures, he does “not see any reason at all to accept the claim that only 
choice of democracy can express the idea that persons have equal basic moral 
status.”340 However, if moral evaluation and judgments are decisive, Arneson 
leaves open to whom the legitimate moral authority is owned, and how the 
moral status and standards are defined and validated.  
Whereas Dahl includes the premise of unquestioned intrinsic value of auton-
omy in his instrumental argument for democratic government, Miller avoids 
any reference to such (“metaphysical” or intrinsic) moral concepts. According to 
 
340 Arneson, “Debate,” at 131. 
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Miller’s human-needs-oriented approach, the practical agreement regarding human 
rights is crucial to their legitimation. Human rights are defined as rights that 
serve to guarantee basic human needs. The latter are identified by a so-called 
humanitarian strategy and characterized by a priority of physical, material needs 
that are human rights relevant. According to Miller, a human right to demo-
cratic institutions falls out of the territory of urgent human rights because the 
human rights value of democratic institutions is dependent from their quality 
and implementation. Miller endorses “some form” of a human right to partici-
pation understood as the right to vote that enables the right-holder to maintain 
“the power to check those who make political decisions.”341 
Against this, Talbott includes the HRD, understood as a complex of political 
rights, including democratic rights and an independent judiciary to enforce the 
entire package of rights, in his list of nine basic human rights. Talbott’s strongest 
argument for the HRD states that a rights-respecting democracy promotes ap-
propriately distributed wellbeing, and promotes substantively just results. Add-
ing the mediating function that democratic rights play between citizens and 
governments, he argues for a universal HRD against the background of the his-
torical-social process of moral learning. 
Scrutinizing the moral instrumental conceptions shows that they mostly pull 
out their instrumental value of human rights because of the beforehand stated 
conception of a good life, of certain (self-evidently assumed) human values or 
needs. Unlike the moral intrinsic conceptions they have to provide less exhaus-
tive derivations of such normative goals, as they do not aim to prove an intrinsic 
relation between such values and the HRD-claim but determine them respec-
tively to their basic assumptions. Despite considerable differences in argumenta-
tion, apart from Arnson’s and Miller’s approaches (which seems to allow a right 
to voice claim only in case of physical or material harm), the minimal democrat-
ic claim to voice remains unchallenged. 
 
341 Miller, “Is there a Human Right to Democracy?”, at 15. 
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4  
 
AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE  
ON THE HUMAN RIGHT TO  
DEMOCRACY  
4 . 1 .  P O S T  A N A L Y S I S :  K E Y  F I N D I N G S  SUMMAR I Z E D  
The human right to democracy has inspired a growing body of scholarship. 
Representing human rights from a moral perspective, the human right to de-
mocracy has been argued for as a precondition for living a decent and self-
determined life in political societies. The gradual differences between moral po-
sitions are mirrored by the extent of each concrete human right to democracy 
claim or its rejection. Whereas authors such as Christiano argue for worldwide 
institutional implementation of minimal egalitarian democracy, authors like 
Miller limit their claim on the basic human right to political participation. In 
contrast to the moral positions argued for from the viewpoint of a human being 
with needs, capacities and dignity, the political positions argue against a human 
right to democratic institutions with a view to the requirements and limits of in-
ternational political action taking and collaboration.  
The adaption of the fourfold thematic map helped to analyze and compare 
the contemporary arguments for or against a HRD and to get a well-structured 
overview of the various authors’ positions. The distinction between moral and 
political rationales classifies an approach as a political one, on the one hand, if 
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the claim or rejection of the HRD is justified by emphasizing either reasons 
concerning the logic and optimization of the existent supranational system, or 
by emphasizing general political normative aims (such as the right of a political 
community to collective self-determination, to minimal social justice, or, more 
generally, to peace). Conceptions classified as moral ones, on the other hand, 
start their reasoning from the bottom up, as it were, and ask why a HRD can or 
cannot be claimed from the moral standpoint of any reasonable human being. 
Methodologically, the two rationales have been further divided according to ei-
ther their intrinsic or instrumental form of argumentation.  Hence, the distinc-
tion of four categories of human rights conceptions led to four different possible 
answers to the HRD question. Thus, I distinguished between the categories of 
normative political conceptions, instrumental political conceptions, intrinsic 
moral conceptions, and instrumental moral conceptions. Normative political concep-
tions emphasize normative political ideals and principles concerning the welfare 
of societies such as justice, equality, popular sovereignty or collective self-
determination. They aim at a legitimate and just social and political order. Au-
thors argue for or against a HRD by examining if democratic rights or institu-
tions are an intrinsically valuable precondition to realize normative political 
principles and ideals. Joshua Cohen’s idea of membership and philosophical 
contributions from Alyssa R. Bernstein, Matthew Lister and David A. Reidy 
have been discussed under this heading. Instrumental political conceptions emphasize 
the role that human rights play in international relations as political and public 
instruments. Partisans of this approach take empirical reasons into “normative” 
consideration and define legitimacy as the practical applicability and efficiency 
of human rights in international political contexts. The justification of a HRD 
claim depends on its value for strategic, political goals of the international 
community, for example, as a legitimate instrument to impose sanctions on re-
gimes that violate other human rights. Discussed under the heading of instru-
mental political conceptions, Charles Beitz’s rejection of a HRD provided a ma-
jor contribution to the debate. It stands in contrast to the contribution of Allan 
Buchanan who argued for minimal democracy as a legitimate claim. Intrinsic 
moral conceptions derive human rights from assumptions concerning human na-
ture, general human conditions, capabilities and needs. Correspondingly, they 
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are postulated to protect essential human features (such as particular under-
standings of human dignity) and to enable the unfolding of individuals’ poten-
tials and capabilities by ensuring the satisfaction of basic claims and needs. Only 
if it can be shown that the right to democracy is a right that each human has 
simply in virtue of being a human being, and as a right that guarantees human 
dignity, the claim equates a justified human rights claim. Several, in fact most, of 
the debate’s authors have been classified under the heading of intrinsic moral 
conceptions. Contributions from moral philosopher James Griffin, capability-
philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, critical theorists 
such as Rainer Forst and Seyla Benhabib, but also the social philosopher Carol 
C. Gould and Stephan Kirste as a philosopher of law enriched a diversified dis-
cussion. Instrumental moral conceptions argue, as do intrinsic moral conceptions, 
from the wellbeing and vulnerability of individuals. Disparaging of intrinsic 
moral conceptions, they emphasize the contingency of human rights due to 
their practical, historical, and political constructiveness. Human rights are seen 
as instruments to protect humans from injuries, which are defined as human 
rights violations. The justification of a HRD claim proves that the HRD is nec-
essary to guarantee other human rights. Several authors team up under the 
heading of instrumental moral conceptions headed by Thomas Christiano, Sa-
mantha Besson, and Richard J. Arneson. Robert Dahl, David Miller, and Wil-
liam Talbott are listed in this category as well, whereas they could alternatively 
be construed as offering moral intrinsic contributions, as their thoughts include 
major borrowings from intrinsic moral argumentation. 
My initial desire in approaching this topic was simply to understand and 
map out the different voices partaking in this debate. Certainly, the entangle-
ment of moral, political and legal aspects complicates the comparative discus-
sion of philosophical approaches that provide answers to the question whether 
there should be a human right to democracy. Additionally, from a methodical 
standpoint, few authors can be neatly classified into the fourfold scheme. Some 
authors such as Martha Nussbaum or James Griffin have been selected as con-
tributors to the debate not because they provide a particular contribution to the 
HRD debate but for providing enough HRD related thinking in their human 
rights theories to derive a HRD position. The selection of these authors has 
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been made to point out how the differences in human rights theories matter and 
get reflected in the normative evaluation about whether there should be a hu-
man right to democracy.  In general, however, the fourfold classification and its 
adaption to several human rights conceptions reveal that the divergences con-
cerning content are narrower than were to be expected.  
Despite the lack of consensus among authors, the real controversies between 
them tend to concentrate on practical, political matters of implementation. In 
contrast to a relative uniformity in contra arguments, the pro arguments are 
highly varied. The core issue of whether a moral human right to democracy 
should be claimed—that is, abstracting from factual worldwide conditions—
appears far less controversial. None of the objections against the HRD claim, 
for instance, amounts to an objection to democracy as such. Most authors who 
reject the human right to democratic institutions implicitly or even explicitly af-
firm democratic principles and democracy’s various normative criteria. This 
finding has important implications for distinguishing between moral, legal, and 
political dimensions when theorizing the HRD. Whereas the moral claim for an 
(individual) human right to democratic participation is affirmed by the majority 
of authors in at least some minimal sense of recourse—a right every individual 
should possess in the face of injustice inflicted by the community, including a 
right to dissent from collective decisions—the legal and political claim for a hu-
man right to political democratic institutions is far more problematic. I believe 
that it is often taken for granted that moral human rights must be thought as 
necessarily congruent with legal human rights, but this should be questioned. It 
is important to state well-reflected moral human rights claims that serve as a 
point of orientation for philosophical and political discussions, even if the con-
temporary world situation makes it impossible to implement legal rights that 
would be identical to the ideal moral rights. The common distinction between 
basic and non-basic human rights converges partly with the distinction between 
moral rights and legal rights. That is to say, first, that the claim for basic rights 
(which are of such urgency that violations result in legitimate international in-
tervention) can be defined as moral rights that already have their one-to-one le-
gal equivalents. Second, the claim for non-basic human rights can be conceptu-
alized as moral rights of which the universal implementation in political and le-
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gal context is principally required but must be targeted in a long-term develop-
ment process.  
The key aspects of this book’s argumentation can be summarized in a dialec-
tical triad as follows. First, it was shown how moral conceptions value person-
hood and human needs, interests and capabilities to derive human rights. But 
this humanist emphasis is at odds with practical, political conceptions. Second, 
in due consideration of the arguments from the political conceptions, the claim 
of a comprehensive human right to democracy is ill advised from a contempo-
rary, human, moral standpoint. Third, as I will elaborate at length in the last 
sections of this chapter, the common denominator of a human right to voice can be 
justified from a moral human standpoint but also from a political standpoint—
which seems compatible with the Rawlsian requirement of the consultation hi-
erarchy in decent countries. Further research is needed to establish and account 
for the precise boundaries between moral and legal rights in general, and, in 
particular, between a human right enabling individual (democratic) voice and a 
human right to democratic institutions. However, the widespread rejection of a 
human right to democratic institutions should not lead us to the conclusion that 
the legal, political claim for a human right to voice is also necessarily unobtain-
able. On the contrary, the extraction of the general insight, that the philosophi-
cal affirmation of the HRD, understood as a moral human right to voice, is 
hardly controversial, should be considered to be of fundamental political and 
symbolical value. To bring this extended discussion of the human right to de-
mocracy debate to a close, it is first of all necessary to specify the possible con-
tent and limits of a human right to voice. If such a right has to be morally justi-
fied and feasible from an international political standpoint, what does it include? 
 
4 . 2 .  A N  A L T E R N A T I V E  V I E W :   
T H E  H U M A N  R I G H T  T O  VO I C E  
4.2.1. The Moral and Social Philosophical Justification of a Human Right to Voice  
The human right to voice can be defined as a right that secures the individual 
political right to complain, or organize to complain or to protest if, for example, 
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the individual becomes endangered or harmed within the society it is living in. 
The critique of Cohen’s normative idea of membership helped to elaborate the 
way in which  the human right to voice assigns the individual the moral and po-
litical competence and authorization to present basic interests, rights and needs 
in form of a communicative and public act in his or her society. Cohen’s idea of 
membership includes an individual equal right to political participation but is 
not distinct enough to justify the individual member’s right to be heard and pro-
tected from unjust harm and severe repression that his or her own membership 
community exercises upon him/her. This diagnosis helped in filtering out the 
right to voice representing the basic normative core of the human right to de-
mocracy. It justifies dissent and protest against the society’s denial of individual 
rights, against injustice or harm experienced or not prevented through one’s 
own political government. Claiming a right to voice, e.g. to be heard, recog-
nized and supported in political needs and experiences of repression in one’s 
own society (be it at home, in education or at the workplace) cannot be justified 
through the normative argument of collective self-determination by which Co-
hen justifies the individual right to inclusion. According to this view, the right to 
dissent from and appeal to collective decisions is justified only against the as-
sumption of a shared conception of the society’s common good. 
Prima facie, the above stated claims of a human right to voice could be 
summarized under the heading of individual self-determination as claimed by 
Rainer Forst, Seila Benhabib, and Stephan Kirste. But even if the right to voice 
clearly can be seen in relation to the generally more comprehensive claim for 
political self-determination and moral autonomy, its function is narrower. What 
the human right to voice protects is a minimal realm of moral and social free-
dom,342 the integrity of the individual’s internal liberty to stand up for herself 
and her life plan despite standing in an asymmetrical social or political relation 
to the powerful authority or to the majority. Prior to the normative claim for 
political equality, the normative core of the human right to voice (which is to 
say: its intrinsic justification from a moral human standpoint), is the irrevocable 
 
342 Axel Honneth introduces the notion of social freedom in Hegelian footsteps, in: Axel Hon-
neth, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life (Cambridge: Polity, 2014). 
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claim of minimal self-disposability [Selbstverfügbarkeit] within the social and political 
community one is living in. Thus, even if not necessarily protecting the physical 
vulnerability of human beings, its instrumental function is, on the one hand, to 
protect personal integrity by guaranteeing minimal freedom to articulate one’s 
interests and needs. Apart from protecting the ‘sender’s’ freedom of speech, the 
human right to voice expresses the requirement of a ‘receiver’-side that ade-
quately responds to the particular appeal. Thus, on the other hand, the human 
right to voice emphasizes the requirement of any successful intersubjective 
communication act by pointing out the necessity to provide a receiver-side to 
the sender, such as a representative or public hearing and response to the ap-
peals of singular members. From an existential point of view, the human right 
to voice therefore reflects the paradigm of intersubjectivity, stating that human 
development and behavior can only be understood and transformed in the con-
text of relatedness, in a context where a claim or action find an adequate re-
sponse. Thus, the human right to voice can be seen as a basic institution of 
recognition protecting and representing the individual’s social and juridical 
freedom to engage in active self-realization by means of participation in speech-
acts. From a hermeneutical philosophical perspective, Paul Ricoeur describes 
the underlying need to be recognized as a “speaking subject” in his “phenome-
nology of the capable human being,”343 with a reference to the theory of speech 
acts.  
It is the fact that to speak, following the well-known saying of J.L. Austin, is 
“to do things with words.” By launching the idea of capacity by way of being 
able to say things, we confer on the notion of human action the extension that 
justifies the characterization of the self as the capable human being recogniz-
ing himself in his capabilities.344 
Ricoeur describes interlocutory situations as the locus where the self-designation 
of the speaking subject is produced, “where the reflexivity is combined with 
otherness.” The existential relevance of discourse, of having a voice and being 
 
343 Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), at 
89–109. 
344 Ibid., at 94. 
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heard by others, is represented by the insight that any speech pronounced by 
someone is a speech act addressed to someone else, often even a response to a 
call from others: “The structure of question and answer thus constitute the basic 
structure of discourse, in implicating the speaker and the interlocutor.”345 Ap-
plied to the human right to voice discussion, the denial of a human right to 
voice is a radical denial of discourse, which —according to Ricoeur—equals the 
denial of the recognition as a capable human being. Subsequently, this denial 
reduces the individual’s scope of action, extends to a denial of accountability, 
makes it impossible for the human agent to undertake responsibilities, and im-
pairs personal and collective identity formation.346 
Less focused on the speech act dimension but more to the social philosophi-
cal side, Axel Honneth’s recognition theory provides relevant reasons for the 
moral and psychological significance of intersubjective and juridical recognition 
of someone’s voice for a stable positive self-relation, for the relation to the other 
and for reasonable dealing with the social and political collective. In his more 
recent analysis in Freedom’s Right347, these relational competences of the subject 
are crucial with regard to the formation of ethical life in a democratic society. 
From a psychological standpoint, being guaranteed hearing and response meets 
the basic personal need to experience self-efficacy in social relations. Having a 
voice frees one from invisibility, and by this, it also becomes the source of per-
sonal responsibility. The opportunity to articulate and defend one’s particular 
self-understanding is a necessary condition to individuate and to live free from 
harm and danger within a community.  
Honneth’s conception of recognition is based on the assumption that the in-
tersubjective dynamics of recognition structure the private and the public com-
munities, and that reciprocal recognition is vital for the individuals development 
of capabilities and its individuation. The development of human capabilities 
and of social and moral imputability requires a minimal satisfaction of individu-
al needs for recognition. Relations of recognition are necessary conditions for 
 
345 Ibid., at 96. 
346 Ibid., at 104–109. 
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moral subjectivity, fostering practical relations-to-self in the form of self-
confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem.348 These three positive attitudes corre-
spond with the three levels of recognition in the theoretical model: The first 
form of recognition is developed in primary relationships (love, friendship), the 
second one is experienced in legal relations (rights), and the third one in once 
community of value (solidarity).349 Communicative self-expression, self-reliant 
negation and affirmation, and effective participation in the discourse about 
one’s own needs and life conditions are relevant at all three levels of recogni-
tion. However, in our human rights context, they seem of particular importance 
at the second level. Referring to G.H. Mead, Honneth describes the develop-
ment of cognitive respect of a person who has learned to view himself or herself 
from the perspective of a generalized other as the particular self-understanding 
of a legal person. In the process of becoming a socially accepted member of 
one’s community the person learns to appropriate the social norms of the gen-
eralized other by way of an internalization of the others normative attitudes and 
the norms of cooperation. 350 In addition to the internalized insight into the log-
ic of rights and obligations, reciprocal recognition and responsibilities in a 
community, a functional system of legal recognition must be based on the 
knowledge of secured long-term communal life. The generally valid structure of 
rights and obligations ensures at the same time a private space in which the in-
dividual can develop and aim for his own conception of the good life. The expe-
rience of being recognized as a legal person allows the individual to adopt a pos-
itive attitude towards herself: The conferral of rights comes down to the attribu-
tion of personal properties accounting for the individual’s moral accountability. 
The consequences, which violations of legal status can have on the individual’s 
self-understanding are described as a deprivation of self-respect: 
For the individual, having socially valid rights-claims denied signifies a viola-
tion of the intersubjective expectation to be recognized as a subject capable of 
 
348 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, 
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350 Ibid., at 79. 
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forming moral judgements. To this extent, the experience of this type of disre-
spect typically brings with it a loss of self-respect, of the ability to relate to one-
self as a legally equal interaction partner with all fellow humans.351  
The denigration and exclusion from the legal community further leads to the 
loss of self-esteem as the individual can no more refer to himself as an equally 
entitled fellow being. The restriction of personal freedom that a subject experi-
ences through the denial of legal recognition and participation leads not just to 
a constraint of capable action but to an isolating constraint of possible social in-
teraction and social (intersubjective) freedom.352 The concept of social freedom 
represents the Hegelian idea that self-awareness is attained only by regarding 
the other as other. Further differentiated as a concept to normatively recon-
struct the spheres of market and public democratic life, concerning the private 
sphere social freedom stands for the experience of “being with oneself in the 
other”.353 This idea of social freedom is „rooted in a conception of social institu-
tions in which subjects can grasp each other as the other of their own selves“.354 
In this sense, as a “social institution” the human right to voice protects more 
than the individual freedom and political participation. Standing for the idea 
that realization of individual (reflexive) freedom depends on a social and politi-
cal reality in which reciprocal and complementary deliberation and equal say 
are guaranteed, it represents a basic institution for the realization of social free-
dom.355 In Honneth’s theory of democratic ethical life356 (demokratische Sittlichkeit), 
the function of both liberties and social rights on the one hand, and political 
rights (voting rights, right to assemble, and to form associations357) on the other 
hand, is shown to be crucial for the citizen as an opportunity to identify with the 
society and to form a shared we-perspective as a basis for democratic solidarity.  
 
351 Ibid., at 133f. 
352 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, 42f. 
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After all, political rights necessarily involve an activity that can only be carried 
out in cooperation, or at least in exchange, with all other fellow legal subjects. 
The significance of the difference between liberties and social rights of partic-
ipation on the one hand, and political rights of participation on the other 
hand, is not only empirical but also conceptual: The first two categories of 
rights can only be appropriately understood and implemented if individuals 
use them to form a private “I”, while the third category of rights must be 
viewed as an invitation to engage in civil activity and thus in the formation of 
a common will.358 
In its reading as a moral human right, the right to voice expresses first of all a 
basic individual and social liberty. However, understood as a legal, political 
claim, it also represents a political right to participation. By this twofold func-
tion, the human right to voice symbolizes the bridge between freedom and in-
tersubjective recognition on the basis of which democratic ethical life can only 
become realized in a collective. Ethical life requires the subjects shared self-
understanding that recognition of individual differences and pluralism is built 
on the basis of a common understanding of rights but also on its reference to the 
societies general moral value system. The latter allows social identification and 
solidarity, but also becomes the reference point for citizens or groups to dissent 
from. On the one hand, the idea of a right to voice represents the freedom right 
to stand up for one’s individual interests and values in a social and political con-
text, on the other hand, the dependence of a right to voice from being heard 
through another represents the basic social, communal recognition that this 
right guarantees. If and only if the smallest entity that shapes democracy, the 
individual, has a voice, the minimal condition for the establishment of demo-
cratic life praxis is fulfilled. Against this background, human right to voice can 
be seen as a substantial component in realizing democratic ethical life.  
In a nutshell, both Honneth and Ricoeur link the ethical requirement to rec-
ognize a human being’s “voice” to the personal development of identity, capa-
bilities, responsibility, and finally, by both citing Joel Feinberg, to human digni-
ty: “What is called ‘human dignity’ may simply be the recognizable capacity to 
 
358 Ibid, 79. 
4 · An Alternative Perspective on the Human Right to Democracy 
126 
assert claims.”359 With a view to the well-known objection of culturally relative 
human rights values, one could ask again whether the claim for a human right 
to voice borrows from a too strong Western liberal ideal of moral autonomy and 
individual self-determination. I believe that the minimal content of “moral au-
tonomy” that we have to proclaim for a human right to voice guaranteeing the 
assertion of individual claims in a (repressive) social environment does not over-
stretch the limits of human rights’ universalizability. There is no moral judg-
ment involved against those individual members of a society that for example 
consciously accept the social repression they face because of their low status 
within the caste system for religious reasons. But for those humans who have a 
self-understanding that differs from their society’s understanding of the good 
(entailing a reference to moral autonomy), and who cannot live according to it 
without severely suffering in psychic, social or physical life, the right to voice is 
demanded.  
Several examples falling under area of responsibility of the enforcers of a 
human right to voice can be given, each showing the high complexity and diffi-
culty to implement such a moral rights idea under given world political circum-
stances. Nevertheless, they help to shine a light on fundamental and unaccount-
ed for injustices on individual level that should be acknowledged from a sub-
stantial human rights standpoint and for which perception the consciousness of 
the international human rights community should increase. From a human 
rights standpoint, where the nation-state is not capable or willing to protect the 
individual against severe injustice, the international community’s responsibility 
to support the particular individual arises. 
Let me first take up the example of forced marriage. Imagine the example of 
a young woman born in an orthodox family in a non-secular and conservatively 
religious state who identifies herself with a strong value of personal autonomy 
and self-determination. Despite her cultural identity and connectedness to her 
family and society, her “voice” saying that she wants to choose her own partner 
for a lifetime is not heard by her family. She tries to argue reasonably for her 
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rights but her voice as a woman is given less force and her father and uncles in-
terpret her repugnance as a sign of immodesty and immaturity. In her local en-
vironment, there are no approachable mediators or ombudsmen who could 
support her in this distress. To whom could she possibly make an appeal to be 
heard in her concerns? Will she flee her village hoping for another life abroad? 
Will she be trapped and punished, or become a feminist activist in a more open 
environment? Will she surrender to the values of her patriarchs and finally raise 
her daughter in the same ancient spirit? Will she surrender to a forced marriage 
while building up a secret network of local women that aim for freedom rights?  
The reader can easily imagine how this story ends.  
Another possible case falling under the jurisdiction of a human right to voice 
would be the freshman worker in a factory in a poor country who learns that 
several of his co-workers get sick and die within a work period of few years in 
the same factory. Researching and inquiring among his experienced colleges, 
the father of three children finds out that the glue the workers are required to 
use by the overseers must contain highly poisonous ingredients. Trying to com-
plain at his superiors, they advise him to either work on without complaining, or 
to quit the job and promise absolute discreetness about his findings. Threatened 
to not be sure of his own and his family’s life again if not surrendering to one of 
the given ultimate options, the worker finds himself in a life threatening dilem-
ma. Trying to appeal to national work agencies, he finds himself standing in 
front of closed doors. Are there real other options then the ultimate ones, and to 
whom could he possibly make an appeal to be heard in his concerns? Will he try 
to organize a protest with his co-workers despite knowing that he puts his and 
their life in danger? Will he continue working in the factory silently because he 
decides it to be more important to sustain his family and to enable his kids a 
better education than to secure his own health?  
To finish with a third example, imagine a history teacher in a country ruled 
by despotism. The teacher is constrained to teach the history of his country’s re-
lation to neighbor states according a national curriculum. He knows that the 
textbooks contain ideologically biased propaganda and rabble-rousing and de-
rogatory exposition of the neighbors. Aware that in the long term he helps to 
mobilize a new generation of pupils for the next war against these neighboring 
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countries, he wants to refuse teaching counterfactual stories. However, his expe-
rience prooves that he will be prosecuted for disobedience by the state as soon 
as he implements his decision publicly. Again, we can ask what options the 
teacher has to escape the personal dilemma. To whom can he appeal for sup-
port and protection? Does he decide to stand up for his belief despite the risk to 
spend a lifetime in prison? Does he consider going into hiding and adopting a 
new identity in the underground? Does he consider speaking up in public or ra-
ther emigrating to a country respecting his freedom rights?  
We can only speculate about the fate of these individuals. Of course, we 
could continue with several more examples where the lack of voice represents a 
severe restriction to basic political and individual freedoms. Already these few 
examples imply how complex and illusionary it seems to practically provide be-
ing heard and supported to all these myriads of individuals worldwide whose life 
situations would benefit from human rights protection. The questions in what 
form and to what extent an institutionalized agency of the international com-
munity could take over responsibility over time and support the individual in 
particular circumstances are a different matter to which no panacea is available. 
Besides the morally justified claim of a repressed individual stand antagonist po-
litical interests, and diplomatic relations in practice. Despite these difficulties, 
and under the widely shared hope for incremental democratic development 
minimally in decent countries, naming these ‘taboo’ human rights issues on in-
dividual level seems fair. As I already pointed out, the international political 
impracticality of supporting the individual within the problematically acting 
country throws up the question of whether the international community would 
have to support the exit option. At this point, Albert O. Hirschman’s conceptual 
and sociological contribution to the human right to voice idea from Exit, Voice, 
and Loyality360 and the conceptual revision he gave in Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the 
German Democratic Republic361 provides an attractive endorsement. In the course of 
reconstructing Hirschman’s concept of voice it becomes obvious that the exit 
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option correlates or – in a strong interpretation: co-emerges – with the (denied) 
voice option. The discussion about a human right to voice will be shown to 
transport the follow-up question of a right to exit. According to Warren’s subse-
quent analysis, 362 exit represents a political course of action with significant 
democratic potential. To begin with the reconstruction, Hirschman’s use of the 
concept “voice” that inspired the idea of a “human right to voice” is summa-
rized.  
 
4.2.2. Voice and Exit in Albert O. Hirschman’s Footsteps 
All in all, my adaption of Hirschman’s analytical categories of voice and exit 
understands them as a template structuring and helping to extrapolate the hu-
man rights relevance of voice, but also shining a light on the exit option as a 
possible co- or complementary right to the right to voice. In a political process, 
as Hirschman points out, having a voice to articulate one’s protest and to be 
heard from the responsible political authorities can operate as a substitute for 
the use of the exit option. This link is of contemporary importance for the re-
flection about the contemporary migration challenges, itself clearly being one of 
the empirical fields in which both the human right to voice and the exit option 
become live options. In general and especially concerned about conceiving the 
content and limits of a human right to voice, Hirschman’s template is used pri-
marily as a structuring perspective on the logic of political participation within 
in the context of political or social repression. Tolerating and encouraging the 
study of the particular, contextual relationship between voice and exit against 
the background of the assumption that manifold relationships between the two 
logics are per se possible, the template’s openness and simplicity matches this 
purpose. 
Starting from Hirschman’s thoughts, “the voice option” is originally intro-
duced as one of two indicators in economic organization theory. The “exit op-
tion” represents the second indicator. Outgoing from his analysis focused on 
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economics and management processes, Hirschman adapts the findings as one 
way to understand wider political participation processes. In the course of his 
examination of “exit and voice” lasting from the late 1960ties to the early 
1990ies, he discusses the relation between these two forms of protest of custom-
ers against a firm or of citizens against their repressive governments in several 
ways. Whereas in his earlier writings363 exit and voice are discussed as two ‘al-
ternative routes’ in customers’ reaction to deterioration in a firm or another 
type of organization, revised and to particular contexts extended ways of inter-
play between exit and voice become elaborated in his later work.364  
To understand Hirschman’s use of the concepts of voice and exit, his mono-
graph Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) provides a good starting point. Hirschman de-
scribes therein how in case of deterioration in performance of a firm, the struc-
tural deterioration is typically accompanied by an absolute or comparative dete-
rioration of the quality of the product or service provided. According to 
Hirschman, there are two options the customers can choose to express their dis-
satisfaction with the deterioration of product or service quality. First, the exit 
option lies in the customers’ choice to stop buying the firm’s products or to quit 
their membership in the organization. Second, the voice option lies in the cus-
tomers or organization’s members’ expression of dissatisfaction either directly 
confronting the management or responsible agency, or through “general protest 
addressed to anyone who cares to listen.”365 Initially, Hirschman understands 
exit as an economic, and voice as a political mechanism. Pointing out the poten-
tial of reciprocity of both concepts, he intends to demonstrate the usefulness of 
economic concepts to political scientists and the usefulness of political concepts 
to economists. Particularly in his later work, both the voice but also the exit op-
tion in form of emigration are described as options individuals and groups make 
use of in the political sphere of their societies. Whereas the exit option is de-
scribed as a private and typically silent decision and activity of an individual that 
leaves the country to find a more satisfactory environment, the voice option is 
described as typically a public activity: 
 
363 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, ch. 1. 
364 Hirschman, “Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic.” 
365 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, at 4. 
4 · An Alternative Perspective on the Human Right to Democracy 
131 
Though it [the voice option] does not indispensably require organization, ac-
tion in concert with others, delegation, and all the other features of collective 
action, it thrives on it.366 
The voice option can be executed from a singular human standpoint but always 
requires a recipient of one’s message and a sufficient response. Joined by fellow 
travelers, it can also be used to organize a collective movement, for example in 
using petitions or demonstrations. If the right of voice as a public option is cate-
gorically denied, the private decision to exit the country is often the standing to 
reason way out of a repressive life situation. Criticizing Hirschman’s tenuous 
discussion of exit as a democratic response, Mark E. Warren emphasizes the ex-
it-based empowerment of the individual in claiming its connection to two basic 
norms of democratic theory, the non-domination principle and the all-affected 
principle. The principle of non-domination contends that individuals should not 
be subject to domination but have political, economic, and social empower-
ments sufficient for them to avoid relations of domination and to exercise indi-
vidual autonomy. The all-affected principle refers to the claim of self-
determination and states that those who are potentially affected by collective 
decisions should have the opportunity to influence those decisions.367 The im-
plementation of these principles requires the individual’s right to voice and a 
guarantee to be heard. If voice is denied, exit can function as a key mechanism 
in breaking a relationship of domination or generating attentiveness for social 
injustices in an organization or under a political regime. Therefore, as an alter-
native to rights-based inclusion, exit provides the “communicative feature” of a 
signal under circumstances in which voice is denied.368 Thus, exit as a form of 
political action carries communicative content without necessarily carrying lin-
guistic content. The metaphor of “voting with your feet” represents this non-
verbal communicative act in an apt way. Apart from the neglect of exit’s com-
municative function, Warren argues that Hirschman’s “voice-monopoly-model” 
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underestimates the role exit plays in terms of power: Exit may function to 
change asymmetrical relationships of power into symmetrical relationships of 
choice, at least if the individual has an alternative relationship option (for ex-
ample an unsatisfied employee or customer quitting his firm and choosing a 
new business). This objection points out the important distinction between exit 
understood as an option that benefits people exiting and between exit as a stra-
tegic means that can have an effect of changing the unjust structure in a country 
or organization for the better. Whereas the first option seems primary for our 
thinking about exit in the human rights context, the second option requests a 
further study of political dynamics that might follow the utilization of the exit 
option. 
Initially rejecting the assumption of a pre-established harmony between exit 
and voice, and in contrast following the idea that “they often work at cross-
purpose and tend to undermine each other, in particular with exit undermining 
voice,” Hirschman himself later reformulates the relation between exit and 
voice in Warren’s direction. He uses the metaphor of a “basic seesaw pattern,” 
which is characterized by a “hydraulic” model illustrating how “deterioration 
generates the pressure of discontent, which will be channeled into voice or exit; 
the more pressure escapes through exit, the less is available to foment voice.”369 
In the course of studying the events of 1989 in the GDR, he further extends the 
possible interplay of the mechanisms in the political field in demonstrating that 
exit (out-migration) and voice (protest demonstrations against the regime) can 
reinforce each other in particular situations, and work in tandem. Identifying 
exit and voice as two basic complementary ingredients of democratic freedom, 
he describes them now as “on the whole enlarged or restricted jointly” in a po-
litical process.370 Depending on the momentous political and social constella-
tion, “exit can cooperate with voice, voice can emerge from exit, and exit can 
reinforce voice.”371 From Hirschman’s sociological and economical thoughts 
about exit and voice, enriched by Warren’s revaluation of the democratic po-
tential of exit, a bridge can be built back to the philosophical, Rawlsian idea of a 
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consultation hierarchy in The Law of Peoples,372 and the therein noticed right to 
emigration. Let me therefore take a last twist that leads us back to the 
“Rawlsian shadow” we already discussed at the very beginning of the book. The 
idea of the consultation hierarchy in decent countries complementing the 
Rawlsian human rights theory is used as a perspective from which the idea of a 
human right to voice can be critically discussed. 
 
4.2.3. The Human Right to Voice under an International, Political Philosophical Viewpoint: 
Is Rawls’ Consultation Hierarchy a Critique of the Idea of a Human Right to Voice? 
Discussing the human right to voice requires considering the criterion of a con-
sultation hierarchy Rawls establishes as a second requirement for decent coun-
tries in The Law of Peoples. Besides the criterion that a decent society’s system of 
law needs to be guided by a common good idea of justice, he insists that the le-
gal system of a decent hierarchical people must contain a decent consultation 
hierarchy.373 This consultation hierarchy is described as a basic structure of the 
society that must “include a family of representative bodies whose role in the hi-
erarchy is to take part in an established procedure of consultation and to look 
after what the people’s common good idea of justice regards as the important 
interest of all members of the people.”374 Prima facie, the idea of a consultation 
hierarchy seems close to the idea of a human right to voice, since it states that 
each person belongs to a group represented by a body in the consultation hier-
archy, and each person engages in distinctive activities and plays a certain role 
in the overall scheme of cooperation. Even closer to the idea of a human right 
to voice, Rawls states that persons as members of associations, corporations, 
and estates have the right to express political dissent at some point of the proce-
dure of consultation (often at the state of selecting a groups representatives): 
“the government has an obligation to take a group’s dissent seriously and to give 
a conscientious reply.”375 
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It is necessary and important that different voices be heard, because judges' 
and other officials' sincere belief in the justice of the legal system must include 
respect for the possibility of dissent. Judges and other officials must be willing 
to address objections. They cannot refuse to listen, charging that the dissent-
ers are incompetent and unable to understand, for then we would have not a 
decent consultation hierarchy, but a paternalistic regime. Moreover, should 
the judges and other officials listen, the dissenters are not required to accept 
the answer given to them; they may renew their protest, provided they explain 
why they are still dissatisfied, and their explanation in turn ought to receive a 
further and fuller reply. Dissent expresses a form of public protest and is per-
missible provided it stays within the basic framework of the common good 
idea of justice. 376 
Although the actors of Rawls’s international theory are peoples, not individuals, 
he justifies the necessity and importance of different voices to be heard signifi-
cantly by referring to the individual dissenters’ moral entitlement to ask for rea-
sons and justification.  
Although all persons in a decent hierarchical society are not regarded as free 
and equal citizens, nor as separate individuals deserving equal representation 
(according to the maxim: one citizen, one vote), they are seen as decent and 
rational and as capable of moral learning as recognized in their society.377 
Although the argument focuses on people in decent countries, the general con-
cept of the person is hardly differently conceptualized for persons in outlaw 
states, societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, or societies that are benev-
olent absolutisms. Rawls describes just the latter as not being well ordered be-
cause their members are denied a meaningful role in making political deci-
sions.378 The Rawlsian vision entails that the Law of the Peoples would be fully 
achieved when all societies have been able to establish either a liberal or a de-
cent regime. This underlines the normative presumption that all persons, all 
human beings, should have the right to live in a society in which their voice is 
taken seriously, at a minimum by representatives in a consultation hierarchy. 
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Despite these convergences of the Rawlsian consultation hierarchy and the pro-
posal of a human right to voice, his overall conceptualization of human rights 
on the one hand, but also his explicit emphasis in the ‘three observations’ that 
follow the introduction of the idea of a decent consultation hierarchy give rea-
son to ask whether the derivation of a human right to voice understood as an 
individual right overstretches his intention. Let me show why I think that this is 
not the case. In his first observation, Rawls emphasizes that in decent consulta-
tion hierarchies, groups, not (as in the liberal scheme) individuals, are represent-
ed. He explains his preference for the group theoretical standpoint towards the 
individual’s standpoint by arguing that ‘the individualistic idea that each per-
son, as an atomistic unit, has the basic right to participate equally in a political 
deliberation’ is not shared by decent hierarchical societies. Because they never 
integrated the liberal democratic concept of one person, one vote, the dominat-
ing view in well-ordered decent societies is that persons belong first to groups 
such as estates, corporations, and associations: 
Since these groups represent the rational interests of their members, some 
persons will take part in publicly representing these interests in the consulta-
tion process, but they do so as members of associations, corporations, and es-
tates, and not as individuals.379  
However, in applying the consultation hierarchy using the fictive example of 
Kazanistan, he insists on six guidelines, of which the first says that authorities 
have to consult all groups, and the second that each member of a people must 
belong to a represented group.380 At this point, Cohen’s normative idea of 
membership meets its Rawlsian base.  
 
379 Ibid., at 73. 
380 Ibid., 77: “This hierarchy satisfies quite closely the following six guidelines. First, all groups 
must be consulted. Second, each member of a people must belong to a group. Third, each 
group must be represented by a body that contains at least some of the group’s own members 
who know and share the fundamental interests of the group. These first three conditions ensure 
that the fundamental interests of all groups are consulted and taken into account. Fourth, the 
body that makes the final decision—the rulers of Kazanistan—must weigh the views and claims 
of each of the bodies consulted, and, if called upon, judges and other officials must explain and 
justify the rulers’ decision. In the spirit of the procedure, consultation with each body may 
4 · An Alternative Perspective on the Human Right to Democracy 
136 
In addition and in the context of claiming religious toleration as a criterion 
for decent societies, Rawls claims that if the adequate representation of the indi-
vidual’s equal (religious) freedom rights cannot be guaranteed “it is essential 
that a hierarchical society allows and provides assistance for the right of emigra-
tion.”381 This justification of the member’s right to the “emergency solution” of 
emigration underlines the emphasis Rawls puts on the protection of the individ-
ual person also in his international theory. This concern for the balance of injus-
tice at the individual level is also expressed in his “third observation.” Concern-
ing the representation of these members in a consultation hierarchy, who may 
have long been subjected to oppression and abuse, such as women, he demands 
that a majority of the members of the bodies representing the (previously) op-
pressed group must be chosen from among those whose rights have been violat-
ed.382 The main objective of a human right to voice is that every individual is 
heard in his interests especially in life situations that endanger or constrain ma-
terial and psychic security and basic needs, and in which the national state does 
not or cannot provide adequate representation and response to these interests. 
The very same objective underlines the Rawlsian claim to explicitly account for 
the interests and needs of those who were repressed or are still in danger not to 
be represented adequately in their political or religious community; as men-
tioned above, he underlines the urgency of this objective by noting that the right 
to emigrate serves as an emergency solution for the individual.  
 
4.2.4. Potentials and challenges of a human right to voice 
Distinguishing between different moral and political rationales in human rights 
theory, this book elaborated the importance of the still (implicitly or explicitly 
for all human rights conceptions) fundamental claim stating that human rights 
are rights humans have in virtue of being humans. In other words, human 
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rights are rights that gain their normative, public action-inspiring force mainly 
from representing basic individual or subjective rights claims in their core. A 
philosophical justification of the moral human right to voice has been elaborat-
ed referring to the recognition theoretical rationales from Honneth and Ric-
oeur. The human right to voice was extracted out of the comparison of the sev-
eral philosophical contributions to the human right to democracy debate, and it 
represents a common denominator, namely the shared intrinsic core value of 
any democratic human rights claim. The predominant rejection of a compre-
hensive human right to democracy cannot be seen as sufficient reason to deny 
the ethical human rights value of democracy in general. To avoid throwing the 
baby out with the bath water, the categorical repudiation of a human right to 
democracy should be replaced by the promotion of the softer and universally 
justified moral claim for a human right to voice. This minimal normative core 
claim can but must not in every country lead to democratic government. Never-
theless, it works as a symbol for every human being under every political regime 
representing the fundamental right to represent one’s basic individual interests 
and to be heard if one is suffering from severe experiences of injustice at the 
hands of one’s own political and social community. Even in the human rights 
conception of Rawls, which serves as the representative template for most polit-
ical human rights conceptions, the consultation hierarchy was successfully 
shown to explain the priority of a right to voice of each member of a society in 
terms of a right to freedom of thought and religion. More extensive than Co-
hen’s membership conception, Rawls concedes the right to emigrate as an 
emergency solution for any individual who finds no adequate representation 
and protection in his society. The main argument of Rawls against understand-
ing human rights as (liberal) individual rights is argued for from the standpoint 
of cultural and conceptual differences, saying that decent hierarchical societies 
never had the individualistic liberal concept of one person, one vote. But the 
thesis that in some decent countries the people’s self-understanding is not based 
on an individualistic idea or on individual rights claims, but rather on a person-
al identifications as part of the own society and with the community’s shared 
conception of the good, is challenged by the factual considerable use of the exit 
option in decent but also other non- liberal states such as outlaw states. If the 
4 · An Alternative Perspective on the Human Right to Democracy 
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exit option, in particular the right to emigrate, is as Hirschman points out, a 
private option taken by individuals who see no other way to realize their fun-
damental interests in a society or to use the public voice option without putting 
themselves or their families in danger, this act comes down to nothing less than 
an individualistic choice. An act of emigration, rightly put in the metaphor of 
voting with one’s feet, which is fully or partly caused by the denial of the voice 
option, can be interpreted as an act of individualization in the liberal democrat-
ic sense of a reconquest of freedom. Touching a broad network of correlations, 
the human right to voice finally refers to the understanding of the right to emi-
grate or exit as a normatively justified reaction of the individual. By implication, 
a meaningful right of exit must also entail an obligation on the part of decent 
societies to allow entrance. However, this obligation seems not entirely 
acknowledged in the international community. Altogether, the insights about 
the human right to voice lead to further questions: Which kinds of violations of 
a human right to voice should lead to the right to emigrate according to the in-
ternational law? How should the right to voice exercise influence over the defi-
nition of the refugee status in international law? However, that is a story to be 
continued on another occasion. 
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Anerkennung und Freiheit: Subjekttheoretische Grundlagen einer Theorie 
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Abstract: Axel Honneth legt seiner politischen Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit in Das Recht der Freiheit 
(RdF, 2011) ein gegenüber der intersubjektiven Anerkennungstheorie im Kampf um Anerkennung (KuA, 1994) 
revidiertes Modell der Anerkennung zugrunde. Den drei Formen der intersubjektiven Anerkennung (KuA) 
stehen neu fünf Sphären der institutionalisierten Anerkennung (RdF) gegenüber. Als Zentralbegriff der 
Gesellschaftstheorie fungiert im RdF nicht mehr “intersubjektive Anerkennung”, sondern “soziale Freiheit”. 
Trotz der mehrfachen und explizit betonten Abstützung des Freiheitsmodells auf der 
Anerkennungskonzeption bleibt der genaue begriffliche Zusammenhang zwischen Freiheit und Anerkennung 
im RdF nur fragmentarisch erläutert. Dies provoziert den Einwand, dass das begriffliche Verhältnis von 
Anerkennung und Freiheit im RdF verschattet bleibt und damit die Anschlussfähigkeit von 
Anerkennungstheorie und politischer Gesellschaftstheorie in Frage gestellt werden kann. Honneths Revision 
des Anerkennungsbegriffs wird kritisch in Frage gestellt und es wird für eine komplementäre statt einer 
substituierenden Lesart der Anerkennungsmodelle als Grundlage für seine Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit 
argumentiert. Anhand der Auseinandersetzung mit der Sphäre der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit zeige ich 
auf, dass der Bezug zu den drei ursprünglichen Anerkennungsformen, insbesondere zur intersubjektiven 
Anerkennungsform der sozialen Wertschätzung, für eine konsistente Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit 
unverzichtbar ist. Als Bedingung sozialer Freiheit in der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit leistet die 
Anerkennungsform sozialer Wertschätzung eine unterschätzte Überbrückung zwischen der Subjektebene und 
der Ebene der politischen Institutionen.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dieser Aufsatz ist im April 2016 bei der Zeitschrift “Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie” 
eingereicht worden.  
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ANERKENNUNG UND FREIHEIT:  
S U B J E K T T H E O R E T I S C H E  G R U N D L A G E N  E I N E R  
THEOR I E  D E M O K R A T I S C H E R  S I TTL ICHKE IT  
 
Zusammenfassung 
Axel Honneth legt seiner politischen Theorie demokratischer Sitt-
lichkeit in Das Recht der Freiheit (RdF, 2011) ein gegenüber der in-
tersubjektiven Anerkennungstheorie im Kampf um Anerkennung (KuA, 
1994) revidiertes Modell der Anerkennung zugrunde. Den drei 
Formen der intersubjektiven Anerkennung (KuA) stehen neu fünf 
Sphären der institutionalisierten Anerkennung (RdF) gegenüber. 
Als Zentralbegriff der Gesellschaftstheorie fungiert im RdF nicht 
mehr “intersubjektive Anerkennung”, sondern “soziale Freiheit”. 
Trotz der mehrfachen und explizit betonten Abstützung des Frei-
heitsmodells auf der Anerkennungskonzeption bleibt der genaue 
begriffliche Zusammenhang zwischen Freiheit und Anerkennung 
im RdF nur fragmentarisch erläutert. Dies provoziert den Ein-
wand, dass das begriffliche Verhältnis von Anerkennung und Frei-
heit im RdF verschattet bleibt und damit die Anschlussfähigkeit von 
Anerkennungstheorie und politischer Gesellschaftstheorie in Frage 
gestellt werden kann. Honneths Revision des Anerkennungsbegriffs 
wird kritisch in Frage gestellt und es wird für eine komplementäre 
statt einer substituierenden Lesart der Anerkennungsmodelle als 
Grundlage für seine Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit argumen-
tiert. Anhand der Auseinandersetzung mit der Sphäre der demo-
kratischen Öffentlichkeit zeige ich auf, dass der Bezug zu den drei 
ursprünglichen Anerkennungsformen, insbesondere zur intersub-
jektiven Anerkennungsform der sozialen Wertschätzung, für eine 
konsistente Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit unverzichtbar ist. 
Als Bedingung sozialer Freiheit in der demokratischen Öffentlich-
keit leistet die Anerkennungsform sozialer Wertschätzung eine un-
terschätzte Überbrückung zwischen der Subjektebene und der 
Ebene der politischen Institutionen.   
1 
U M S T R I T T E N E S  V E R H Ä L T N I S :   
V O M  K A M P F  U M  A N E R K E N N U N G   
Z U M  R E C H T  D E R  F R E I H E I T  
Zur Annäherung an die Verhältnisbestimmung zwischen Axel Honneth’s in-
tersubjektiver Anerkennungstheorie (Kampf um Anerkennung, 1994, Abk. KuA) 
zu seiner politischen Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit (Das Recht der Frei-
heit, 2011, Abk. RdF) bietet sich eine vergleichende Auseinandersetzung mit 
den Kernbegriffen beider Werke an. Den drei Formen der wechselseitigen 
Anerkennung (Liebe, Recht, soziale Wertschätzung, KuA) steht im RdF ein 
dreidimensionaler Freiheitsbegriff gegenüber, angeführt vom Zentralbegriff 
der sozialen Freiheit. Vergleicht man zunächst die Unterschiede und Ge-
meinsamkeiten bei den Grundannahmen beider Werke, besteht ein Unter-
schied darin, dass der Freiheitsbegriff gegenüber dem Anerkennungsbegriff 
im RdF deutlich priorisiert wird. Während im KuA die anthropologischen, 
intersubjektiven Entwicklungsprozesse auf Subjektebene als Grundvoraus-
setzung für das Verstehen sozialer und politischer Zusammenhänge hervor-
gehoben werden, stehen im RdF die gesellschaftlichen und politischen Insti-
tutionen der modernen Gesellschaft hinsichtlich dem Beitrag, den sie zur 
Realisierung der sozialen Freiheit leisten können, auf dem normativen Prüf-
stand. Dies geht einher mit der unterschiedlichen Methode von KuA und 
RdF. Während der KuA eine sozialphilosophisch und –psychologisch abge-
stützte Aktualisierung der Subjekttheorie in der Tradition des Hegeliani-
schen Anerkennungsmodells leistet, widmet sich das RdF der normativen 
Rekonstruktion der historischen Entwicklungen der modernen Gesellschaf-
ten und ihrer liberal-demokratischen Institutionen. Ein weiterer wesentli-
cher Unterschied zwischen der politischen Theorie demokratischer Sittlich-
keit im RdF und der intersubjektiven Anerkennungstheorie im KuA besteht 
in einem grundsätzlich revidierten, im RdF jedoch nicht systematisch einge-
führten Anerkennungsbegriff. Diese Revision wird im RdF nicht explizit er-
läutert, jedoch von Honneth in der Erwiderung auf eine Vortragskritik 
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nachträglich ausdifferenziert1: Den drei Formen der intersubjektiven Aner-
kennung (KuA) stehen neu fünf Sphären der institutionalisierten Anerken-
nung (RdF) gegenüber.  
Neben den ausgewählten Unterschieden bleiben zwischen RdF und 
KuA zugleich wesentliche Gemeinsamkeiten bestehen, die ein starkes Ar-
gument für die Vereinbarkeit beider Ansätze darstellen. Zunächst bildet das 
Verhältnis von Anerkennung und Freiheit sowohl in KuA wie im RdF den 
Kern der normativen Erörterungen; im KuA beginnt die Annäherung an 
dieses Verhältnis ausgehend von den Voraussetzungen der wechselseitigen 
intersubjektiven Anerkennung, im RdF im Ausgang von der Kritik des libe-
ral-demokratischen Freiheitsbegriffs. Das Verhältnis von Anerkennung und 
individueller Autonomie bildet die Hauptachse des Anerkennungsmodells.2 
In der Gerechtigkeitstheorie des RdF geht es weiterführend um die Siche-
rung der individuellen und intersubjektiven Autonomie im Bereich des poli-
tischen und sozialen Kollektivs. Zentral für beide Werke ist der Fokus auf 
die conditio der Intersubjektivität, die als Schlüssel zum Verstehen der Genese 
sowohl des persönlichen, kulturellen wie des moralischen und politischen 
Selbstverständnisses fungiert und vor deren Hintergrund das Autonomie-
streben des Subjekts analysiert wird. Die psychosoziale und moralische Ent-
wicklung des Subjekts wird durch die Begegnungen und Interaktionen mit 
dem menschlichen Gegenüber und durch die Sozialisierungsgemeinschaft 
auf fundamentale Weise vorgeprägt, so dass eine legitime normative Politi-
sche Theorie die psychologischen Entwicklungs- und Sozialisierungsprozesse 
des Subjekts mit in Betracht ziehen muss. Diese im KuA explizite Grundauf-
fassung kommt im RdF (impliziter) darin zum Ausdruck, dass diejenigen In-
stitutionen wie Freundschaft, Familie etc., welche die intersubjektiven Ent-
wicklungsbedingungen sozialer Freiheit im Privaten gewährleisten sollen, für 
Honneth von prioritärer Bedeutung sind. Eine klare Trennbarkeit der indi-
viduellen Persönlichkeitsentwicklung von den Bedingungen einer demokrati-
schen Sozialisierung wird hier ebenso abgelehnt wie die Konzeptualisierung 
 
1 Axel Honneth, “Réponse (De la reconnaissance à la liberté),” in Axel Honneth. De la recon-
naissance à la liberté, ed. Mark Hunyadi, La Pensée élargie (Le Bord de l’eau: Lormont, 2014), 
109–29. 
2 Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung - Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte (Suhr-
kamp, 1994), 111. 
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einer politischen Gerechtigkeitstheorie ohne Begründung in einer Theorie 
des Guten.  
Der Vergleich der Freiheitsbegriffe in KuA und RdF ist dennoch schwie-
rig zu leisten; in KuA ist terminologisch mehrheitlich von „(individueller) 
Autonomie, nicht von „(sozialer) Freiheit“, die Rede. Die Unterscheidung 
von negativer, rechtlicher oder sozialer Freiheit spielt im KuA noch keine 
explizite Rolle. Zugleich scheint sich über die Analyse des Freiheitsbegriff 
derjenige Bereich des Vergleichs aufzutun, bei der die Komplementarität 
zwischen der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Anerkennungsbegriff (KuA) und 
der Auseinandersetzung mit der Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit (RdF) 
besonders deutlich herausfiltriert werden kann.  
In der Autonomie der menschlichen Lebenspraxis identifizierte Honneth 
bereits in der KuA im Sinne Hegels den Zweck der Anerkennung: „Nur die Per-
son, die sich von den Anderen in bestimmter Weise anerkannt wissen kann, 
vermag sich so vernünftig auf sich selber zu beziehen, dass sie im vollen Sin-
ne des Wortes „frei“ genannt werden kann.“3 Während das Verhältnis von 
Anerkennung und Autonomie in KuA über das Korrelativ der entsprechen-
den Selbstbeziehung analysiert wird, bleibt das Verhältnis von individueller 
Autonomie und dem politischeren Aspekt der sozialen Freiheit im Übergang 
von KuA zu RdF numinos – zumindest sofern die Orientierung an den ur-
sprünglichen Anerkennungsformen zugunsten des erneuerten Anerken-
nungsmodells wegfällt. Einerseits ist die Vorstellung sozialer, intersubjektiver 
Freiheit bereits im Autonomiebegriff der KuA angelegt, andererseits sprengt 
sie aufgrund ihrer umfassenden und politischen Dimension den morali-
schen, subjektbezogenen Autonomiebegriff. Aufgrund dieser Doppelnatur 
des Begriffs der sozialen Freiheit, die Honneth selbst als besonders schwer 
charakterisierbar bezeichnet4, fällt es methodisch schwer, die Grenzen mo-
ralphilosophischer Begründung, empirisch psychologisch oder soziologisch 
gestützter Argumentation und historisch normativer Rekonstruktion syste-
matisch zu fassen. Andererseits fungiert die soziale Freiheit dadurch als Po-
tentialbegriff, der die moralische Ebene auf der Individualebene mit der po-
 
3 Ibid., 325–326. 
4 Axel Honneth, Das Recht der Freiheit - Grundriss einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit (Suhrkamp, 
2011), 233. 
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litischen Ebene der Gesellschaft überbrückt. Ihre Realisierung als (inter-
)subjektive Erfahrung aber auch als Idealbegriff des gesellschaftlichen und 
politischen Zusammenlebens enthält wesentliche Bezüge zu allen Formen 
der wechselseitigen Anerkennung. Der Nachvollzug der anerkennungstheo-
retischen Grundvoraussetzungen der individuellen Autonomie (KuA) stellt einen 
wesentlichen Beitrag zur Erklärung des Begriffs der sozialen Freiheit (RdF) auf 
der gesellschaftlichen und politischen Ebene in Aussicht.  
Nähert man sich der Frage an, weshalb Honneth eine Revision des An-
erkennungsbegriffs vornimmt, scheint zunächst plausibel, dass auf der Ebe-
ne der Politischen Theorie zu einem bestimmten Grad von der Subjektebe-
ne abstrahiert werden muss. Mit dem Fokus auf intersubjektive Anerken-
nungsbeziehungen als Ausgangspunkt für jegliche soziale oder politische In-
teraktion erlaubt hingegen bereits der KuA die Ableitung gewisser Forde-
rungen an eine Politische Theorie, indem er den gesellschaftsimmanenten 
Kampf um Anerkennung als Ausgangspunkt für die Erklärung von histori-
schen moralischen und gesellschaftspolitischen Entwicklungen und Trans-
formationsprozessen identifiziert. Eine demokratische, rechtssichere Gesell-
schaftsstruktur ist als Realisierungsbedingung von Anerkennungsverhältnis-
sen bereits in der KuA vorausgesetzt. Erst im Anschlussprojekt des RdF setzt 
Honneth diese Überlegungen zu den institutionellen Anforderungen einer 
demokratischen Gesellschaft jedoch in den eigentlichen Entwurf einer Politi-
schen Theorie um, entwickelt mittels der Methode einer normativen Rekon-
struktion. Die Resultate dieser historischen Rekonstruktion stellen die Hege-
lianischen Annahmen, insbesondere die Idee einer Objektivierung des Geis-
tes im Laufe des historischen Entwicklungsprozesses, der in eine hochentwi-
ckelte politische Kultur einmündet, in Frage. Gemäss dem wünschbaren 
aber mittels der normativen Rekonstruktion für die historische Realität nicht 
bestätigbaren Ideal der demokratischen Sittlichkeit würde soziale Freiheit 
den gemeinsamen sozialen und politischen Raum ausgehend von ihrer Rea-
lisierungserfahrung im Bereich persönlicher Beziehungen durchdringen und 
gestalten. Analog würde sie sich sowohl in die Sphären des marktwirtschaft-
lichen Handelns wie der demokratischen Willensbildung (u.u.) übersetzen. 
Hegels ursprüngliche und der Anerkennungstheorie vorausgestellte Annah-
me, dass sich aus dem Kampf der Einzelnen um wechselseitige Anerken-
nung ihrer Identität ein „innergesellschaftlicher Zwang zur praktisch-
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politischen Durchsetzung von freiheitsverbürgenden Institutionen ergibt“5, 
muss nun aber im RdF selbst angesichts des Ergebnisses der historisch nor-
mativen Rekonstruktion problematisiert werden. Während die Anerken-
nung der Identität des Anderen für den sozialen und moralischen Fortschritt 
grundlegend bleibt, mildert insbesondere die normative Rekonstruktion zu 
den Pathologien des dreifachen Freiheitsbegriffs die Plausibilität einer – 
wenn konflikthaft so dennoch generell progressiven – Entwicklung zu einem 
„Zustand kommunikativ gelebter Freiheit“ 6 – selbst innerhalb einer konsoli-
dierten liberal-demokratischen Sphäre. Zwischen dem ernüchternden Er-
gebnis der normativen Rekonstruktion im RdF und der Annahme des mora-
lischen Fortschritts im Laufe der Geschichte in der KuA ergibt sich ein 
grundsätzlicher Widerspruch. Die gesellschaftlichen und politischen Zu-
sammenhänge in den pluralistischen westlichen Gesellschaften sind zu kom-
plex und vielfältig, um einen verlässlichen Zusammenhang zwischen der 
moralischen und authentischen Individuation von Einzelperson und dem 
moralischen Fortschritt und seiner Umsetzung im gesellschaftlichen und po-
litischen Kollektiv zu postulieren.  
Diese Ergebnisse mögen ein Grund dafür sein, dass Honneth sich in sei-
ner politischen Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit im RdF mit klaren Be-
züge zum ursprünglichen Modell der intersubjektiven Anerkennung zu-
rückhält. Dem RdF legt er bewusst einen gegenüber dem KuA substantiell 
revidierten Anerkennungsbegriff zugrunde. Im Fokus des RdF stehen nicht 
mehr das in Beziehung-stehende Subjekt und seine psychosozialen Entwick-
lungsbedingungen auf dem Weg zum politischen Akteur. Die normative Re-
konstruktion evaluiert primär den Stand der Institutionalisierung gewisser 
normativer Vorstellungen von sozialer Freiheit in den modernen liberal-
demokratischen Gesellschaften. Eine Überbrückung beider Projekte setzt 
eine Verhältnisbestimmung zwischen den Begriffen „intersubjektiver Aner-
kennung“ (Kernbegriff im KuA) und „sozialer Freiheit“ (Kernbegriff im 
RdF) voraus. In einem ersten Schritt werde ich deshalb die wichtigsten In-
halte des dreistufigen Anerkennungsmodells aus dem KuA und der dreifa-
chen Unterscheidung des Freiheitsbegriffs im RdF rekapitulieren. Davon 
 
5 Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung - Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, 11. 
6 Ibid. 
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ausgehend werde ich Honneths Revision des Anerkennungsmodells disku-
tieren.  
 
Zum Verhältnis von intersubjektiver  
Anerkennung und sozialer Freiheit 
In der Anerkennungstheorie entwickelt Honneth auf der Grundlage von 
Hegel und Mead ein intersubjektivitätstheoretisches Personenkonzept, „in-
nerhalb dessen sich die Möglichkeit einer ungestörten Selbstbeziehung als 
abhängig von drei Formen der Anerkennung (Liebe, Recht, soziale Wert-
schätzung) erweist“7. Individualisierung und Individuation finden vor dem 
Hintergrund der sozialen Einbettung des Subjekts statt; das Streben nach 
individueller Autonomie zeigt sich als wesentlich vermittelt und beeinflusst 
durch die – entweder anerkennungsbewusste oder missachtende –  Interak-
tion im intersubjektiv und kollektiv mitgeprägten Beziehungs- und Lebens-
raum des Subjekts. Die intersubjektiven und sozialen Erfahrungen des Sub-
jekts werden als Grundlage des rechtlichen und politischen Zusammenle-
bens in der Gesellschaft betrachtet. Das Verstehen von Anerkennungs- und 
Missachtungserfahrungen und Dynamiken wird zum Ausgangspunkt der 
Gesellschafts- und Institutionskritik. Die Rechtfertigung politischer Mass-
nahmen und staatlicher Gewalt muss gemäss der Logik des KuA dem nor-
mativen Kriterium Geltung zollen, Anerkennungsbedingungen in der Ge-
sellschaft zu schaffen oder zu erhalten sowie Missachtungsverhältnisse zu 
verhindern und zu unterbinden. Gegenüber den drei Stufen der Anerken-
nung werden entsprechend drei Formen der Missachtung ausdifferenziert, 
die mit moralischen Verletzungen einhergehen. Die Eigenart moralischer 
Verletzungen besteht gemäss dem Anerkennungsmodell darin, dass sie die 
positive Selbstbeziehung des betroffenen Subjekts erschüttern und damit 
dieses selbst in seiner psychischen Integrität und Handlungsfähigkeit in Fra-
ge stellen. Dies geschieht durch die Vorenthaltung der intersubjektiven Be-
stätigung, die jedes Subjekt zur Aufrechterhaltung einer positiven Selbstbe-
ziehung benötigt.8  „Selbstbeziehung“ bezeichnet hierbei das Bewusstsein 
 
7 Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung - Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte (Suhr-
kamp, 1994), 8. 
8 Axel Honneth, Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 2000), 181. 
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oder Gefühl einer Person im Hinblick auf ihre eigenen Fähigkeiten und die 
ihr zukommenden Rechte.9 Das die intersubjektiv bestimmte Selbstbezie-
hung des Subjekts zur Basis seiner Beziehung zum Kollektiv und damit zur 
Grundlage der sozialphilosophischen Theorie wird, kann als spezifisches 
Merkmal des anerkennungstheoretischen Denkens identifiziert werden. 
 
Anerkennung vs. Missachtung 
Die drei Formen der Anerkennung werden gemäss einer idealen Lesart der 
Anerkennungstheorie zur Grundlage eines stabilen Selbstverhältnisses, das 
ein Subjekt in seiner späteren Rolle als Bürgerin und Teilnehmer am politi-
schen Prozess idealerweise anhand seiner intersubjektiven Erfahrungen und 
Entwicklungsleistungen erworben hat. In der Praxis sind die drei Stufen der 
Anerkennungsfähigkeiten aufgrund der Heterogenität und Individualität 
persönlicher Entwicklungsverläufe nicht legitim als konstitutiv zu lesen. Es 
kann also beispielsweise nicht reliabel behauptet werden, dass ein Kind, das 
in den Primärbeziehungen nicht genügend Anerkennung erhalten hat, auf 
der kollektiven Ebene nicht zur Ausbildung von Solidarität fähig sein kann. 
Ebenfalls ist das mittlere, das rechtliche Anerkennungsverhältnis insofern 
von einer besonderen Qualität, als dass die Aufrechterhaltung von Rechts-
verhältnissen auch von einer Person aufrechterhalten werden kann, die aus-
schliesslich rational ihr Eigeninteresse verfolgt ohne intersubjektiv oder sozi-
al eine Anerkennungsfähigkeit entwickelt zu haben. Unabhängig dieser 
Vorbehalte gegenüber einer Verallgemeinerung der anerkennungstheoreti-
schen Voraussetzungen des subjektiven Entwicklungsprozesses, stellt Hon-
neth mit dem Fokus auf intersubjektive Selbstbeziehungen ein heuristisch 
wertvolles Modell zur Analyse sozialer Beziehungen im Kollektiv zur Verfü-
gung. Erhält das Subjekt gemäss diesem Modell eine intersubjektive Bestäti-
gung seiner Selbstbeziehung über die drei Anerkennungsformen hindurch, 
sollte es theoretisch dazu befähigt werden, a) eine Form des Selbstvertrauens 
zu entwickeln, die ihm die „elementare Sicherheit über den Wert der eige-
nen Bedürftigkeit“10 aufgrund relationaler Erfahrungen bestätigt. Die Aner-
 
9 Ibid., 182. 
10 Honneth gemäss der Definition von Selbstvertrauen nach E.H. Erikson. Ibid. 
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kennung erhält das Subjekt über die affektive Zuwendung, durch die Liebe 
und Fürsorge anderer im Sinne einer konditionalen und emotionsgebunde-
nen Sorge um sein Wohlergehen.11 Ebenfalls gereicht diese Bestätigung b) 
zur Entwicklung von Selbstrespekt im Sinne einer Sicherheit über den Wert 
der eigenen Urteilsbildung sowie c) zu einem Selbstwertgefühl im Sinne des 
Bewusstseins für den Wert der eigenen guten und wertvollen Fähigkeiten.12 
Selbstrespekt setzt moralischen Respekt voraus, das Zugeständnis morali-
scher Zurechnungsfähigkeit mittels einer universellen Gleichbehandlung, 
wie sie vorzugsweise in Rechtsverhältnissen ausgedrückt wird. Die dritte 
Form der Anerkennung entspricht der sozialen Wertschätzung der besonde-
ren Fähigkeiten einer Person, die für die konkrete Gesellschaft von konstitu-
tivem Wert sind. Diese Wertschätzung des besonderen Einzelnen wird von 
Honneth als Solidarität oder Loyalität bezeichnet (im RdF wird diese Fähig-
keit auch als Fähigkeit zur Übernahme einer gemeinsamen Wir-Perspektive 
bezeichnet), womit eine konditionale, wertgebundene Sorge um das Wohl-
ergehen des Anderen gemeint ist, die um der gemeinsamen Ziele willen ge-
pflegt und aufrechterhalten wird.13 Korrelierend zu diesen drei Schichten 
einer positiven Selbstbeziehung unterscheidet Honneth drei Typen morali-
scher Verletzung oder Missachtung. Bei der elementarsten Form der Miss-
achtung a) (bspw. physische Misshandlung, Folter, Vergewaltigung) wird ei-
ne Person der Sicherheit beraubt, über ihr physisches Wohlergehen verfü-
gen zu können. Damit verliert sie das Vertrauen in den Wert, den die eigene 
Bedürftigkeit in den Augen aller anderen geniesst. Bei der zweiten Form 
moralischer Verletzung (bspw. individuelle Fälle der Täuschung oder des 
Betrugs, rechtliche Benachteiligung ganzer Gruppen) wird die moralische 
Zurechnungsfähigkeit der Person missachtet. Dadurch wird die Selbstach-
tung, die das Subjekt erhält, indem Andere den Wert seiner Urteilsbildung 
anerkennen, zerstört. Der dritte Typ moralischer Verletzungen (bspw. über 
ein Spektrum vom Nicht-Grüssen bis zur Stigmatisierung) besteht darin, 
dass einer Person oder Gruppe die Anerkennung für die eigenen besonderen 
 
11 Ibid., 187. 
12 Ibid., 182-183. 
13 Ibid., 187; Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung - Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, 
chap. 5. 
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Fähigkeiten mittels Demütigungen oder Respektlosigkeit demonstrativ abge-
sprochen werden. Zerstört wird dem Subjekt dadurch das Gefühl, innerhalb 
einer konkreten Gemeinschaft von sozialer Bedeutung zu sein.14 Aufgrund 
dieser Übersicht lässt sich bereits antizipieren, dass die Motivation zum soli-
darischen Handeln und zur demokratischen Partizipation des Einzelnen im 
Kollektiv durch die Anerkennungs- und Missachtungserfahrungen innerhalb 
der sozialen und politischen Gemeinschaft wesentlich beeinflusst werden 
können.  
 
Drei Freiheitsbegriffe und ihre Pathologien 
Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Anerkennung und Autonomie aus der 
KuA mündet im RdF in eine korrektive Auseinandersetzung mit dem libe-
ral-demokratischen Verständnis von Autonomie und Freiheit, bzw. in die 
umfassende Exegese des Kernbegriffs der sozialen Freiheit. Wechselseitige 
Anerkennungsverhältnisse in den verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Sphären 
bedingen für die Realisierung der erweiterten sozialen Freiheitserfahrung in 
einer politischen Gemeinschaft das Vorhandensein und die Einbettung des 
Subjekts in bestimmte Institutionen demokratischer Sittlichkeit. Im Zentrum 
des RdF steht zunächst eine Kritik des liberal-demokratisch tradierten Frei-
heitsbegriff der modernen Gesellschaften sowie ein Vorschlag zur Revision 
dieses Freiheitsverständnisses. Entgegen einer atomistisch-liberalen Auffas-
sung des Subjekts, welches gewissen sozialen Grundbedingungen mit ihrem 
Freiheitsverständnis nicht gerecht werden kann und gesellschaftliche sowie 
politische Entwicklungen befördern kann, die einer authentischen Selbstbe-
stimmung und Selbstrealisierung entgegenwirken, verfolgt Honneth im RdF 
die alternative und systemischer orientierte Unterscheidung von negativer, 
reflexiver und sozialer Freiheit15. Die negative/rechtliche Freiheit und die 
 
14 Ibid., 183–184; Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung - Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, 
chap. 5–6. 
15 Honneth unterscheidet die drei Dimensionen des Freiheitsbegriffs in einer historischen 
Vergegenwärtigung im RdF zunächst als negative, reflexive und soziale Freiheit. Nach dem 
Übergang zu seinem Entwurf einer Gerechtigkeitstheorie nach dem Ideal der demokrati-
schen Sittlichkeit nennt er die drei Möglichkeiten der Freiheit rechtliche, moralische und soziale 
Freiheit. Es wird an dieser Stelle davon ausgegangen, dass die Dimensionen miteinander 
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reflexive/moralische Freiheit sind für die soziale Freiheit in der Sphäre der 
demokratischen Öffentlichkeit vorausgesetzt16. Wenn jedoch die jeweiligen 
Grenzen der rechtlichen und moralischen Grenzen überdehnt werden und 
dadurch für die soziale Wertschätzung im Kollektiv entscheidende soziale 
Interaktionen verunmöglicht werden, können sich in der Gesellschaft auch 
Pathologien der Freiheitsbegriffe entwickeln. In diesen Pathologien, die 
Honneth primär anhand des Blicks in die Gegenwartsliteratur dingfest zu 
machen versucht, verortet er einen Ansatzpunkt u.a. zur Erklärung gegen-
wärtiger Probleme demokratischer Öffentlichkeit. Um zu Verstehen, warum 
Honneth sich im RdF vom Primat des Anerkennungsbegriffes weg, hin zum 
Primat des Freiheitsbegriffs, wendet, gilt es zunächst, seine anhand der nor-
mativen Rekonstruktion erlangten Freiheitsbegriffe und ihre Pathologien in 
ihren Grundzügen nachzuvollziehen.  
Negative/Rechtliche Freiheit: Die negative Freiheit bedarf zu ihrer Realisie-
rung den Schutz subjektiver Rechte im gesicherten rechtsstaatlichen Rah-
men. Sie kann deshalb primär mit der Anerkennungsform des Rechts in 
Verbindung gebracht werden, was Honneth unter dem Kapitel „Rechtliche 
Freiheit“ beschreibt. Die Garantie historisch gewachsener und transformier-
ter subjektiver Rechte ermöglicht dem Einzelnen Privatautonomie zur Rea-
lisierung eigener Präferenzen und Absichten unabhängig von der Zustim-
mung anderer.17 Rechtliche Freiheit konstituiert die Sphäre individueller 
Privatheit.18Unter der anerkennungstheoretischen Sichtweise setzt negative 
Freiheit eine Form der Anerkennung voraus, die insofern keine primär sozi-
ale Form ist, als das Subjekt für ihre Inanspruchnahme zunächst nicht wei-
tergehender auf die Bedürfnisse der anderen Subjekte eingehen muss als 
durch die Respektierung deren eigener negativer Freiheitsräume. Innerhalb 
des zugesprochenen negativen Freiheitsbereichs kann es frei und entspre-
chend idiosynkratrisch (sogar unverantwortlich oder selbstdestruktiv19) ent-
 
korrelieren bzw. dass sich die negative und die rechtliche sowie die reflexive und moralische 
Freiheit jeweils auf dieselbe Freiheitsdimension beziehen. 
16 Honneth, Das Recht der Freiheit - Grundriss einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit, 473. 
17 Axel Honneth, Das Recht der Freiheit - Grundriss einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit (Suhr, 2011), 
129. 
18 Ibid., 147. 
19 Ibid., 51. 
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scheiden, welche Handlungen und Einstellungen es als subjektiv richtig er-
achtet: „Freiheit besteht dementsprechend darin, nicht durch äussere Wi-
derstände daran gehindert zu werden, selbstgesetzte Ziele zu realisieren.“20 
Die rechtliche Freiheit muss jedoch durch wechselseitige Normen der Aner-
kennung reguliert werden, um dadurch ein legitimes Handlungssystem der 
Gesellschaft zu sein, dass es die intersubjektive Freiheit ihrer Mitglieder be-
fördert. Wenn das Subjekt zu sehr mit seiner Rolle als Rechtsperson identi-
fiziert ist, führt dies zu einem rechtskategorialen Denken, dass die anderen 
Menschen auf Akteure mit strategischen Zielen reduzieren muss. Weil im 
Rechtskontext immer bereits zwischen legitim und falsch unterschieden ist, 
erübrigt sich durch den Bezug auf ein subjektives Recht auch die diskursive 
Erörterung von konfligierenden Gründen und es kommt zu einem Kommu-
nikationsabbruch.21 Dies führt bei einer Überbeanspruchung der rechtlichen 
Freiheit als normativer Urteilsinstanz zu einer unbestimmten und nicht 
mehr auf das Individuum und den spezifischen Kontext bezogenen Haltung. 
Honneth betont deshalb, dass die subjektiven Rechte allein der Befragung 
und Überprüfung von existierenden, nicht aber der Herauspräparierung 
und Formulierung von neuen Vorstellungen des Guten dienen können.22 
Die vorgängige Übernahme von intersubjektiven Rechtfertigungspflichten 
ist für den ethischen Umgang mit rechtlicher Freiheit vorausgesetzt.  
Aus der Kritik am rechtlichen Freiheitsbegriff entwickelt Honneth in der 
normativen Rekonstruktion ein gegenwärtiges Ideal subjektiver Rechte, bei 
dem das Individuum durch das die negative Freiheit erweiternde Zuge-
ständnis von politischen und sozialen Rechten die Freiheit erhält, seine Wer-
tüberzeugungen öffentlich zu artikulieren und zu vertreten. In diesem „ethi-
schen Pluralismus“, der dem Einzelnen den Spielraum zur ethischen Selbst-
vergewisserung zusichert, sorgen die politischen Rechte dafür, dass die 
Rechtssubjekte über Teilnahmerechte aktiv an der demokratischen Willens-
bildung und allgemeinen politischen Gesetzgebung teilnehmen können, ih-
 
20 Ibid., 45. 
21 Ibid., 154. 
22 Ibid., 153. 
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ren Selbstgesetzgebungsbedarf also auch ausserhalb des isolierten Bereichs 
der Privatsphäre wahrnehmen können.23  
Interessant insbesondere für die Analyse der Prozesse in der demokrati-
schen Öffentlichkeit sind die Erörterungen zur Pathologie des rechtlichen 
Freiheitsbegriffs. Über einen Blick in die literarischen Gegenwartszeugnisse 
übt Honneth Kritik an einem Rationalitätsdefizit in der westlich-
demokratischen Gesellschaft, bei dem die rechtliche Freiheit überstrapaziert 
wird.24 Ein über den Bereich des Sinnvollen hinaus überdehntes rechtliches 
Selbstverständnisses der Bürgerinnen und Bürger in der politisch-öffentliche 
Sphäre sowie deren Betonung im Bildungskontext führt dazu, dass das 
Rechtsdenken auch dort angewandt wird, wo andere Formen der sozialen 
Interaktion erforderlich wären.25 Konkret identifiziert Honneth zwei For-
men von Pathologien der rechtlichen Freiheit, die zu einer „nennenswerten 
Beeinträchtigung der rationalen Fähigkeiten der Gesellschaftsmitglieder füh-
ren, an massgeblichen Formen sozialer Kooperation teilzunehmen“.26 Zum 
einen geht es um einem Prozess der Verrechtlichung, bei der es zur Ver-
selbstständigung der Rechtspersönlichkeit und zu einer Verabsolutierung 
des Rechtsgedankens kommt. 27  Die Subjekte der liberaldemokratischen 
Länder verstehen sich grundsätzlich als Rechtsträger und planen ihre Hand-
lungen im Fall von Konflikten und Streit unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Er-
folgsaussichten vor dem Gerichtshof. 28 Damit einher geht der Verlust des 
Gespürs für die nicht rechtlich artikulierbaren Belange und Absichten:  
Die Fähigkeit, zwischen strategischem Vorder- und lebensweltlichem 
Hintergrund am Interaktionspartner zu unterscheiden, geht verloren, und 
übrig bleibt nur die Person als Summe ihrer rechtlichen Ansprüche. [...] 
Statt individualisierter Bedürfnisse werden nur noch verallgemeinerbare 
Interessen zur Geltung gebracht, statt auf je eingespielte Normen und 
Werte wird dann nur noch auf rechtskonforme Prinzipien zurückgegrif-
 
23 Ibid., 139ff. 
24 Ibid., 157ff. 
25 Ibid., 167. 
26 Ibid., 157. 
27 Ibid., 161–162. 
28 Ibid., 163. 
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fen, an die Stelle von kommunikativen Konfliktregelungen treten schnell 
und beinah ausschliesslich gerichtliche Schlichtungsverfahren.29 
Die indirektere Pathologie des Rechtsbegriffs neben dieser „Verselbstständi-
gung der Rechtspersönlichkeit“ besteht darin, dass die authentische Identi-
tätsfindung angesichts des überpräsenten Rechtsdenkens einen sozialen Ty-
pus der unentschlossenen und handlungsarmen Persönlichkeit befördert.30 
Diese Persönlichkeitsausprägungen hemmen die zwischenmenschlichen An-
erkennungsfähigkeiten, die es für den aktiven und solidarischen Nachvollzug 
der rechtlichen Anerkennung und für die soziale Wertschätzung braucht.  
Reflexive/Moralische Freiheit: Der Begriff der reflexiven Freiheit wird von 
Honneth zunächst im Ausgang von Isiah Berlins Begriff der positiven Frei-
heit entwickelt, dann im Spannungsfeld der Unterscheidungen zwischen 
Selbstbestimmung und Selbstverwirklichung, Autonomie und Authentizität,  
rationaler Selbstbegrenzung und diachroner Selbstfindung, sowie autono-
mer und heteronomer Handlung, ausdifferenziert.31 Diese begrifflichen Ge-
genüberstellungen verweisen bereits darauf, dass die moralische und reflexi-
ve Selbstbehauptung im Wechselspiel von Autonomiebedarf und sozialer 
Abhängigkeit für diese Freiheitsform prioritär ist. Die Erläuterung dessen, 
was unter reflexiver Freiheit verstanden werden kann, beginnt Honneth mit 
der Unterscheidung von autonomen und heteronomen Entscheidungen. Die 
reflexive Freiheit ist Grundvoraussetzung für die moralische Abwägung zwi-
schen dem Erfordernis der authentischen Selbstrealisierung oder Selbstbe-
stimmung des Subjekts im Verhältnis zu den gesellschaftlichen oder univer-
sellen Anforderungen an das allgemein Gute. Ihr liegt also die Fähigkeit des 
Subjekts zur Reflexion in dem Sinne zu Grunde, als dass die Bezugnahme 
auf das allgemeine Kultursystem der Moral eine Rolle dabei spielt, was als 
normative gute Handlung oder Entscheidung des Einzelnen vollzogen wird. 
Der Erfahrung reflexiver Freiheit liegt also die Fähigkeit zur vernünftigen 
und selbstbewussten Abwägung zwischen den allgemeinen normativen An-
forderungen des Kollektivs/des Kultursystems der Moral und den persönli-
chen Anforderung eines authentischen und selbstbestimmten Lebensvollzugs 
 
29 Ibid., 163–164. 
30 Ibid., 167. 
31 Ibid., 59. 
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zugrunde. Mit der Aufwertung des Begriffs der reflexiven Freiheit und des 
Kultursystems der Moral geht im RdF eine Aufwertung der individuellen 
Freiheit einher. Diese Aufwertung identifiziert Honneth selbst als wesentli-
cher Grund für die Revision des Anerkennungsbegriffs.32 Die reflexive Frei-
heit trägt einerseits im klassisch liberalen Verständnis als Zuschreibung der 
moralischen Selbstgesetzgebung der moralischen Autonomie des Einzelnen 
Rechnung. Andererseits kann auch moralische Autonomie nach Honneth 
nicht mehr monologisch gedacht werden, sondern erhält eine intersubjekti-
vitätstheoretische Bedeutung, die auf die unhintergehbare Verwurzelung 
jeglicher Autonomie und Selbstgesetzgebung in den sozialen Strukturen der 
Lebenswelt und in ihren wechselseitigen Anerkennungslogiken verweist.33  
Die Aufwertung des individuellen Freiheitsbegriffs bricht also nicht mit 
den intersubjektiven Grundannahmen der KuA. Innerhalb des geltenden 
gesellschaftlichen Normengefüges hat der Einzelne zunächst das Recht, die 
öffentliche Auslegung moralischer Normen zu beeinflussen. Im „reflexiven 
Moratorium der Selbstgesetzgebung“ kann moralisch-reflexive Freiheit 
dann aber nur über die Teilnahme an einer Rechtfertigungspraxis realisiert 
werden, die der Tatsache Rechnung trägt, dass „unsere individuellen Ent-
scheidungen immer auch Rückwirkungen auf andere haben“.34 Wie bei der 
rechtlichen Freiheit müssen also auch der moralischen Freiheit elementare 
Formen der wechselseitigen Anerkennung vorausgehen.35:  
Im Handlungssystem moralischer Freiheit muten sich die Subjekte wech-
selseitig zu, sich unter der Bedingung an allein individuell für richtig ge-
haltene Grundsätzen zu orientieren, dass sie für deren Legitimität gege-
benenfalls allgemeine Gründe namhaft machen können; der Standpunkt, 
den sie daher jederzeit einzunehmen bereit sein müssen, ist der eines un-
parteilichen Aktors, der rechtlich nicht geregelte Konflikte ohne Rück-
sichtnahme auf existierende Bindungen und Verpflichtungen zu beurtei-
len mag.36 
 
32 Honneth, “Réponse (De la reconnaissance à la liberté),” 125–126. 
33 Honneth, Das Recht der Freiheit - Grundriss einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit, 69. 
34 Ibid., 205. 
35 Ibid., 204. 
36 Ibid., 198. 
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Diese unparteiische Perspektivenübernahme dient der Abstraktion von per-
sönlichen Belangen; sie unterscheidet sich von einer Depersonalisierung,  bei 
der das Subjekt auch gegenüber privaten oder sozialen Bindungen stumpf 
und empfindungslos wird.37 Wenn die Unvoreingenommenheit und Unpar-
teilichkeit dazu führen, dass die Grundsätze seines Handelns ausschliesslich 
am „Leitfaden der Verallgemeinerbarkeit“ und der moralischen Universali-
sierbarkeit ausgerichtet werden, führt dies zu Pathologien der moralischen 
Freiheit, indem es den Persönlichkeitstypus des unverbundenen Moralisten 
fördert und zu Erscheinungsformen von moralisch begründetem Terroris-
mus führen kann.38  
Das Rationalitätsdefizit der Gesellschaftsmitglieder besteht bei diesen pa-
thologischen Praxen der Logik moralischer Freiheit darin, dass es zu einer 
Rigidisierung und Erstarrung individuellen Handelns kommt, die sich in 
Symptomen der gesellschaftlichen Isolierung und erneut einer Form des 
Kommunikationsverlusts widerspiegeln. 39  Der Vollzug der moralischen 
Selbstgesetzgebung wird insofern missverstanden, als der Einzelne zur blos-
sen Charaktermaske seiner moralischen Gesinnung wird, indem das Krite-
rium universalistischer Geltung den existierenden Normen des konkreten 
Umfelds und der partikulären sozialen Lebenswelt ihre Geltung abspricht. 
Wie bei religiös radikalisierten Ideologien führt auch der überdehnte Mora-
lismus letztlich zu einer instrumentalisierenden Umgangsweise mit dem 
Subjekt, bei dem die authentische intersubjektive Anerkennungspraxis und 
die autonome ethische Reflexion von der angepassten Ausrichtung an der 
moralischen Gesetzgebung abgelöst wird und soziale Anerkennung über die 
Anpassung an den bestehenden Moralismus abgeholt werden kann. Die so-
ziale Wertschätzung für besondere Eigenschaften erreicht das Subjekt ge-
mäss dieser Logik nicht mehr aufgrund seiner eigenen Individualität und 
Authentizität, sondern dann, wenn die besonderen Eigenschaften zur Errei-
chung des gemeinsamen grösseren Ziels eingesetzt werden.  
Soziale Freiheit: Zusätzlich zu diesen beiden Freiheitsformen, die beide auf 
ihre Weise begrenzt sind und in ihren pathologischen Ausprägungen demo-
 
37 Ibid., 199. 
38 Ibid., 207. 
39 Ibid., 208. 
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kratische Sittlichkeit gefährden können40, wird schliesslich das Ideal der sozi-
alen Freiheit zum entscheidenden Kriterium der normativen Rekonstrukti-
on. In ihr scheint der Schlüssel zur Lösung aller Konflikte sowohl im Hin-
blick auf Missachtungserfahrungen aus KuA wie von Pathologien der recht-
lichen und moralischen Freiheit in Aussicht gestellt. Zunächst ist soziale 
Freiheit im RdF als institutionelle Erweiterung des Freiheitsbegriffs gedacht. 
Sie bezieht sich auf die institutionellen Formen, die die Ausübung der refle-
xiven Freiheit als Medium oder Vollzugsbedingung ermöglichen:  
Es ist eine solche institutionelle Erweiterung des Freiheitsbegriffs, die dem 
dritten, sozialen Begriff der Freiheit als Richtschnur dient; nach dieser 
Vorstellung lässt sich die Idee der reflexiven Freiheit nicht entfalten, ohne 
dabei die institutionellen Formen einzubeziehen, die ihren Vollzug er-
möglichen.41  
Dem Begriff der sozialen Freiheit liegt die These zugrunde, dass allein das 
intersubjektive Zusammenwirken im Diskurs die Art von rationaler Selbst-
kontrolle ermöglicht wird, die es zum Vollzug der reflexiven Freiheit 
braucht. Im Begriff der sozialen Freiheit kommt die Verbindung von Aner-
kennung und Autonomie auf der grundlegenden Ebene der persönlichen in-
tersubjektiven Beziehungen definitorisch zur Geltung, indem soziale Freiheit 
in der an Hegel angelehnten Formulierung als Erfahrung des „Bei-sich-
selbst-Sein im Anderen“ definiert wird.42 Damit definiert er soziale Freiheit 
im RdF inhaltlich vergleichbar mit Liebe im KuA, die dort als „Sein-selbst-
sein im Fremden“ definiert ist.43 Soziale Freiheit entspricht also nicht nur 
der umfassendsten Freiheitsform im RdF, sondern auch der grundlegends-
ten Anerkennungsform, die es im konstitutiv lesbaren Anerkennungsmodell 
für die Realisierung der rechtlichen Anerkennung und für die authentische 
Praxis sozialer Wertschätzung benötigt. Soziale Freiheit entsteht als Ergeb-
nis einer wechselseitigen Bezogenheit zwischen Subjekten, die sich der ge-
teilten Anteilhabe am und Verantwortung für den gemeinsamen sozialen 
 
40 Ibid., 146–172, 190–218. 
41 Ibid., 80. 
42 Axel Honneth, Das Recht der Freiheit - Grundriss einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit (Suhr, 2011), 
85. 
43 Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung - Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, 154. 
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und politischen Raum bewusst sind und dieser Bewusstheit über ihr Han-
deln und Verhalten in privaten und öffentlichen Raum Rechnung tragen. In 
dieser Einstellung ist dem Einzelnen die Ergänzungsbedürftigkeit seiner Zie-
le durch den Anderen bewusst und er kann „das Gegenüber als Anderen 
seiner Selbst begreifen.“44 Soziale Freiheit, als existentiale Grunderfahrung 
und als Bedürfnis des sich authentisch selbstrealisierenden Subjekts, muss in 
der Sphäre demokratischer Öffentlichkeit notwendig im spezifisch instituti-
onalisierten Kontext der äusseren Welt erfahren werden. 45  Aus diesem 
Grund fungiert die Evaluation, inwiefern eine Institution die Realisierung 
der sozialen Freiheit befördert, als Kriterium der normativen Rekonstrukti-
on. Vor dem Hintergrund einer politischen Gerechtigkeitstheorie im Recht 
der Freiheit, die gemäss Honneth einen Rückbezug auf eine geteilte Konzep-
tion des Guten Lebens (zumindest im Sinne einer geteilten demokratischen 
Öffentlichkeit) beinhalten muss, entspricht dies einer gesellschaftlichen, insti-
tutionellen und politischen Bedingtheit der Realisierung sozialer Freiheit im 
Kollektiv. Die Beurteilung der institutionellen Voraussetzungen setzt jedoch 
bereits ein anerkennungsfähiges und zu einem bestimmten Grad individu-
iertes Subjekt voraus. Als paradigmatische Freiheitsform gelebter demokrati-
scher Sittlichkeit verbindet und prägt soziale Freiheit die Sphären von Staat, 
Wirtschaft und privaten Beziehungsräumen (klassisch: Sphäre der Familie) 
nämlich nur insofern, als sie durch die aktive Tätigkeit der einzelnen Gesell-
schaftsmitglieder intersubjektiv und öffentlich realisiert wird. Anhand der 
normativen Rekonstruktion historischer Realisierungs- und Gefährdungser-
fahrungen der sozialen Freiheit im Durchgang durch die Sphären der 
Freundschaften, Intimbeziehungen, Familie, Markt und Moral, Kon-
sumsphäre und Arbeitsmarkt zeichnet Honneth entsprechend Zusammen-
hänge zwischen der privaten und intersubjektiven Dimension von Freiheit 
und ihren politischen, institutionellen Voraussetzung auf. Die Zusammen-
hänge zwischen den Persönlichkeitsvoraussetzungen der Teilnehmenden 
und der Möglichkeit einer umfassenden Realisierung sozialer Freiheit in der 
demokratischen Öffentlichkeit beleuchtet Honneth aus guten Gründen mit 
 
44 Axel Honneth, Das Recht der Freiheit - Grundriss einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit (Suhr, 2011), 
85. 
45 Ibid. 
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einer gewissen verallgemeinerungsskeptischen Distanz. Die Abhängigkeit 
der Realisierung politischer Gerechtigkeit und sozialer Freiheit im Kollektiv 
von den Fähigkeiten, dem Selbstverständnis und der Selbstrealisierung der 
Einzelnen bleibt jedoch als Grundannahme evident.  
Gemäss der bisherigen Gegenüberstellung der Anerkennungsbegriffe ge-
genüber den Freiheitsbegriffen scheint ein ergänzendes Verhältnis zwischen 
der Anerkennungs- und der Freiheitsbegrifflichkeiten plausibel. Verblüffend 
scheint die Tatsache, dass Honneths Definition der sozialen Freiheit sich mit 
der Definition der Anerkennungsform der Liebe nahezu deckt. In der pri-
märsten Anerkennungsform scheint der Angelpunkt für die Erfahrung sozia-
ler Freiheit zu liegen. Die soziale Freiheit wird als Erfahrung des „Bei-sich-
selbst-Sein im Anderen“ verstanden, Liebe mit „Sein-selbst-sein im Frem-
den“. Gerade diesen Bezug, der es erlauben würde, eine substantielle Brü-
cke zwischen der subjektorientierten Anerkennungstheorie und der Theorie 
demokratischer Sittlichkeit herzustellen, scheint Honneth nicht explizit be-
nennen zu wollen. Im Gegensatz dazu vertritt er die Revision des dreistufige 
Anerkennungsmodells, zugunsten eines neu fünfstufigen Modells.  
 
R E V I S I O N  D E S  A N E R K E N N U N G S M O D E L L S :   
V O N  D R E I  F O R M E N  D E R  A N E R K E N N U N G  I M  K U A   
Z U  F Ü N F  S P H Ä R E N  I N S T I T U T I ON A L I S I E R T E R  
A N E R K E N N U N G  I M  R D F  
Das fünfstufige Anerkennungsmodell beschreibt Honneth in einer Erwide-
rung auf Jules Kédés Frage an einer Konferenz in Frankreich. Die Frage 
lautete, ob die Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit (RdF) aufgrund der stär-
keren Betonung der individuellen Freiheit nicht eine bessere Alternative an-
biete, als der intersubjektivistische Ansatz im KuA. Als Rechfertigung auf 
die von Kédé angefügte Kritik am unklaren Verhältnisses zwischen der An-
erkennungstheorie und der Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit präsentiert 
Honneth in einer knapp zweiseitigen schriftlichen Erwiderung seine eigene 
Einschätzung des Verhältnisses beider Ansätze. Zunächst betont er die enge 
Verbindung zwischen Freiheit und Anerkennung, die sich als Konstante 
durch seine Überlegungen zieht:  
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Tatsächlich bildet für mich die menschliche Freiheit nur den normativen 
Punkt, um den sich alle wechselseitige Anerkennung – gleich welcher so-
zialen Form – letztendlich dreht: Stets wird in und durch die Anerken-
nung der anderen Person ein normativer Status eingeräumt oder zugebil-
ligt, der in nichts anderem als der Berechtigung zu einer bestimmten 
Klasse von Handlungen oder Äusserungen besteht. Insofern ist jede Form 
von Freiheit Produkt einer sozialen Kommunikation, die die besondere 
Gestalt der wechselseitigen Anerkennung besitzt.46  
Es scheint also so, dass insbesondere die positiven Freiheitsräume, welche 
durch wechselseitige Anerkennungsverhältnisse ermöglicht werden, zu einer 
aktiven Befähigung oder Ermächtigung des Subjekts beitragen. Das norma-
tive und im intersubjektiven Raum von den Gesellschaftsmitgliedern wech-
selseitige Zugeständnis des Subjekts, sich durch Handlungen und Stellung-
nahmen selbstbestimmt zu veräussern, wird zur oder berechtigt zur sozialen 
Freiheitserfahrung. Wie Honneth weiter erläutert, setzt seines Erachtens das 
RdF die ursprünglichen Impulse der Anerkennungstheorie mit einer verän-
derten Schwerpunktsetzung nur fort; ausgedrückt werde dies durch den 
Versuch, die Arten von Freiheit anhand der verschiedenen, in modernen 
Gesellschaften etablierten Sphären der Anerkennung zu rekonstruieren. Als 
„grossen Vorteil“ der neuen Studie des RdF hebt er hervor, dass die norma-
tive Rekonstruktion zu einem wesentlich differenzierteren Bild der Gesell-
schaft verhelfe, als die Überlegungen in KuA. Diese These einer differen-
zierteren Gesellschaftsanalyse demonstriert er an der schlussgefolgerten Re-
vision des dreistufigen Anerkennungsmodells, dass nun durch ein fünfdi-
mensionales Modell ersetzt wird:  
Wir haben es in den modernen Gesellschaften anstatt bloss mit drei tat-
sächlich mit fünf Sphären institutionalisierter Anerkennung zu tun, weil 
neben dem ‚Recht’ noch das Kultursystem der ‚Moral’ existiert und sich 
darüber hinaus die Formen der sozialen Wertschätzung in die drei Kom-
plexe der Liebe, des wirtschaftlichen Handelns und der demokratischen 
Öffentlichkeit aufgespalten haben (...). An der Grundeinsicht hat sich in-
sofern also nichts geändert, nur dass ich mittlerweile viel deutlicher sehe, 
inwiefern das juridische ‚Recht’ uns zu einer negativen Freiheit autori-
siert, während die ‚Moral’ eine Form der individuellen Freiheit hervor-
 
46 Honneth, “Réponse (De la reconnaissance à la liberté),” 125–126. 
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bringt, die mir im ‚Kampf um Anerkennung’ gänzlich verschlossen ge-
blieben ist.47 
Während er also tatsächlich den individualistischen Seiten der Freiheit im 
RdF grössere Bedeutung zumesse, geschähe dies nicht aufgrund von neuen 
intersubjektivistischen Einsichten, sondern bloss deswegen, weil ihm das 
neue institutionstheoretische Gerüst zu einer genaueren Differenzierung der 
Anerkennungs- bzw. Freiheitsformen verholfen habe.48 
Als Erklärungen für die Erneuerung des Modells scheint Honneth also 
zwei Gründe anzugeben. Einerseits eine bis anhin vernachlässigte Betrach-
tung der moralischen Sphäre neben der rechtlichen, andererseits einen dif-
ferenzierten Begriff der Sozialen Wertschätzung gemäss den drei Sphären 
von Liebe, wirtschaftlichem Handeln und demokratischer Öffentlichkeit.  
 
Anerkennungsmodell KuA: Anerkennungsmodell RdF: 
3 Formen der intersubjektiven Anerkennung 5 Sphären der institutionalisierten  
Anerkennung 
1) Liebe (Primärbeziehungen, Freund-
schaft); Selbstbeziehung: Selbstvertrauen 
1) Recht (Sphäre der negativen Frei-
heit) 
2) Rechtsverhältnisse (Rechte); Selbstbezie-
hung: Selbstachtung 
2) Moral (Sphäre der individuellen, re-
flexiven Freiheit) 
3) Soziale Wertschätzung (Solidarität, 
Wertgemeinschaft) 
Selbstbeziehung: Selbstschätzung 
3) Soziale Wertschätzung: Liebe (Sphä-
re der sozialen Freiheit) 
 4) Soziale Wertschätzung: wirtschaftli-
ches Handeln (Sphäre der sozialen 
Freiheit) 
 5) Soziale Wertschätzung: demokrati-
sche Öffentlichkeit (Sphäre der sozi-
alen Freiheit) 
 
Während die Einflechtung des Kulturmodells der Moral ins Anerken-
nungsmodell eine wertvolle jedoch keineswegs selbsterklärende Perspekti-
verweiterung darstellt, irritiert die Tatsache, das die dritte Form der Aner-
kennung, die soziale Wertschätzung, aufgrund ihrer Anwendbarkeit in ver-
schiedenen gesellschaftlichen Sphären aufgespalten wird – zumal der nor-
 
47 Ibid., 126. 
48 Ibid., 127. 
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mative Kern der sozialen Wertschätzungspraxis in allen Sphären derselbe 
zu scheinen bleibt. Es lässt sich also die kritische Frage anhängen, weshalb 
die Anwendung der sozialen Wertschätzung zu verschiedenen Anerken-
nungskategorien führt, obwohl die normative Grundidee der Anerkennungs-
form dieselbe bleibt. Es ist unklar nachzuvollziehen, weshalb diese unter-
schiedlichen Anwendungsdimensionen eigentliche Anerkennungskategorien 
einfordern sollen, während beispielsweise hinsichtlich der Anerkennungs-
form der Liebe, welche ebenfalls in verschiedenen Anwendungssphären eine 
Rolle spielt, diese unterschiedlichen Anwendungsgebiete keine zusätzliche 
kategoriale Unterscheidung zur Folge haben. Würde man beispielsweise die 
ursprüngliche Anerkennungsform der Liebe hinsichtlich ihrer Anwendung 
in verschiedenen Sphären aufspalten, könnte zwischen der Privatssphäre 
(über Eltern-, Liebes- und Freundschaftsbeziehungen) und der halb-
öffentlichen Sphäre professioneller Begegnungen (zum Beispiel am Arbeits-
platz, im Schüler-Lehrer-Verhältnis während des Bildungsprozesses oder bei 
der sozialen und politischen Beteiligung im Kollektiv) unterschieden wer-
den. Nur auf der ursprünglich dritten Stufe der Anerkennung scheint jedoch 
das Vorliegen verschiedener Anwendungssphären auch eine kategoriale 
Aufsplittung nach sich zu ziehen. Im Gegenteil dazu wird die Liebe als ei-
genständige Anerkennungsform im neuen Modell aufgelöst und im Verbund 
mit der Sozialen Wertschätzung  als eine von fünf Anerkennungsformen 
aufgeführt.  
Es zeigt sich, dass Honneth beim Versuch, den Kritikern gerecht zu 
werden, die für den Nachvollzug der Argumentation im KuA ebenso wie im 
RdF entscheidende Abgrenzung zwischen der intersubjektiven Individual-
ebene und der kollektiven Ebene durch das neue Modell vernachlässigt. Der 
Perspektivwechsel, der weg von den intersubjektiven, hin zu den institutio-
nellen Zusammenhängen führt, verschleiert auf den ersten Blick mehr, als 
dass er zur Klärung beiträgt. Honneth insistiert, nicht vom intersubjektiven 
Paradigma abgewichen zu sein; dennoch bleiben die intersubjektiven 
Grundlagen, sofern sie unabhängig vom ursprünglichen Anerkennungsmo-
dell, bloss aufgrund des RdF, verstanden werden sollen, für die Leserin 
mehrheitlich im Dunkeln. Ich werde in Frage stellen, dass die Differenzie-
rung von fünf Anerkennungsdimensionen die drei Formen der Anerken-
nung (oder ihre Revision) aus dem KuA ersetzen kann.  
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Aufgrund der Einsicht, dass die Exegesen zu den verschiedenen Formen 
des Freiheitsbegriffs von Honneth zu einem hohen Grad mit einem subjekt-
orientierten Fokus durchgeführt werden, dass also auch der Politischen 
Theorie der Sittlichkeit eine Subjekttheorie immanent bleibt, verfolge ich 
die komplementäre Lesart der Freiheits- und der Anerkennungstheorie als 
subjekttheoretische Grundlage der Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit. Al-
ternativ zu Honneths fünffacher Aufteilung werde ich vorschlagen, das drei-
stufige Anerkennungsmodell beizubehalten und im Verhältnis zum dreifa-
chen Freiheitsbegriff zu diskutieren. Auf dieser Grundlage kann dann die 
Anwendung in den verschiedenen Sphären, der Privatssphäre, der Sphäre 
des wirtschaftlichen Handelns, und der Sphäre der demokratischen Öffent-
lichkeit unternommen werden. Dies erlaubt die sinnvolle Erhaltung der ur-
sprünglichen drei Formen der Anerkennung und ihrer Relevanz für die Re-
alisierung des dreifachen Freiheitsbegriffs auf der Ebene einer subjekttheore-
tischen Gesellschaftsanalyse. Bedingung und Zweck der Realisierung jegli-
cher Anerkennungsbeziehungen ist die Sicherung von Freiheiten innerhalb 
der sozialen und politischen Gemeinschaft. Auf dieser Grundlage wird die 
normative Rekonstruktion zu einem Instrument der Gesellschaftskritik, das 
durch den Blick auf die institutionellen Voraussetzungen in den modernen 
Gesellschaften Missachtungserfahrungen und Pathologien der Freiheit iden-
tifiziert. Politische Forderungen werden auf der Grundlage dieser subjekt-
orientierten normativen Theorie  begründet. 
Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass von Anerkennungsfähigkeit in drei 
Formen auf Subjektebene durchaus weitergesprochen werden kann und 
muss, während die Anerkennungskonzeption im Sinne Honneths auf der 
Ebene der politischen Institutionalisierung komplexer, nämlich gemäss den 
verschiedenen Freiheitsdimensionen und hinsichtlich der Sphären (Lie-
be/Privatbereich, wirtschaftliches Handeln, demokratische Öffentlichkeit) 
ausdifferenziert werden muss. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass das „dif-
ferenziertere Bild der Anerkennung“, das Honneth im RdF für die Gesell-
schaftsanalyse in Anspruch nimmt, nur dann transparent nachvollziehbar 
wird, wenn der Bezug zu den ursprünglichen Formen explizit hergestellt ist. 
Erst vor diesem subjekttheoretischen Hintergrund der intersubjektiven An-
erkennung wird die hohe normative Bedeutung sozialer Freiheit im institu-
tionellen Rahmen ersichtlich.  
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Soziale Wertschätzung als Brücke zwischen  
intersubjektiver Anerkennung und sozialer Freiheit 
Wenn wir uns in Erinnerung rufen, dass Honneth den Kernbegriff des RdF, 
die soziale Freiheit, durch eine verwandte Definition beschreibt, wie die ers-
te Anerkennungsform der Liebe (vgl. S. 14, soziale Freiheit: „Bei-sich-selbst-
Sein im Anderen“; Liebe: „Sein-selbst-sein im Fremden“), scheint zunächst 
einsichtig, dass Honneth das intersubjektive Paradigma des KuA keinesfalls 
hinter sich gelassen, sondern es in die normativen Grundlagen seiner Politi-
schen Theorie eingewoben hat. Zugleich erschweren die Komplexität des 
Begriffs der sozialen Freiheit und seine Adaption auf den sozialpolitischen 
institutionellen Rahmen eine vorschnelle Verallgemeinerung dieses Zu-
sammenhangs. Der normative, subjektbezogene Kern der intersubjektiven 
Anerkennung scheint einerseits in den sozialen Freiheitsbegriff eingeschlos-
sen. Andererseits scheint gerade das neue, fünfstufige Modell der Anerken-
nung den subjektbezogenen normativen Gehalt abzuspalten oder seine Be-
deutung zu minimieren, da Anerkennung (mit Ausnahme von Liebes-, 
Freundes- und Familienbeziehungen) ausschliesslich über die institutionsbe-
zogene Ebene rekonstruiert wird. Während in KuA die Anerkennungsfähig-
keit des Subjekts im Verhältnis zur psychischen und physischen Entwicklung 
bottom up ausgedehnt wird, ausgehend von den Primärbeziehungen, im 
Bezug auf die eigene Mitgliedschaft im sozialen und politischen Kollektiv, 
im Kindergarten, in der Schulklasse, am Arbeitsplatz oder in Vereinen etc., 
wird Anerkennung im RdF in einer umgedrehten Logik als Output des frei-
heitssichernden Rechtssystems, der Moral oder der sozialen Wertschätzung 
in Privat-, Wirtschafts- oder Öffentlichkeitssphäre betrachtet. Eine komple-
mentäre Lesart von KuA und RdF setzt voraus, dass soziale Freiheit einer-
seits im Kern den substantiellen Bezug zur Liebe auf der intersubjektiven 
Ebene aufrecht erhält, andererseits auf der kollektiv geteilten, gesellschaftli-
chen Ebene  adaptiert und erweitert wird. Auf der gesellschaftlichen Ebene 
setzt soziale Freiheit vom Subjekt auch die Anerkennungsfähigkeit des 
Rechtsperson und die Fähigkeit zur Solidarität voraus. Zusätzlich werden 
diese Voraussetzungen durch diejenige einer reflexiven Auseinandersetzung 
mit dem Kultursystem der Moral ergänzt. Ich beschränke mich an dieser 
Stelle auf die Auseinandersetzung mit dem im fünfstufigen Anerkennungs-
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modell aufgewerteten Begriff der sozialen Wertschätzung. Die Zentralität, 
die Honneth dieser Anerkennungsform dadurch zugesteht, dass er sie so-
wohl in der Privatsphäre, wie in den Sphären der Wirtschaft und der demo-
kratischen Öffentlichkeit als Grundvoraussetzung sozialer Freiheit identifi-
ziert, stellt das stärkste Argument für eine konstruktive Verknüpfung der 
Anerkennungstheorie (unter Beibehaltung der bisherigen Anerkennungs-
formen) mit der Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit dar.  
Die soziale Wertschätzung entspricht der gelebten Einstellung, den An-
deren zugleich als anders denkenden, anders handelnden Menschen sowie 
als Mitglied der eigenen Partizipationsgemeinschaft zu achten. Durch das 
wechselseitige Zugeständnis moralischer Zurechnungsfähigkeit, das implizit 
durch die geteilte Praxis an der rechtlich gesicherten und politisch geteilten 
Entscheidungsfindung ausgesprochen wird, das eigentliche Zugeständnis der 
Gleichberechtigung im Meinungs- und Willensbildungsprozess, wird über 
die Praxis sozialer Wertschätzung im intersubjektiven Raum zur Grundlage 
für die Entwicklung von Gefühlen der Solidarität, Loyalität und der Bereit-
schaft, eine Wir-Perspektive einzunehmen, die auch eine konditionale, wert-
gebundene Sorge um das Wohlergehen der Anderen miteinschliesst. Als 
dritte Form entspricht die soziale Wertschätzung der anspruchsvollsten An-
erkennungsfähigkeit, die eine gewisse Persönlichkeitsreife des Subjekts sowie 
die Integration von Erfahrungen mit den beiden anderen Formen der Aner-
kennung voraussetzt. Honneth streicht mit Rekurs auf Michael Sandel und 
Hannah Arendt die sozial wertschätzende, intersubjektive Beratung in der 
politischen Öffentlichkeit als kollektive Form der Selbstverwirklichung als 
Grundlage einer gerechten Gesellschaft hervor:  
Die Füllung dieser abstrakten Idee von Gerechtigkeit hängt dann im wei-
teren davon ab, was im einzelnen für erforderlich betrachtet wird, um die 
soziale Integration der politischen Gemeinschaft zu gewährleisten [...].49  
Die institutionellen Arrangements einer Gesellschaft werden entsprechend 
anhand der Frage, ob sie die erforderliche Solidarität der Bürgerschaft auf-
rechterhalten können, normativ evaluiert.  
 
49 Honneth, Das Recht der Freiheit - Grundriss einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit, 77. 
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Die soziale Wertschätzung spielt im RdF die weitaus dominanteste Rolle 
im Kapitel „Soziale Freiheit“ (III), wenn es um die Ausbuchstabierung des 
„Wir“ persönlicher Beziehungen, des marktwirtschaftlichen Handelns oder 
der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit geht. Im Bereich der persönlichen Bezie-
hungen traut Honneth der modernen Familie zu, als Spielfeld, um „demo-
kratische, kooperative Verkehrsformen sozialisatorisch einzuüben und zu 
praktizieren“50, fungieren kann. Die Entwicklung eines gerechten „Wir des 
marktwirtschaftlichen Handelns“ sieht er als abhängig von einem „voraus-
laufenden Solidaritätsbewusstsein“, das eine Verpflichtung auf faire und ge-
rechte Umgangsweisen beinhaltet. Dieses Solidaritätsbewusstsein verpflich-
tet also zu mehr als nur zur Einhaltung einmal geschlossener Verträge; die 
beteiligten Subjekte müssen sich vorweg nicht nur rechtlich als Vertrags-
partner, sondern auch moralisch oder sittlich als Mitglieder eines kooperie-
renden Gemeinwesens anerkannt haben.51 Dieser starke Rückbezug zum 
einzelnen Subjekt und zu seinen Kompetenzen als Grundelement jeden so-
zialen und politischen Prozesses und als Kriterium zur Evaluation von Insti-
tutionen im RdF erklärt teilweise, weshalb eine klare Unterscheidung von 
individueller und gesellschaftlicher, politischer Argumentationsebene für 
Honneth schwer zu leisten ist. Dennoch scheint gerade eine klare Abgren-
zung der Anerkennungsformen bezüglich des Entwicklungsprozesses des 
Subjekts (Individualebene) gegenüber der institutionell erwartbaren oder be-
reits realisierten Bedingungen von anerkennungsgerechten Verhältnissen im 
Kollektiv entscheidend für das Verstehen von individuellen, sozialen und 
politischen Dynamiken, Ressourcen und Pathologien. Um die Praxis der so-
zialen Wertschätzung als normative Grundlage für die Erfahrung sozialer 
Freiheit  nachvollziehen zu können, ist der Rückbezug auf die intersubjekti-
ven Voraussetzungen und die beiden ergänzenden Anerkennungsfähigkeiten 
der Liebe und der Einhaltung von Rechtsverhältnissen zentral. Zusammen 
mit der reflexiven Fähigkeit zur Selbstbestimmung vor dem Hintergrund des 
geteilten moralischen Kultursystems werden diese grundlegenden Fähigkei-
ten zur internalisierten Grundlage für den demokratischen Willens- und 
Meinungsbildungsprozess und die in der demokratischen Praxis verorteten 
 
50 Ibid., 314. 
51 Ibid., 329, 327–330. 
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Freiheitsrealisierung. – Diese distinkte Analyse der Voraussetzung sozialer 
Wertschätzung, die Honneth durch das neue Modell der institutionalisierten 
Formen von Anerkennung aus dem Blick verliert, kann nur geleistet werden, 
wenn neben den institutionalisierten Formen auch die subjektiven Anerken-
nungsfähigkeiten des Subjekts weiterhin unterscheidbar bleiben. Dass das 
ursprüngliche Modell der Anerkennung einen nach wie vor einen analytisch 
wertvollen und differenzierenden Beitrag zum Verstehen gesellschaftlicher 
Dynamiken und politischer Prozesse leisten kann, soll anhand der folgenden 
Analyse der Problematik der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit gezeigt werden. 
Honneth hebt die Problematik im RdF als gegenwärtige Herausforderung 
des modernen Staates hervor, wird unter einem komplementären Ansatz, 
der die Unterscheidungskategorien der ursprünglichen Anerkennungstheo-
rie aufrecht erhält, aber auch der normativen Rekonstruktion Rechnung 
trägt, untersucht. 
 
A N A L Y S E  D E R  P R O B L E M A T I K  D E M O K R A T I S C H E R  
Ö F F E N T L I C H K E I T  U N T E R  E I N E R  K O M P L E M E N T Ä R E N  
L E S A R T  B E I D E R  A N E R K ENNUNG SMOD E L L E  
Bedingungen demokratischer Öffentlichkeit 
Die Sphäre der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit, deren Funktionieren auf rea-
lisierte Anerkennungsbedingungen in der Sphäre der persönlichen Bezie-
hungen ebenso basiert wie in der Sphäre des Marktes, zeigte sich als attrak-
tiver Ausgangspunkt für eine Studie der Zusammenhänge zwischen in-
tersubjektiven Anerkennungs- und politischen Freiheitsverhältnissen. Denn 
ihre normative Rekonstruktion trägt bei Honneth wesentlich dazu bei, den 
postulierten moralischen Transfer von der in den modernen Gesellschaften 
durch eine Breite von subjektiven Rechten gewährleisteten Anerkennungs-
form der rechtlichen Freiheit auf die Anerkennungsform der sozialen Wert-
schätzung, die idealerweise zu einer solidarischen politischen und sozialen 
Teilnahmepraxis innerhalb der Sphäre der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit 
führen sollte, in Frage zu stellen. Zugleich bietet der Vergleich zwischen 
dem Modell der Anerkennung und den kritischen Gesellschafts- und Struk-
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turanalysen im Recht der Freiheit eine sich ergänzende Grundlage, um die 
Probleme der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit, die als Entpolitisierung, Apa-
thie, Privatisierung oder Desinteresse an der aktiven politischen Partizipati-
on identifiziert wurden, besser zu verstehen.  
Zur historischen Entwicklung der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit gehört 
die Etablierung von kommunikativen Bedingungen, unter denen sich die 
Bürgerinnen und Bürger in freiwilligen Assoziationen diskursiv eine Mei-
nung über praktisch-politische Grundsätze der repräsentativen Körperschaf-
ten und das gesellschaftliche Selbstverständnis bilden.52 Der intersubjektive, 
deliberative Prozess einer Willensbildung in freiwilligen lokalen Interessens-
gemeinschaften (z.B. Parteien oder Vereine) führt im Idealfall zur Internali-
sierung einer Staatsbürgerpersona, zu der die diskursive Rechtfertigung ge-
genüber anderen legitimen Stellungnahmen als Kompetenz dazugehört. Im 
gemeinsamen demokratischen Willensbildungsprozess ergibt sich eine sozia-
le Praxis, in denen der einzelne als Bürger an einem Prinzip der reziproken 
Anerkennung teilhat, bei der das Argument des einen soviel Gewicht hat 
wie das jedes Anderen. 53 Konkret benennt Honneth sechs Bedingungen der 
sozialen Freiheit in der Sphäre der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit. Die bei-
den ersten Bedingungen sozialer Freiheit in der demokratischen Öffentlich-
keit sind die Bedingung von Rechtsgarantien sowie die Bedingung des Vor-
handenseins eines schichtübergreifenden, allgemeinen Kommunikations-
raums, der es den verschiedenen, von den politischen Entscheidungen be-
troffenen Gruppen und Klassen ermöglicht, überhaupt in einen Meinungs-
austausch zu treten.54 Diese beiden ersten Bedingungen verlangen nach ei-
ner gesellschaftlichen Inklusion des Subjekts, die historisch immer wieder 
von neuem geleistet werden muss, um die bestehenden Macht- und Klas-
senverhältnisse innerhalb einer Gesellschaft auf demokratische Weise auszu-
gleichen. Dazu braucht es bei Honneth drittens eine differenzierte Medien-
landschaft, die eine erhellende Aufklärung über die Entstehung, Ursachen 
und das Deutungsspektrum sozialer Probleme ermöglicht, und die zu einem 
 
52 Ibid., 483. 
53 Ibid., 484. 
54 Ibid., 540. 
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informierten Meinungs- und Willensbildungsprozess befähigt. 55  Diese 
Grundvoraussetzung bedeutet für das einzelne Subjekt die Möglichkeit, sich 
deliberativ in einer anerkennungsbedachten Kommunikationsform zu üben, 
bei welcher der Wechsel in der Rolle von Sprecher und Zuhörer die res-
pektvolle Haltung und Begegnungsweise kultiviert, die es für die Aufrecht-
erhaltung eines konstruktiven Austausches auch bei konfligierenden Mei-
nungen benötigt. Als vierte Bedingung ist die Bereitschaft der Staatsbürger 
genannt, sich an der diskursiven Willensbildung aber auch an unvergüteten 
Dienstleistungen bei der Vorbereitung und Abwicklung publikumsbezoge-
ner Veranstaltungen und Meinungspräsentationen zu beteiligen.56 Die Rea-
lisierung dieser vierten Bedingung speist sich substantiell aus der fünften, der 
Bedingung der Existenz einer politischen Kultur und der Bindungskraft ei-
ner staatsbürgerlichen Identität. Solidaritätsgefühle, welche die individuelle 
Bereitschaft befördern, private Ziele zwischenzeitlich hinter die Verfolgung 
des Gemeinwohls zu stellen, sind als Grundvoraussetzung zur Erhaltung so-
zialer Freiheit innerhalb der Sphäre der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit exis-
tenziell. Neben diesen fünf Grundvoraussetzungen ist letztlich auch die Be-
dingung des demokratischen Rechtsstaats als sechste Bedingung einsichtig, 
welche die Effektivität und Durchsetzung des zivil-demokratischen Engage-
ments garantieren. 57 
 
55 Ibid., 541. 
56 Ibid., 543. 
57 Während die Existenz einer demokratischen Sphäre der Willensbildung bis in die Mitte 
des 19. Jahrhunderts an die nationalstaatliche Identität und geteilte Interessen und kulturelle 
Werte als Mitglieder eines Nationalstaats gebunden war, wird diese emotional verankerte 
gemeinschaftliche Identifikation im Laufe der zunehmenden Pluralisierung und der öko-
nomischen Globalisierung heterogenisiert und erschwert. Bereits Dewey identifiziert in der 
Gesellschaft seiner Zeit eine zunehmende Apathie, die phasenweise Verbreitung nationalis-
tischer Stimmungen in Westeuropa und eine besorgniserregende Entwicklung der Medien-
landschaft. Die Kommerzialisierung der Medien mittels einer Dominanz von Werbung und 
Propaganda und einem Nachrichtenframing, das eher der Sensationslust als der sachlichen 
Information als Grundlage für demokratische Meinungsbildung dient, scheint die Kompe-
tenzen demokratischer Kommunikation zu lähmen, und damit auch die Realisierung der 
sozialen Freiheit in der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit. Ibid., 505–509. 505-509. Bereits in 
der Gesellschaftskritik vor dem 2. Weltkrieg ist damit das bis heute gegenwärtige und von 
Honneth problematisierte Desinteresse der aktiven Nutzung an den institutionellen Freihei-
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Versucht man die Bedingungen aufgrund ihrer Abhängigkeit von der 
bürgerschaftlichen Realisierung (Individualebene) oder der gesellschaftli-
chen, staatlichen Institutionalisierung einzuteilen, kommen die erste und die 
sechste Bedingung demokratischer Öffentlichkeit einer Forderung nach 
Rechtsgarantien von seitens des Staates gleich. Die Schaffung eines Kom-
munikationsraums zur Meinungsbildung entspricht bereits einem nicht bloss 
an die institutionelle Autorität, sondern an die politischen Einzelakteure ge-
richteten Appell nach aktiver Partizipation. Wie die dritte Bedingung nach 
einer historisch immer wieder von neuem geleisteten Sensibilisierung des 
Subjekts für Inklusion- und Exklusionsdynamiken innerhalb einer Gesell-
schaft scheint auch die Sensibilisierung für Kommunikations- und Delibera-
tionsprozesse insbesondere einen bildungspolitischen Appell zu beinhalten. 
Die Rolle der Bildungsinstitutionen bei der Förderung von Anerkennungs-
fähigkeit und einem demokratischen, sozialen Freiheitsbewusstsein wird bei 
Honneth erstaunlicherweise nicht diskutiert. Zugleich scheinen die persönli-
chen Voraussetzungen, die ein Bürger oder eine Bürgerin erfüllen muss, um 
sich in der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit zu beweisen und sich für diese zu 
interessieren, unmittelbar mit der Frage der Bildung und Sensibilisierung 
verknüpft zu sein. Um zu einem sozial wertschätzenden Mitglied in der de-
mokratischen Öffentlichkeit zu werden, scheint eine Schulung von intersub-
jektiven Anerkennungsfähigkeiten vorausgesetzt. Die Schulung dieser 
Grundfähigkeiten ist für das Subjekt als Grundlage zur erweiterten sozialen 
Wertschätzung, damit zur Entwicklung von Solidarität, von Bedeutung. Die 
Ausführungen im RdF zeigen, dass die Freiheitsterminologie ohne Anbin-
dung des sozialen Freiheitsbegriffs an die subjekttheoretischen Anerken-
nungsfähigkeiten für eine Erklärung von gesellschaftlichen Problemen wie 
der Entpolitisierung oder der Entwicklung von sozialen Pathologien keine 
ausreichende Erklärungskraft hat. Im Gegensatz dazu erlaubt das ursprüng-
liche Anerkennungsmodell einen differenzierten Bezug zwischen subjektiven 
Voraussetzungen und politischen Dynamiken herzustellen. Dies zeigt sich 
insbesondere bei der Frage nach der Genese der fünften Bedingung demo-
kratischer Öffentlichkeit, die aufgrund ihrer Funktion als geteilte Identifika-
 
ten – im Sinne eines verminderten Identifiziert-Seins mit einer Wir-Perspektive des demos – 
ein Grundproblem der westlich-demokratischen Gesellschaften. 
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tionsgrundlage der einzelnen Bürgerinnen und Bürger als Grundvorausset-
zung der anderen Bedingungen eingestuft werden kann. Die fünfte Bedin-
gung demokratischer Öffentlichkeit, die Existenz einer politischen Kultur 
und die Bindungskraft einer staatsbürgerlichen Identität, stellt einen wesent-
lichen Teil des institutionellen aber auch substantiellen, normativen Materi-
als sozialer Wertschätzung. 
 
Erklärung der Problematik demokratischer Öffentlichkeit  
aus einer kombinierten Lesart von RdF und KuA 
In Anlehnung an Dewey’s Verständnis von Demokratie als „Herrschafts-
form der Reflexion“58 nimmt Honneth die Idee auf, dass das kooperative 
Zusammenwirken in der öffentlichen Willensbildung zunächst und vor al-
lem sowohl als Mittel als auch Zweck der individuellen Selbstverwirklichung 
zu betrachten ist.59 Ein wesentlicher Zweck demokratischer Kooperation ist 
aus subjekttheoretischer Sicht die aktive Selbstrealisierung mittels politischer 
Selbstbestimmung. Die Erfahrung des selbstwirksamen Mitwirkens wird zur 
Grundlage sozialer Wertschätzung und der Entwicklung eines Wir-Gefühls. 
Die kommunikativen Prozesse in der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit, die es 
(z.B. mithilfe der Nachrichtenmedien) erlauben, sich in eine Wir-Perspektive 
zu versetzen (zur Beurteilung von Handlungskonsequenzen) werden in ihrer 
Gesamtheit als „demokratische Öffentlichkeit“ bezeichnet. Es manifestiert 
sich in ihr im Idealfall eine Form sozialer Freiheit, die es dem Einzelnen er-
möglicht, im Austausch mit den anderen Gesellschaftsmitgliedern seine Ab-
sicht einer Verbesserung der eigenen Lebensumstände zu verwirklichen.60 
Eine entscheidende Rolle spielen hierbei die politischen Rechte (allgemeines 
Wahlrecht, Recht auf Versammlung, Recht auf politische Vereinigung61) als 
Befähigungsinstrumente zum diskursiven Austausch und zum Widerstreit 
mit anderen Staatsbürgern. Politische Rechte wie das Wahlrecht sind von 
besonderer Qualität für das Individuum, weil sie es nicht nur als private 
Einzelperson, sondern in der Rolle und Verantwortung als Staatsbürgerin 
 
58 Honneth, Das Recht der Freiheit - Grundriss einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit, 504. 
59 Ibid., 505. 
60 Ibid., 509. 
61 Ibid., 481. 
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oder Staatsbürger, als Mitglied der demokratischen Rechtsgesellschaft, an-
sprechen.62 Im Gegensatz zu den liberalen Rechten, die von den „Rechtfer-
tigungszumutungen“ der politisch-moralischen Umwelt gerade entlasten, 
handelt es sich bei den politischen Rechten um eine Befähigung zur Teil-
nahme an der deliberativen Praxis der demokratischen Gemeinschaft. Um 
zu verstehen, warum die Bedeutung der demokratischen Beteiligung, des 
„eine-Stimme-Habens“ im Kollektiv von subjektiver Bedeutung ist, lohnt 
sich der nochmalige Blick in die Sphäre intersubjektiver Anerkennungslogi-
ken. Das Wissen darum, dass man zur Teilnahme am politischen Meinungs- 
und Willensbildungsprozess berechtigt ist, entspricht einer Bestätigung des 
Selbstverständnisses als moralisch zurechnungsfähige Person: 
Die Erfahrung von den Mitgliedern des Gemeinwesens als Rechtsperson 
anerkannt zu werden, bedeutet für das einzelne Subjekt, sich selber ge-
genüber eine positive Einstellung einnehmen zu können; denn jene billi-
gen ihm dadurch, dass sie sich zur Respektierung seiner Rechte verpflich-
tet wissen, umgekehrt die Eigenschaften eines moralisch zurechnungsfä-
higen Aktors zu.63  
Eine der rechtlichen Anerkennung gemässe Inanspruchnahme rechtlicher 
Freiheit bedeutet entsprechend, dass das Subjekt über ein Bewusstsein des 
Gesamtwillens der Gemeinschaft verfügt, dass es mit den Ansprüchen seiner 
persönlichen Selbstverwirklichung zu vermitteln gelernt hat. 64  Noch ur-
sprünglicher muss das Subjekt in der frühen Entwicklung über die Anerken-
nungserfahrung emotionaler Zuwendung und über den Aufbau von zwi-
schenmenschlicher Bindung eine Form von Selbstvertrauen entwickelt ha-
ben, das zu einem ausreichenden Mass von Selbstbehauptung und Indivi-
duation im Verhältnis zur Verantwortungsübernahme und zur fürsorglichen 
Rücksichtnahme für Andere verhilft. Diese wechselseitige Anerkennungs-
form entspricht derjenigen der Liebe, bei deren Vollzug sich die Subjekte 
„wechselseitig in ihrer konkreten Bedürfnisnatur bestätigen und damit als 
bedürftige Wesen anerkennen: in der reziproken Erfahrung liebevoller Zu-
wendung wissen beide Subjekte sich darin einig, dass sie in ihrer Bedürftig-
 
62 Ibid., 482. 
63 Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung - Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, 129. 
64 Ibid., 132. 
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keit von jeweils anderen abhängig sind.“65 Die Einsicht in die wechselseitige 
Abhängigkeit generalisiert sich im Rechtsverhältnis und wird letztlich zur 
Grundlage für die Entwicklung von sozialer Wertschätzung und solidari-
schen Gefühlen für die erweiterte Gemeinschaft. 
Sofern wir die Problematik der Entpolitisierung, der Apathie, der Priva-
tisierung oder des Desinteresse an der aktiven politischen Partizipation, 
dadurch zu erklären versuchen, dass die Bedingungen demokratischer Öf-
fentlichkeit nicht oder nicht ausreichend erfüllt sind, stellt sich aus anerken-
nungstheoretischer Optik die Frage, ob als Grund für die Privatisierungs- 
und Entpolitisierungstendenzen eine fehlende soziale Wertschätzung der 
Einzelnen oder bestimmter Gruppen im Kollektiv feststellbar ist. Für die 
Entwicklung eines politischen und sozialen Interesses und die Bereitschaft, 
sich zu engagieren ist auf der Ebene des Subjekts vorausgesetzt, dass es sich 
als berechtigtes Mitglied anerkannt weiss und ein Wir-Gefühl gegenüber 
den anderen Mitgliedern entwickelt. Dass und inwiefern diese Solidarität die 
Fähigkeit sozialer Wertschätzung voraussetzt, lässt sich aus der Studie im 
KuA, nicht jedoch transparent aus dem Verwendungszusammenhang sozia-
ler Wertschätzung im RdF nachvollziehen. Bei der sozialen Wertschätzung 
ergibt sich gemäss dem ursprünglichen Anerkennungsmodell zusätzlich zum 
durch das Rechtsverhältnis ermöglichten Selbstrespekt eine Form der 
Selbstachtung aufgrund der sozialen Achtung der besonderen Eigenschaften 
einer Person. Aus denjenigen sozialen Interaktionen, die dem Einzelnen 
Achtung für seine unvergleichliche Person vermitteln, ergibt sich wechselsei-
tige Sittlichkeit.66 Diese Sittlichkeit als wechselseitige Form der Anerkennung 
von persönlichen Unterschieden auf der Basis eines geteilten Rechts- oder 
Werteverständnisses bildet die Identifikationsgrundlage zur Entwicklung von 
gemeinschaftlicher Solidarität. Ihre Ausbildung ist gemäss Honneth abhän-
gig vom Grad der Pluralisierung des sozial definierten Werthorizonts, aber 
auch vom Charakter darin ausgezeichneter Persönlichkeitsideale67 sowie von 
der ungebrochenen Kraft religiöser oder metaphysischer Überlieferungen 
 
65 Ibid., 153. 
66 Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung - Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, 196. 
67 Ibid., 198. 
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und dem kulturellen Selbstverständnis.68 In der pluralistischen Gesellschaft 
sieht Honneth, auch vor dem Hintergrund von Meads Idee der demokrati-
schen Arbeitsteilung, ein Ansatzpunkt zur Solidarität darin, dass die Subjek-
te über individuelle Leistungen entsprechend ihrer je eigenen Selbstverwirk-
lichung zu sozialer Anerkennung gelangen, dass sich also in der pluralisti-
schen Gesellschaft die Wertsetzung durchgesetzt hat, dass jeder einzelne die 
Chance zur Erlangung sozialen Ansehens erhalten muss.69 In der Praxis 
scheint die normative Einsicht, dass jeder Mitmensch die Chance zur Erlan-
gung sozialen Ansehens erhalten muss, allerdings für bestimmte und wech-
selnde Gruppen von Gesellschaftsangehörigen zu jeder Zeit neu erstritten 
werden zu müssen. Wenn einige Minderheiten, wie beispielsweise ein gros-
ser Anteil von Immigrantinnen, die längerfristig einen tieferen Rechtsstatus 
besitzen, keine ausreichende Rechtfertigung oder sozial wertschätzende In-
tegration erfahren, kann dies die Identifikation dieser späteren potentiellen 
Bürger mit der Bevölkerung nachhaltig beeinträchtigen.  
 
S CH LU S S  
Ausgehend vom Vergleich der drei Kernbegriffe der Anerkennungstheorie 
(Liebe, Recht, soziale Wertschätzung) mit den drei Freiheitsbegriffen im 
RdF hat sich gezeigt, dass die subjekttheoretischen Grundlagen beider Wer-
ke eine hohe Vereinbarkeit aufweisen. Trotz des starken institutionellen Fo-
kus im RdF sind die Freiheitsbegriffe (wie die Anerkennungsbegriffe) als 
normative Grundeinheiten der Rekonstruktion hinsichtlich ihrer Bedeutung 
für intersubjektive Beziehungen ausdifferenziert. Das substantielle und auch 
in der Revision des Anerkennungsmodells beibehaltene Ergänzungsverhält-
nis von Anerkennung und Freiheit auf der Subjektebene kann als normative 
Grundlage von Honneths Theorie demokratischer Sittlichkeit betrachtet 
werden. Wie die Ausführungen deutlich gemacht haben, lässt sich der tradi-
tionelle anerkennungstheoretische Zugang zur Erklärung der Problematik 
demokratischer Öffentlichkeit mit Gewinn anwenden. Hingegen wurde 
 
68 Ibid., 201. 
69 Ibid., 207. 
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nicht klar, inwiefern die Revision des Anerkennungsmodells durch seine 
fünfstufige Gliederung eine präzisere Analyse gesellschaftlicher Geschehnis-
se erlauben kann. Während der verstärkte Fokus auf das Kultursystem der 
Moral als Grundbedingung intersubjektiver Verhältnisse durch die Revision 
sinnvoll aufgewertet wird, bleibt der Begriff der sozialen Wertschätzung (so-
fern allein aus dem neuen Modell vermittelt) unterbestimmt. Um die Dy-
namik sozialer Wertschätzung und sozialer Freiheit  auf kollektiver Ebene zu 
analysieren, lohnt sich die Beibehaltung des ursprünglichen anerkennungs-
theoretischen Zugangs zur sozialen Wertschätzung. Diese Voraussetzung 
scheint notwendig, um die charakteristische Stärke von Honneths Politischer 
Theorie, die in ihrer aufrechterhaltenen Anbindung an die Subjekttheorie 
besteht, zu  bewahren. 
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